THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI will hold examination for direct recruitment against 14 vacancies to Delhi Higher Judicial Service on Sunday, the 06th April,2014-Last Date 06.02.2014 13/11/2013: While renewing the term of the appointment of the existing incumbents the State Government is required to consider their past performance and conduct in the light of the recommendations made by the District Judges and the District Magistrates. Therefore, the High Court could not have issued a Mandamus for renewal of the term of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and other similarly situated persons and thereby frustrated the provisions of LR Manual and Section 24 Cr.P.C .- SUPREME COURT. 12 Nov. 2013- Registration of FIR by police in cognizable offence is must and action must be taken against officials for not lodging a case on the complaint filed in such offences.- Supreme Court.(PTI) 09/11/2013: Supreme Court stayed Gauhati High Court order that declared CBI as unconstitutional. 06-11-2013 -"while we decline to hold and declare that the DSPE Act, 1946, is not a valid piece of legislation, we do hold that the CBI is neither an organ nor a part of the DSPE and the CBI cannot be treated as a ‘police force’ constituted under the DSPE Act, 1946"-GUWAHATI HIGH COURT
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA JUDGEMENTS
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Division Bench of Hon`ble CJI (K.G. BALAKRISHNAN), Hon`ble Justice (S.H. KAPADIA), Hon`ble Justice R.V. RAVEENDRAN), Hon`ble Justice (B. SUDERSHAN REDDY), Hon`ble Justice (P. SATHASIVAM)
 
Judgement Dated:5/7/2010 12:00:00 AM
 
Head Note: The reserved category candidates "belonging to OBC, SC/ ST categories" who are selected on merit and placed in the list of General/Unreserved category candidates can choose to migrate to the respective reserved category at the time of allocation of services
 
Judgement:
                   JUDGMENT K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI 1. Leave granted. 2. The constitutional validity of sub-rules (2) to (5) of Rule 16 of the Civil Service Examination Rules (hereinafter `Rules`) relating to civil services examinations held by the Union Public Service Commission in the years 2005 to 2007 is the subject-matter of these appeals by special leave. A three Judge Bench of this Court, by order dated 14.5.2009 has referred these cases to the Constitution Bench as it raises an important legal question as to whether candidates belonging to reserved category, who get recommended against general/unreserved vacancies on account of their merit (without the benefit of any relaxation/concession), can opt for a higher choice of service earmarked for Reserved Category and thereby migrate to reservation category. 3. Selection to three All India Services (Indian Administrative Service, Indian Foreign Service and Indian Police Service) and fifteen Group `A` Services and three Group `B` officers in various Government departments are made by the Union Public Service Commission (hereinafter `UPSC`), by conducting Civil Service Examinations periodically. Civil Service Examinations are held as per the Civil Service Examinations Rules notified in regard to each examination. The Rules for the Civil Service Examination which was to be held in 2005 by the UPSC were published by the Department of Personnel and Training (hereinafter `DOP&T`) vide Notification dated 4.12.2004. 4. To appreciate the issue, it will be necessary to refer to the relevant rules. The Preamble to the Rules enumerates 21 services. Rule 1 provides that the examination will be conducted by the UPSC in the manner prescribed in Appendix-I to the Rules. 4.1) Rule 2 of the Rules relates to preferences and is extracted below: "2. A candidate shall be required to indicate in his/her application form for the Main Examination his/her order of preferences for various services/posts for which he/she would like to be considered for appointment in case he/she is recommended for appointment by Union Public Service Commission. A candidate who wishes to be considered for IAS/IPS shall be required to indicate in his/her application if he/she would like to be considered for allotment to the State to which he/she belongs in case he/she is appointed to the IAS/IPS. Note.--The candidate is advised to be very careful while indicating preferences for various services/posts. In this connection, attention is also invited to rule 19 of the Rules. The candidate is also advised to indicate all the services/posts in the order of preference in his/her application form. In case he/she does not give any preference for any services/posts, it will be assumed that he/she has no specific preference for those services. If he/she is not allotted to any one of the services/posts for which he/she has indicated preference, he/she shall be allotted to any of the remaining services/posts in which there are vacancies after allocation of all the candidates who can be allocated to services/posts in accordance with their preferences." 4.2) Rule 3 relates to number of vacancies and provision for reservation and it reads as follows: "3. The number of vacancies to be filled on the result of the examination will be specified in the Notice issued by the Commission. Reservation will be made for candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Classes and physically disabled categories in respect of vacancies as may be fixed by the Government." 