Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.
1. Leave granted.
The facts of the present case reveal that a person who initiated
the disciplinary proceedings against the appellant for disobeying his
own orders; appointed his subordinate as an inquiry officer; appeared
as a witness in the proceedings to prove the charges of disobedience
of his orders; accepted the enquiry report; and further passed the order
of punishment - i.e. dismissal of the appellant from service. The
question does arise as to whether such a course is permissible in law.
2. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order
dated 12th July, 2007 passed by the High Court of Allahabad
(Lucknow Bench), dismissing the Writ Petition No. 782 of 2007 filed
by the appellant against the judgment and order of the U.P. State
Public Services Tribunal, (hereinafter referred to as the `Tribunal)
Lucknow dated 25th May, 2007, by which the Tribunal dismissed the
Claim Petition No. 837 of 2003 filed by the appellant and upheld the
order of dismissal of the appellant from service by the Statutory
3. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that the
appellant was appointed as a Constable in the Provincial Armed
Constabulary (hereinafter referred to as `PAC) on 10th February, 1969
and promoted to the post of Head Constable vide order dated 5th May,
1983. The appellant was posted with 30th Battalion PAC in G-
Company in the year 2002. On 29th September, 2002, the appellant
was on duty as Guard Commander along with another Head Constable
named Rama Nand. At around 6.20 A.M., the appellant left his post
and came back after 25 minutes after having tea and medicine in the
canteen. His departure from his post was duly recorded in the register
maintained for the purpose by the other guard, Head Constable Rama
Nand. The Dal Nayak endorsed his comments in respect of the
appellants absence for the period of 25 minutes and placed it before
the Commandant on 3rd October, 2002. The Commandant vide order
dated 4th October, 2002 imposed the punishment of 10 days
punishment drill. Upon protest by the appellant, the Commandant
enhanced the punishment to 10 days confinement in a cell. The
appellant refused to serve the punishment being not acceptable to him.
4. Refusal to serve the punishment so imposed by the appellant
was considered to be a serious act of indiscipline and he was placed
under suspension. The appellant was served with a chargesheet dated
2nd December, 2002 indicating that an enquiry was to be held against
him under Rule 14(1) of the Uttar Pradesh Police Officers of the
Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991 (hereinafter
referred to as `the Rules 1991). The appellant submitted his reply to
the said chargesheet on 11th December, 2002. The inquiry officer
concluded the enquiry and submitted the report on 28th March, 2003
with the finding that the appellant was guilty of negligence and
disobedience and recommended his removal from service.
5. The Disciplinary Authority issued a notice dated 31st March,
2003 to the appellant to show cause as to why his services should not
be terminated in view of the enquiry report. The appellant submitted
his reply to the said show cause on 7th April, 2003. After considering
the same, the Commandant passed the order dated 8th April, 2003
imposing the punishment of termination from service.
6. Being aggrieved, the appellant preferred an appeal against the
order of termination. However, the said appeal was dismissed by the
Appellate Authority vide order dated 25th August, 2003. The
appellant challenged the said order of termination before the Tribunal
by filing Claim Petition No. 837 of 2003. The Tribunal dismissed the
said Claim Petition vide judgment and order dated 25th May, 2007
recording the finding that the absence from duty for 25 minutes on
29th September, 2002 was bona fide and permissible under Rule 21 of
the Guard and Escort Rules, however, not obeying the order of
punishment was a case of gross indiscipline and thus, order of
termination of his services was justified.
7. Being aggrieved of the said judgment and order of the Tribunal,
the appellant preferred a Writ Petition before the High Court which
was dismissed vide impugned judgment and order dated 12th July,
2007 in a cursory manner without considering the issues raised by the
appellant, merely on the ground that charge of disobedience of the
orders of the higher authority stood proved and the enquiry had been
conducted in accordance with law. Hence, this appeal.