4.3) Rule 15 provides for three examinations namely preliminary examination, main written examination and interview test as follows: "15. Candidates who obtained such minimum qualifying marks in the Preliminary Examination as may be fixed by the Commission at their discretion shall be admitted to the Main Examination; and candidates who obtain such minimum qualifying marks in the Main Examination (written) as may be fixed by the Commission at their discretion shall be summoned by them for an interview for personality test: Provided that candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes or Other Backward Classes may be summoned for an interview for a personality test by the Commission by applying relaxed standards in the Preliminary Examination as well as Main Examination (Written) if the Commission is of the opinion that sufficient number of candidates from these communities are not likely to be summoned for interview for a personality test on the basis of the general standard in order to fill up vacancies reserved for them." 4.4) Rule 16 lays down the manner of selection, preparation of merit list and selection of candidates. The said rule is extracted below: "16.(1) After interview, the candidates will be arranged by the Commission in the order of merit as disclosed by the aggregate marks finally awarded to each candidate in the Main Examination. Thereafter, the Commission shall, for the purpose of recommending candidates against unreserved vacancies, fix a qualifying mark (hereinafter referred to as general qualifying standard) with reference to the number of unreserved vacancies to be filled up on the basis of the Main Examination. For the purpose of recommending Reserved Category candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes against reserved vacancies, the Commission may relax the general qualifying standard with reference to number of reserved vacancies to be filled up in each of these categories on the basis of the Main Examination: Provided that the candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and the Other Backward Classes who have not availed themselves of any of the concessions or relaxations in the eligibility or the selection criteria, at any stage of the examination and who after taking into account the general qualifying standards are found fit for recommendation by the Commission shall not be recommended against the vacancies reserved for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and the Other Backward Classes. (2) While making service allocation, the candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes or Other Backward Classes recommended against unreserved vacancies may be adjusted against reserved vacancies by the Govt. if by this process they get a service of higher choice in the order of their preference. (3) The Commission may further lower the qualifying standards to take care of any shortfall of candidates for appointment against unreserved vacancies and any surplus of candidates against reserved vacancies arising out of the provisions of this rule, the Commission may make the recommendations in the manner prescribed in sub-rules (4) and (5). (4) While recommending the candidates, the Commission shall, in the first instance, take into account the total number of vacancies in all categories. This total number of recommended candidates shall be reduced by the number of candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes who acquire the merit at or above the fixed general qualifying standard without availing themselves of any concession or relaxation in the eligibility or selection criteria in terms of the proviso to sub-rule (1). Along with this list of recommended candidates, the Commission shall also declare a consolidated reserve list of candidates which will include candidates from general and reserved categories ranking in order of merit below the last recommended candidate under each category. The number of candidates in each of these categories will be equal to the number of Reserved Category candidates who were included in the first list without availing of any relaxation or concession in eligibility or selection criteria as per proviso to sub-rule (1). Amongst the reserved categories, the number of candidates from each of the Scheduled Caste, the Scheduled Tribe and Other Backward Class categories in the reserve list will be equal to the respective number of vacancies reduced initially in each category. (5) The candidates recommended in terms of the provisions of sub-rule (4), shall be allocated by the Government to the services and where certain vacancies still remain to be filled up, the Government may forward a requisition to the Commission requiring it to recommend, in order of merit, from the reserve list, the same number of candidates as requisitioned for the purpose of filling up the unfilled vacancies in each category." 4.5) Rule 19 provides that due consideration will be given at the time of making allocation on the results of the examination to the preferences expressed by a candidate for various services at the time of his application and the appointment to various services will also be governed by the Rules/Regulations in force, as applicable to the respective Services at the time of appointment. 5. The total vacancies notified by the participating services for the Civil Service Examination, 2005 were 457 made up of General Category : 242, OBC category : 117, Scheduled Castes : 166 and Scheduled Tribes : 32. As per Rule 16(1) and (4), UPSC recommended 425 candidates in the first phase made up of the following: General -- 210, OBC -- 117 (including 31 merit candidates); Scheduled Castes -- 66 (including 1 merit candidate) and Scheduled Tribes -- 32. A consolidated Reserve list (wait-list) was also prepared consisting of 64 candidates. The DOP&T after allocation of the candidates from the first list, made a requisition for recommendation of candidates through the operation of the reserve list. 26 Meritorious OBC candidates and one Meritorious Scheduled Caste candidate recommended against unreserved vacancies, opted for reserved vacancies as by that process, they got a service of higher choice in the order of preference. If the said 27 meritorious reserved category candidates had been considered only for service allocation against unreserved vacancies in competition with the General Category candidates, they would have got a service of lower choice. Rule 16(2) enabled the meritorious candidate of any of the reservation categories to get a service of higher preference so that he may not be placed at a disadvantaged position vis a vis other candidates of his category.
 
                   6. The DOP&T could therefore adjust only 5 out of the 31 Meritorious Category OBC candidates through their merit-cum-service preference option as General Candidates. As a result, the UPSC recommended under Rule 16(5) of the Rules, 27 General Category candidates and 5 OBC candidates from the consolidated Reserve List. 7. Certain OBC candidates in the Reserve (wait list) filed applications before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Madras Bench, challenging Rule 16(2). It was contended that adjustment of OBC merit candidates against OBC reservation vacancies was illegal. According to them, such candidates should be adjusted against the general (unreserved) vacancies, as that would have allowed more posts for OBC candidates and would have allowed the lower ranked OBC candidates a better choice of service. They contended that more meritorious OBC candidates should be satisfied with lower choice of service as they became general (unreserved) candidates by reason of their better performance. 8. The Tribunal, after interpreting amended Rule 16(2) in the light of the various judgments of this Court, concluded that meritorious OBC candidates who were selected on merit must be adjusted against the `General Category`. However, it ordered that Rule 16(2) may be applied in terms of decision of this Court in Anurag Patel vs. U.P. Public Service Commission & Ors., (2005) 9 SCC 742, to ensure that allocation of service is in accordance with rank-cum-preference with priority given to meritorious candidates for service allocation. 9. The Union of India and other aggrieved candidates preferred Writ Petitions before the Madras High Court challenging the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal. Some other aggrieved candidates got themselves impleaded in the said proceedings. By the impugned order dated 20.3.2008, the High Court held Rule 16(2) as unconstitutional. Consequently, the High Court set aside the select lists and directed the Government of India and UPSC to redo service allocation de hors Rule 16(2). 10. The first batch of civil appeals @ SLP [C] Nos. 13571-13572 of 2008 is filed by the Union of India against the said order dated 20.3.2008 in W.P. [C] Nos.1814 & 1815 of 2008. Other persons aggrieved by the said order have filed the remaining civil appeals. Being aggrieved by the action of the Union Public Service Commission and the Government of India by which candidates in Reserved Category selected in General Category were given choice to opt for service of higher preference in terms of Rule 16(2) of the Rules, some of the reservation category candidates have filed Writ Petition (C) Nos.297, 312, 336 & 416 of 2008 under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India to declare Rule 16(2),(3),(4) and (5) of the Civil Services Examination Rules, 2005 as ultra vires being inconsistent with Rule 16(1) of the said Rules, as violative of Articles 14, 16(4) and 335 of Constitution of India, consequential reliefs. 11. We heard Mr. Gopal Subramanium, Learned Solicitor General of India, on behalf of the Union of India. Ms. Indira Jaisingh, Learned ASG appeared in W.P. (C) No. 297/1008. Mr. P.P. Rao, Sr. Adv., Mr. P.S. Patwalia, Sr. Adv. and Mr. Anirudh Sharma, Adv. represented the appellants in the other appeals. Mr. Raju Ramachandran, Sr. Adv., Mr. Nidheesh Gupta, Sr. Adv., Prof. Ravi Varma Kumar, Sr. Adv., Mr. Santosh Paul, Adv., Mr. S.P. Sinha, Adv., Mr. Praveen Agarwal, Adv., and Mr. Shiv Pujan Singh Adv., appeared on behalf of the writ petitioners and the respondents in the writ appeals. 12. The case of the contesting respondents is that the newly introduced system which is different from the single list system followed earlier (prior to amendment of CSE Rules) will undermine the rights of the Reserved Category candidates to get assigned to services of higher preference (e.g. IAS, IPS or IRS). They also urged that this system will reduce the aggregate number of reserved candidates who will be selected while simultaneously increasing the number of general candidates. It also puts candidates who come through the second list at a disadvantage in terms of seniority and promotions for rest of their career in their respective services. By the impugned order, the High Court had vindicated these grievances, particularly those raised by OBC candidates. 13. In the light of the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for different appellants, the following questions arise for consideration: I. Whether the Reserved Category candidates who were selected on merit (i.e. MRCs) and placed in the list of General Category candidates could be considered as Reserved Category candidates at the time of "service allocation"? II. Whether Rule 16 (2), (3), (4) and (5) of the CSE Rules are inconsistent with Rule 16 (1) and violative of Articles 14, 16 (4) and 335 of the Constitution of India? III. Whether the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal was valid to the extent that it relied on Anurag Patel v. Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission and Others, (2005) 9 SCC 742 (which in turn had referred to the judgment in Ritesh R. Sah v. Dr. Y.L.Yamul and Others, (1996) 3 SCC 253, which dealt with reservations for the purpose of admission to post graduate medical courses); and whether the principles followed for reservations in admissions to educational institutions can be applied to examine the constitutionality of a policy that deals with reservation in civil services. Re: Question I 14. The relevant provision is Rule 16(2) of the Civil Services Examination Rules which was amended by a notification dated 4.12.2004 issued by the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances, and Pensions (DOP&T), New Delhi. The appellants` contention is that the amended Rule 16 (2) intends to rectify an anomaly, as otherwise, the interests of the Meritorious Reserved Category (hereinafter `MRC`) candidates who have toiled hard to qualify as per the general qualifying standard would be jeopardized. Such candidates could find themselves in a position where Reserved Category candidates who are less meritorious than them can possibly secure posts in a service of a higher preference. The Union Government contends that the object of amending Rule 16 (2) is to ensure that such an adverse incongruous position does not arise for more meritorious candidates. 15. Mr. Gopal Subramanium, the Learned Solicitor General of India, has brought forth three implications and repercussions of the amended Rule 16 once it comes into operation: (i) It affords a Meritorious Reserved Candidate the benefit of reservation insofar as Service Allocation is concerned. In other words, if such a Meritorious Reserved Candidate - although entitled to a post in the General list- is able to secure a better (or more preferred) post in the Reserved List, Rule 16 (2) comes to his aid, and he is able to secure the better post. This preserves and protects inter se merit amongst the Reserved Candidates. (ii) When Rule 16 (2) enables a Meritorious Reserved Candidate to secure a post in the Reserved Category, that Candidate is to be treated as a Reserved Candidate (consistent with his Reserved Category status as per the application form). (iii) Once Rule 16 (2) is operated, the General post that would otherwise have been available to the Meritorious Reserved Candidate is now filled up by a (Wait Listed) General Candidate. The Respondents have objected to the effect of Rule 16 (2) in so far as the second and third aspects are concerned. They have no grievance with respect to the first aspect. They contend that when an MRC candidate is entitled to a General Merit slot, chooses to opt for a slot earmarked for a reservation category the result should be a mutual exchange between the meritorious reserved candidate and the reserved candidate. The MRC candidate will carry the tag of a general candidate even when he occupies the reservation post and the occupant of the reservation post will migrate to the general merit slot vacated by the MRC candidate. If the MRC candidate migrating to reservation category slot is counted as a reservation candidate, to that extent there will be a reduction in the posts meant for reservation category candidates. 16. The Civil Services Examination conducted by Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) has three stages: Preliminary Examination, Main Examination, and Interview. The candidates appearing in the Examination have to render information in the application form indicating their status as General, Other Backward Class (OBC), Scheduled Castes (SC) or Scheduled Tribes (ST). Moreover, at a later stage the candidates have to furnish their preferences of services in which they have to indicate their choices in the event of qualification. This has been spelt out in Rule 2 of the CSE Rules. 17. In support of their contentions, the respondents have relied upon the following observations of this Court in Union of India v. Satya Prakash, (2006) 4 SCC 550, (at paras. 18, 19 and 20): "18. By way of illustration, a Reserved Category candidate, recommended by the Commission without resorting to relaxed standard (i.e. on mer- it) did not get his own preference `say IAS` in the merit/open category. For that, he may opt a pref- erence from the Reserved Category. But simply because he opted a preference from the Reserved Category does not exhaust quota of OBC category candidate selected under relaxed standard. Such preference opted by the OBC candidate who has been recommended by the Commission without resorting to the relaxed standard (i.e. on merit) shall not be adjusted against the vacancies re- served for the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other Backward Classes. This is the mandate of proviso to Sub-rule 2 of Rule 16. 19. In other words, while a Reserved Category candidate recommended by the Commission without resorting to the relaxed standard will have the option of preference from the Reserved Category recommended by the Commission by re- sorting to relaxed standard, but while computing the quota/percentage of reservation he/she will be deemed to have been allotted seat as an open category candidate (i.e. on merit) and not as a Re- served Category candidate recommended by the Commission by resorting to relaxed standard. 