8. Shri Tripurari Ray, learned counsel appearing for the appellant
has raised large number of submissions, inter-alia, the absence from
duty for a short - specified period, when other guard is present on
duty, is permissible under the Guard and Escort Rules. The appellant
had left his duty for only 25 minutes and it was so recorded in the
register at the spot. If such an absence is permissible in law, imposing
the punishment of 10 days punishment drill was unwarranted. More
so, it had been awarded without giving a proper opportunity of
hearing to the appellant. The appellants protest against such an
arbitrary imposition of punishment could not be the ground for
enhancing the punishment to 10 days confinement in a cell; depriving
him of his personal liberty was totally unwarranted and uncalled for,
particularly, in view of the fact that the imposition of the very first
punishment was in contravention of the statutory rules. The
disciplinary authority did not consider the reply submitted by the
appellant against the show cause notice wherein it had specifically
been submitted that in case the Commandant was of the view that his
orders had been violated, he should have referred the matter to his
superior officer to transfer the disciplinary proceedings to another
coordinate officer and that officer should have conducted the enquiry.
The Disciplinary Authority himself appeared as a witness in the
enquiry. Thus, the enquiry itself stood vitiated. The punishment of
dismissal remained disproportionate to the proved delinquency; the
Appellate Authority considered while passing the order, the past
conduct of the appellant for the purpose of confirming the order of
punishment passed by the Disciplinary Authority. The appellants past
conduct had never been the part of the chargesheet or the show cause
notice; nor had the appellant ever been informed that his past conduct
was likely to be considered at the time of passing the order of
punishment. The High Court failed to consider that, in a case where
there had been a violation of the statutory provisions, or principles of
natural justice, power of judicial review required to be exercised. The
appeal deserves to be allowed.
9. Per contra, Shri Ameet Singh, learned counsel appearing for the
State of U.P., has opposed the appeal contending that the appellant
had been the member of a disciplined force. Indiscipline therein,
amounts to a very serious misconduct. Therefore, it is intolerable.
Once the charge of absence and further charge of disobedience stood
proved, the matter does not deserve to be considered by this Court.
The appeal lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed.
10. We have considered the rival submissions made by learned
counsel for the parties and perused the record.
11. An enquiry was initiated against the appellant by the
Commandant, for disobedience of the order of punishment by the
Commandant himself. The charge-sheet contained two basic charges
which read as under:-
"1. Your duty was as a Guard Commander in the
Vahini Quarter Guard from 22.9.2002 to 29.9.2002. On
29.9.2002 in the morning at 06.30 a.m., inspection of the
Vahini Quarter Guard was made by the Platoon Officer
of "G" Platoon, when you were found absent. With
regard to this absence the Second Guard Commander
H.C.39074 Rama Nand told that you have gone to take
tea and medicine. This was mentioned by the Platoon
Officer "G" Platoon in the Inspection Book. With
regard to this absence your explanation was sought by
the Platoon Officer "G" Platoon, when you did not give
satisfactory explanation and you sought that your
explanation be placed before the Senanayak, in your
explanation you alleged violation of rules and standing
orders by the Platoon Officer "G" Platoon, which was
submitted by the Platoon Officer "G" Platoon on
3.10.2002 with his comments before the Senanayak to
produce you in his chamber.
2. On 4.10.2002 when you appeared before the
Senanayak in the Orderly Chamber, after the hearing 10
days P.D. was awarded to you which you declined. On
this you were punished by the Senanayak for violation of
his order passed in the Orderly Chamber with 10 days
cell punishment, which you the H.C. did not accept and
after saluting the Commandant you voluntarily went out
of the chamber."
12. The inquiry officer conducted the enquiry and on its conclusion
held that the appellant was guilty on both counts. The Disciplinary
Authority accepted the report and held that:
"Mohd. Yunus Khan has been found to be violating
orders and bleak chances of improvement, not fit to be
retained in a disciplined force like PAC as his
continuance in the force will have adverse effect on other
personnel. He is guilty of negligence in duty,
indiscipline and disobedience of orders."
The Commandant awarded the punishment - dismissal from
13. The Appellate Authority, while affirming the said order of
punishment, considered the past conduct of the appellant wherein it
had been mentioned that the appellant had been given 8 petty
punishments; 3 censure entries; and a penalty of reversion for six
months from the post of Head Constable to the post of Constable. He
was also reduced to the lowest pay scale of Rs.975/- for one year after
he had been found guilty in a departmental enquiry.
14. The Tribunal dismissed the Claim Petition filed by the
appellant, however, it recorded the finding that the absence of the
appellant for 25 minutes was bona fide and legally permissible in
view of the provisions of Rule 21 of the Guard and Escort Rules.