20. If a candidate of Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and other Backward Class, who has been recommended by the Commission without resorting to the relaxed standard could not get his/her own preference in the merit list, he/she can opt a preference from the Reserved Category and in such process the choice of preference of the Reserved Category recommended by resorting to the relaxed standard will be pushed further down but shall be allotted to any of the remaining services/posts in which there are vacancies after allocation of all the candidates who can be allocated to a service/post in accordance with their preference." 18. The decision in Satya Prakash was rendered prior to the amendment of Rule 16(2) and the learned judge had not contemplated the present version of the rule. Hence, this decision is clearly distinguishable from the present case. Prior to the decision in Satya Prakash`s case (supra.), the practice had been that a single list of successful candidates was released in respect of all the vacancies. At that time, MRC candidates were initially treated as general candidates and had Rule 16(2) not been amended, a single list would have been released for all 457 posts which were vacant in the year under consideration. Accordingly, such a list would have contained 242 General candidates (including 32 MRC candidates). There would have been a separate list for 117 OBCs, 66 SCs and 32 STs (excluding MRC candidates). When the MRC Candidates were shifted from the general list to the reserved list, there was an ouster of the relatively lower ranked Reserved Category candidates who were initially selected as part of the reserved list. For example when 27 MRC candidates (26 belonging to OBC and 1 SC) would have moved from the General List to the Reserved List, 26 OBC and 1 SC candidates who were ranked lower among the 117 OBC and 66 SC candidates initially selected in the Reserved Category, would have been ousted. 19. The unamended as well as amended Rule 16 (2) are as follows:- Rule 16 (2) in the old Civil Rule 16 (2) in the current Service Examination Rules Civil Service Examination Rules (vide notification dated 4.12.2004) The candidates belonging to While making service any of the Scheduled Castes allocation, the candidates or Scheduled Tribes or the belonging to the Scheduled Other Backward Classes Castes, the Scheduled Tribes may, to the extent of the or Other Backward Classes number of vacancies recommended against reserved for the Scheduled unreserved vacancies may be Castes and the Scheduled adjusted against reserved Tribes and the Other vacancies by the Backward Classes be Government, if by this recommended by the process, they get a service of Commission by a relaxed higher choice in the order of standard, subject to the their preference. fitness of these candidates for selection to services. Provided that the candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes and the Other Backward Classes who have been recommended by the Commission without resorting to the relaxed standard referred to in this sub-rule shall not be adjusted against the vacancies reserved for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes and the Other Backward Classes. 20. The UPSC declares results in two stages and the same was done in the year 2006. As per the final result of CSE 2005, out of 457 vacancies, 425 candidates were recommended for appointment which included 210 General, 117 OBC, 66 SC and 32 ST candidates. The UPSC was maintaining a consolidated reserve list, i.e. a Wait List of 64 candidates (consisting of 32 general, 31 OBC and 1 SC candidate) ranking in order of merit below the last recommended candidate under each of these categories as per Rule 16 (4) and (5) of the CSE Rules, 2005. Admittedly, 31 OBC category candidates who had qualified in the General Merit List were not included in the General Category and instead they were part of 117 OBC category candidates selected as part of the Reserved Category. Hence, an equal number of OBC category candidates who were ranked lower in the order of merit as part of the Reserved Category seats were initially ousted. The purpose of including those OBC category candidates who had qualified in the General Category was to give them a higher preferred service from the vacancies under the OBC category. The CSE rules were accordingly amended to allow for such a migration. 21. The Learned Solicitor General has described in detail how along with the list of recommended candidates, the UPSC also prepares a Consolidated Reserve List. This Consolidated Reserve List is a Wait List for filling the remaining 32 vacancies. It contained two parallel sub-lists: Wait List A consisting of 32 General Candidates and Wait List B consisting of 32 Reserved Candidates (31 OBCs and 1 SC) the 1 SC candidate would be positioned in the Wait List at the same position in which the 1 SC candidate was placed amongst the 32 MRC candidates. Two Wait Lists are prepared so that depending on how the 32 MRCs are placed and in whatever contingency - whether they are adjusted against General or Reserved Posts - there will remain a sufficient number of candidates (both general and reserved) to be adjusted against the balance 32 posts in the second stage. 22. When Department of Personnel and Training (DoP&T) received the Lists, the 32 MRC candidates were added to the list of 210 General candidates but at the same time they were positioned in the reserved lists of 117 OBC candidates and 66 SC candidates as well. The UPSC list counts the MRC candidates as part of the Reserved List for the purpose of ascertaining the reservation quota in terms of percentage. The rationale cited for this method is that for the purpose of service allocation, the DOP&T initially counts the MRC candidates in both the General and the Reserved Lists. These candidates are then placed against the better of the two services available to them under either of these categories which is of course based on their order of preference. A Service is allocated by moving downwards in the merit list in a serial manner, with each candidate in the merit list getting the best available option as per his/her preference. 23. The respondents have also placed strong reliance on this Court`s decision in Ritesh R. Sah v. Dr. Y.L.Yamul (1996) 3 SCC 253). The question in that case was whether a Reserved Category candidate who is entitled to be selected for admission in open competition on the basis of his/her own merit should be counted against the quota meant for the Reserved Category or should he be treated as a general candidate. The Court reached the conclusion that when a candidate is admitted to an educational institution on his own merit, then such admission is not to be counted against the quota reserved for Schedule Castes or any other Reserved Category. However, it is pertinent to note that this decision was given in the context of admissions to medical colleges in which G.B. Pattanaik J. (as His Lordship then was) had held: "17. ...In view of the legal position enunciated by this Court in the aforesaid cases the conclusion is irresistible that a student who is entitled to be admitted on the basis of merit though belonging to a Reserved Category cannot be considered to be admitted against seats reserved for Reserved Category. But at the same time the provisions should be so made that it will not work out to the disadvantage of such candidate and he may not be placed at a more disadvantageous position than the other less meritorious Reserved Category candidates. The aforesaid objective can be achieved if after finding out the candidates from amongst the Reserved Category who would otherwise come in the open merit list and then asking their option for admission into the different colleges which have been kept reserved for Reserved Category and thereafter the cases of less meritorious Reserved Category candidates should be considered and they will be allotted seats in whichever colleges the seats should be available. In other words, while a Reserved Category candidate entitled to admission on the basis of his merit will have the option of taking admission to the colleges where a specified number of seats have been kept reserved for Reserved Category but while computing the percentage of reservation he will be deemed to have been admitted as an open category candidate and not as a Reserved Category candidate..." 24. There is an obvious distinction between qualifying through an entrance test for securing admission in a medi- cal college and qualifying in the UPSC examinations since the latter examination is conducted for filling up vacancies in the various civil services. In the former case, all the suc- cessful candidates receive the same benefit of securing ad- mission in an educational institution. However, in the latter case there are variations in the benefits that accrue to suc- cessful candidates because they are also competing amongst themselves to secure the service of their choice. For example, most candidates opt for at least one of the first three services [i.e. Indian Administrative Service (IAS), Indi- an Foreign Service (IFS) and Indian Police Service (IPS)] when they are asked for preferences. A majority of the can- didates prefer IAS as the first option. In this respect, a Re- served Category candidate who has qualified as part of the general list should not be disadvantaged by being assigned to a lower service against the vacancies in the General Cate- gory especially because if he had availed the benefit of his Reserved Category status, he would have got a service of a higher preference. With the obvious intention of preventing such an anomaly, Rule 16 (2) provides that an MRC candi- date is at liberty to choose between the general quota or the respective Reserved Category quota. 25. Some factual examples can clarify the position. In 2005, an MRC (OBC) candidate attained 21st Rank overall. With respect to his position in the General Merit List, there were General Category IAS vacancies available, and he oc- cupied the 17th out of 45 General vacancies in the IAS. Thus, he did not need the assistance of Rule 16(2) to get a post in a more preferred service since he was adjusted against the General List. Accordingly, he opted out of the Reserved Category. This was in line with the proposition that when a candidate is entitled to a certain post on his merit alone, he should not be counted against the reserved quota. In contrast, another candidate who was an MRC (OBC) candidate obtained 64th Rank overall in the CSE 2005. At his position in the General List, he was entitled to a post in the IPS since the General Category IAS vacancies had been exhausted by candidates above him in the General merit list. However, IPS was his second preference while IAS was his first preference. If he were to be considered against the vacancies in the Reserved Category, he would be entitled to a post in the IAS because the 22 OBC IAS vacancies had not been exhausted at that point of time. By the operation of Rule 16 (2), he was able to secure a post in the IAS, while retaining his Reserved Status. Having availed of this benefit, he was adjusted against the Reserved (OBC) category. 