However, his subsequent misconduct, i.e., disobedience in carrying
out the punishment was a serious matter. The Tribunal also took note
of the order of the Appellate Authority wherein the past conduct of the
appellant had been taken into consideration. The High Court
dismissed the Writ Petition without realising the gravity of the legal
issues involved in the case.
15. We have to proceed, keeping in mind the trite law that holding
disciplinary proceedings against a government employee and
imposing a punishment on his being found guilty of misconduct under
the statutory rules is in the nature of quasi-judicial proceedings.
Though, the technical rules of procedure contained in the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 and the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872 do not apply in a domestic enquiry, however, the principles of
natural justice require to be observed strictly. Therefore, the enquiry
is to be conducted fairly and reasonably and the enquiry report must
contain reasons for reaching the conclusion that the charge framed
against the delinquent stood proved against him. It cannot be an ipse
dixit of the inquiry officer. Punishment for misconduct can be
imposed in consonance with the statutory rules and principles of
natural justice. (See Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr.,
AIR 1963 SC 395; Union of India v. H.C. Goel, AIR 1964 SC 364;
Anil Kumar v. Presiding Officer & Ors., AIR 1985 SC 1121;
Moni Shankar v. Union of India & Anr. (2008) 3 SCC 484; and
Union of India & Ors. v. Prakash Kumar Tandon, (2009) 2 SCC
16. The Tribunal has categorically held that absence of the
appellant from duty for such a short span of time was permissible in
view of the statutory rules and was bona fide. That finding was not
challenged by the respondents any further and attained finality. This
finding of the Tribunal leads us to the questions that in case the first
punishment of 10 days punishment drill was unwarranted and illegal;
whether any protest against such punishment, authorised the
Commandant to enhance the punishment to 10 days confinement in a
cell; and whether further disobedience thereof, ought to have enabled
the Commandant to initiate the disciplinary proceedings against the
appellant. These questions have to be considered keeping in mind that
the appellant was a member of disciplined force and the Appellate
Authority as well as the Tribunal had very heavily relied on the past
conduct of the appellant for considering the proportionality of the
punishment, though it had not been a part of the charge-sheet nor was
the appellant informed of the same while issuing the second show
cause notice, giving him the opportunity to make his representation
against the enquiry report.
17. In Union of India & Ors. v. L.D. Balam Singh, (2002) 9 SCC
73, this Court observed as under:
"....the extent of restrictions necessary to be imposed on
any of the fundamental rights in their application to the
armed forces and the forces charged with the mainte-
nance of public order for the purpose of ensuring proper
discharge of their duties and maintenance of discipline
among them would necessarily depend upon the prevail-
ing situation at a given point of time and it would be in-
advisable to encase it in a rigid statutory formula. The
Constitution-makers were obviously anxious that no
more restrictions should be placed than are absolutely
necessary for ensuring proper discharge of duties and
the maintenance of discipline amongst the armed force
personnel". (Emphasis added)
18. In Lt. Col. Prithpal Singh Bedi v. Union of India & Ors.,
AIR 1982 SC 1413, this Court observed:
"It is one of the cardinal features of our Constitu-
tion that a person by enlisting in or entering armed
forces does not cease to be a citizen so as to wholly de-
prive him of his rights under the Constitution....
Persons subject to Army Act are citizens of this an-
cient land having a feeling of belonging to the civilised
community governed by the liberty-oriented constitution.
Personal liberty makes for the worth of human being and
is a cherished and prized right. Deprivation thereof must
be preceded by an enquiry ensuring fair, just and rea-
sonable procedure and trial".
19. In R. Viswan & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1983 SC
658, Constitution Bench of this Court observed:
"Morale and discipline are indeed the very soul of an
army and no other consideration, howsoever important,
can outweigh the need to strengthen the morale of the
Armed Forces and to maintain discipline amongst them.
Any relaxation in the matter of morale and discipline
may prove disastrous and ultimately lead to chaos and
ruination affecting the well being and imperilling the hu-
man rights of the entire people of the country".
20. Thus, the requirements of morale, discipline and justice have to
be reconciled. There is no scarcity of examples in history, and we see
it in day-to-day life also, that even in disciplined forces, forced morale
and discipline without assured justice breeds defiance and
belligerency. Our Constitution protects not only the life and liberty
but also the dignity of every person. Life convicts and hardcore
criminals deprived of personal liberty are also not wholly denuded of
their Constitutional rights. Arbitrariness is an anathema to the
principles of reasonableness and fairness enshrined in our
constitutional provisions. The rule of law prohibits the exercise of
power in an arbitrary manner and/or in a manner that travels beyond
the boundaries of reasonableness. Thus, a statutory authority is not
permitted to act whimsically/arbitrarily. Its actions should be guided
by the principles of reasonableness and fairness. The authority cannot
be permitted to abuse the law or to use it unfairly.
21. Rule 13 of the Rules 1991 reads as under:
"Officer not competent to conduct disciplinary
proceedings- A gazetted officer of the Police Force who
is either a prosecution witness in the case or has either
conducted a preliminary enquiry in that case shall not
conduct inquiry in that case under these rules. In case
the said gazetted officer is the Superintendent of Police
himself, the Deputy Inspector-General concerned shall
be moved to transfer the case to some other district or
unit as the case may be." (Emphasis added)
It is evident from the aforesaid rule that a person who is a
witness in a case can neither initiate the disciplinary proceedings nor
pass an order of punishment.
22. A Constitution Bench of this Court in State of U.P. v. Mohd.
Noor, AIR 1958 SC 86, rejected a submission made on behalf of the
State that there was nothing wrong with the Presiding Officer of a
Tribunal appearing as a witness and deciding the same case, observing
"The two roles could not obviously be played by one and
the same person.......the act of Shri B. N. Bhalla in
having his own testimony recorded in the case
indubitably evidences a state of mind which clearly
discloses considerable bias against the respondent. If it
shocks our notions of judicial propriety and fair play, as
indeed it does, it was bound to make a deeper impression
on the mind of the respondent as to the unreality and
futility of the proceedings conducted in this fashion. We
find ourselves in agreement with the High Court that the
rules of natural justice were completely discarded and
all canons of fair play were grievously violated by Shri.
B.N. Bhalla continuing to preside over the trial. Decision
arrived at by such process and order founded on such
decision cannot possibly be regarded as valid or
23. A similar view was taken by this Court in Rattan Lal Sharma
v. Managing Committee, Dr. Hari Ram (Co-education) Higher
Secondary School & Ors., AIR 1993 SC 2155, observing that a
person cannot be a witness in the enquiry as well as the inquiry
24. The legal maxim "nemo debet esse judex in propria causa" (no
man shall be a judge in his own cause) is required to be observed by
all judicial and quasi-judicial authorities as non-observance thereof is
treated as a violation of the principles of natural justice. (Vide
Secretary to Government, Transport Department v. Munuswamy
Mudaliar & Anr., AIR 1988 SC 2232; Meenglas Tea Estate v.
The Workmen, AIR 1963 SC 1719; and Mineral Development Ltd.
v. The State of Bihar & Anr., AIR 1960 SC 468).
25. This Court in A.U. Kureshi v. High Court of Gujarat &
Anr., (2009) 11 SCC 84, placed reliance upon the judgment in Ashok
Kumar Yadav & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., (1985) 4 SCC
417, and held that no person should adjudicate a dispute which he or
she has dealt with in any capacity. The failure to observe this
principle creates an apprehension of bias on the part of the said
person. Therefore, law requires that a person should not decide a case
wherein he is interested. The question is not whether the person is
actually biased but whether the circumstances are such as to create a
reasonable apprehension in the minds of others that there is a
likelihood of bias affecting the decision.
26. The existence of an element of bias renders the entire
disciplinary proceedings void. Such a defect cannot be cured at the
appellate stage even if the fairness of the appellate authority is beyond
dispute. (Vide: S. Parthasarthy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR
1973 SC 2701; and Tilak Chand Magatram Obhan v. Kamla
Prasad Shukla & Ors., 1995 Supp. (1) SCC 21).
27. In Arjun Chaubey v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1984 SC
1356, a Constitution Bench of this Court dealt with an identical case
wherein an employee serving in the Northern Railway had been
dismissed by the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent on a
charge of misconduct which concerned himself, after considering by
himself, the explanation given by the employee against the charge and
after thinking that the employee was not fit to be retained in service.
It was also considered whether in such a case, the court should deny
the relief to the employee, even if the court comes to the conclusion
that order of punishment stood vitiated on the ground that the
employee had been guilty of habitual acts of indiscipline/ misconduct.
This Court held that the order of dismissal passed against the
employee stood vitiated as it was in utter disregard of the principles of
natural justice. The main thrust of the charges against the employee
related to his conduct qua the disciplinary authority itself, therefore, it
was not open to the disciplinary authority to sit in judgment over the
explanation furnished by the employee and decide against the
delinquent. No person could be a judge in his own cause and no
witness could certify that his own testimony was true. Any one who
had a personal stake in an enquiry must have kept himself aloof from
the enquiry. The court further held that in such a case it could not be
considered that the employee did not deserve any relief from the court
since he was habitually guilty of acts subversive of discipline. The
illegality from which the order of dismissal passed by the Authority
concerned suffered was of a character so grave and fundamental that
the alleged habitual misbehaviour of the delinquent employee could
not cure or condone it.
28. Thus, the legal position emerges that if a person appears as a
witness in disciplinary proceedings, he cannot be an inquiry officer
nor can he pass the order of punishment as a disciplinary authority.
This rule has been held to be sacred. An apprehension of bias
operates as a disqualification for a person to act as adjudicator. No
person can be a Judge in his own cause and no witness can certify that
his own testimony is true. Any one who has personal interest in the
disciplinary proceedings must keep himself away from such
proceedings. The violation of the principles of natural justice renders
the order null and void.
29. In the instant case, Shri Arvind Kumar Upadhyaya, IPS,
Commandant, 30th PAC Battalion, Gonda, appeared as a witness and
proved the disobedience of his orders of imposition of punishment,
first as of punishment drill and subsequently of confinement to a cell.
However, after appearing as a witness in the enquiry, he also passed
the order of punishment, i.e., dismissal of the appellant from service
on 8.4.2003. This issue has been agitated by the appellant throughout
but none of the authorities or the courts below had taken it into
consideration. Appellant has made crystal clear pleadings before this
Court also in this regard and the same have not been denied in the
counter affidavit by the respondents, rather a very vague and evasive
reply has been filed stating that the disciplinary proceedings had been
concluded strictly in accordance with law.
30. An order in violation of the principles of natural justice may be
void depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. (Vide Raja
Jagdambika Pratap Narain Singh v. Central Board of Direct
Taxes & Ors., AIR 1975 SC 1816; Smt. Maneka Gandhi v. Union
of India & Anr., AIR 1978 SC 597; Krishan Lal v. State of J & K,
(1994) 4 SCC 422; State Bank of Patiala & Ors. v. S.K. Sharma,
AIR 1996 SC 1669; Union of India & Anr. v. M/s. Mustafa &
Najibai Trading Co. & Ors., AIR 1998 SC 2526; and Vishnu Dutt
& Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., (2005) 13 SCC 592).
31. In case the very first order of imposition of punishment for
remaining absent from duty for 25 minutes was bad in law, the
appellants protest against the said punishment could not be said to be
unjustified. In Nawabkhan v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1974 SC 1471,
this Court dealt with the issue and held as under:
"In the present case, a fundamental right of the
petitioner has been encroached upon by the police
commissioner without due hearing so the Court quashed
it - not killed it then but performed the formal obsequies
of the order which had died at birth. The legal result is
that the accused was never guilty of flouting an order
which never legally existed." (Emphasis added)
32. We are of the considered opinion that the initiation of
disciplinary proceedings against the appellant and the conclusion
thereof by the imposition of the punishment by the Commandant, who
had himself been a witness, was in flagrant violation of the principles
of natural justice and thus, stood vitiated. "Principles of natural
justice are to some minds burdensome but this price-a small price
indeed-has to be paid if we desire a society governed by the rule of
law." All other consequential orders passed in appeal etc. remained
inconsequential. More so, a protest/disobedience against an illegal
order may not be termed as misconduct in every case. In an
appropriate case, it may be termed as revolting to ones sense of
justice. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that
the protest raised by the appellant against the punishment imposed for
his absence could not give rise to a cause of action for initiating the
33. The courts below and the statutory authorities failed to
appreciate that if the disciplinary authority wants to consider the past
conduct of the employee in imposing a punishment, the delinquent is
entitled to notice thereof and generally the charge-sheet should
contain such an article or at least he should be informed of the same at
the stage of the show cause notice, before imposing the punishment.
34. This Court in Union of India & Ors. v. Bishamber Das
Dogra, (2009) 13 SCC 102, considered the earlier judgments of this
Court in State of Assam v. Bimal Kumar Pandit, AIR 1963 SC
1612; India Marine Service (P) Ltd. v. Their Workmen, AIR 1963
SC 528; State of Mysore v. K. Manche Gowda, AIR 1964 SC 506;
Colour-Chem Ltd. v. A.L. Alaspurkar & Ors., AIR 1998 SC 948;
Director General, RPF v. Ch. Sai Babu, (2003) 4 SCC 331, Bharat
Forge Co. Ltd. v. Uttam Manohar Nakate, (2005) 2 SCC 489; and
Govt. of A.P. & Ors. v. Mohd. Taher Ali, (2007) 8 SCC 656 and
came to the conclusion that it is desirable that the delinquent
employee be informed by the disciplinary authority that his past
conduct could be taken into consideration while imposing the
punishment. However, in case of misconduct of a grave nature, even
in the absence of statutory rules, the Authority may take into
consideration the indisputable past conduct/service record of the
delinquent for "adding the weight to the decision of imposing the
punishment if the fact of the case so required."
35. The appellant joined the service on 10.2.1969 and his services
stood terminated vide order dated 8.4.2003. Therefore, the benefit of
service rendered by the appellant for more than 34 years stood
forfeited. At the time of his removal from service, the appellant was
54 years of age. Thus, he had been visited with serious punishment
on the verge of retirement.
36. In view of the above, we reach the following inescapable
I. Absence of appellant from duty as Guard Commander for 25
minutes was bona fide and permissible under the statutory rules.
II. Imposition of punishment of punishment drill for 10 days for
the said absence was unwarranted.
III. Protest by the appellant against the imposition of the said
punishment could not warrant enhancement of punishment of the
appellant for confinement in cell for ten days.
IV. Disobedience of the enhanced punishment could not, in this
case, warrant initiation of disciplinary proceedings by the
Commandant concerned against the appellant.
V. The Commandant could not himself become the Judge of his
VI. The Commandant could not appoint his own subordinate as the
VII. The Commandant could have referred the matter to his superior
officer for appropriate action in terms of Rules 1991.
VIII. Once the Commandant concerned appeared as a witness
himself in the enquiry, he could not pass the order of punishment.
IX. The Authority who initiated the disciplinary proceedings
against the appellant became a witness before the inquiry officer
appointed by him, who is subordinate to him in his office and also
accepted the enquiry report and passed the order of punishment.
Thus, the order of punishment stood vitiated.
X. The Appellate Authority could not consider the past conduct of
the appellant to justify the order of punishment passed by the
disciplinary authority without bringing it to the notice of the appellant.
XI. As the punishment order had been passed in violation of the
statutory rules and the principles of natural justice as well, it is
rendered null and void. Thus, it remained inexecutable.
XII. Past conduct of an employee should not generally be taken into
account to substantiate the quantum of punishment without bringing it
to the notice of the delinquent employee.
XIII. The error of violating the principles of natural justice by the
Disciplinary Authority has been of such a grave nature that under no
circumstance can the past conduct of the appellant, even if not
satisfactory, be taken into consideration.
37. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the
present case is squarely covered by the decision of the Constitution
Bench in Arjun Chaubey (supra). The order of punishment is null
and void and therefore, cannot be given effect to. The appeal deserves
to be allowed. The appellant had already reached the age of
superannuation and no fresh enquiry can be initiated in the matter if
the earlier proceedings are rendered null and void for the violation of
the statutory provisions and principles of natural justice. In the facts
and circumstances of the case and in order to meet the ends of justice,
it is desirable that the appellant be paid 50% of the wages from the
date of removal from service till the date of reaching the age of
superannuation and he be granted retiral benefits in accordance with
law from the date of his retirement.
In view of the above, appeal stands disposed of. No order as to