26. Learned Counsel for respondent questioned the ratio- nale of declaring the CSE results in two phases in order to support the proposition that even if MRC candidates are giv- en a service of a higher preference, they should not oust lower-ranked Reserved Category candidates. However, Rule 16 (2) should not be interpreted in an isolated manner since it was designed to protect the interests of MRC candidates. MRC candidates having indicated their status as SC/ST/OBC at the time of application, begin their partici- pation in the examination process as Reserved Candidates. Having qualified as per the general qualifying standard, they have the additional option of opting out of the Reserved Cat- egory and occupying a General Post. Where, however, they are able to secure a better post in the Reserved List their placement in the General List should not deprive them of the same. In that respect, the adjustment referred to in Rule 16 (2) does not, in fact, denote any change in the status of the MRC from General to Reserved. To the contrary, it is an affirmation of the Reserved Status of the MRC candidate. Rule 16(2) exists to protect this Reserved Status of the MRC candidates. 27. We must also take note of the fact that when MRC candidates get adjusted against the Reserved Category, the same creates corresponding vacancies in the General Merit List (since MRC candidates are on both lists). These vacan- cies are of course filled up by general candidates. Likewise, when MRC candidates are subsequently adjusted against the General Category [i.e. without availing the benefit of Rule 16 (2)], the same will result in vacancies in the Re- served Category which must in turn be filled up by Wait Listed Reserved Candidates. Moreover, the operation of Rule 16 does not result in the ouster of any of the candidates rec- ommended in the first list. Many of the wait-listed candi- dates are accommodated in the second stage, and the rela- tively lower ranked wait-listed candidates are excluded. It is pertinent to note that these excluded candidates never had any absolute right to recruitment or even any expectation that they would be recruited. Their chances depend on how the MRC candidates are adjusted. 28. In the impugned judgment, the High Court had rea- soned that allocation to a particular post cannot be distin- guished from allocation to a service for the purpose of reser- vation. However, the High Court had not considered the fact that in the CSE examination, the candidates are not com- peting for similar posts in one service but are instead com- peting for posts in different services that correspond to vary- ing preferences. Furthermore, the impugned judgment did not appreciate the possibility that when an SC/ST/OBC candidate qualifies on merit (i.e. without any relaxation/concession) there can be a situation where a low- er ranked OBC candidate gets allotted to a better service in comparison to a higher ranked SC/ST/OBC candidate sim- ply because the higher ranked OBC candidate performed well enough to qualify in the General Category. Such a situ- ation is anomalous. As we have already discussed, the High Court`s reliance on the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Satya Prakash, (supra.), is not tenable since it dealt with the effect of Rule 16 (2) as it existed prior to the amendment notified on 4.12.2004. 29. A significant aspect which needs to be discussed is that the aggregate reservation should not exceed 50% of all the available vacancies, in accordance with the decision of this Court in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, (1992) Supp 3 SCC 217. If the MRC candidates are adjusted against the Reserved Category vacancies with respect to their higher preferences and the seats vacated by them in the General Category are further allotted to other Reserved Category candidates, the aggregate reservation could possi- bly exceed 50 % of all of the available posts. 30. In Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education and Research v. Faculty Association, (1998) 4 SCC 1, G.N. Ray J. had clearly stated that the upper ceiling of 50% reservations should not be breached: "32. Articles 14, 15 and 16 including Articles 16(4), 16(4-A) must be applied in such a manner so that the balance is struck in the matter of appointments by creating reasonable opportuni- ties for the reserved classes and also for the other members of the community who do not belong to reserved classes. Such a view has been indicated in the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Balaji case, Devadasan case and Sabharwal case. Even in Indra Sawhney case the same view has been held by indicating that only a limited reservation not exceeding 50% is permissible. It is to be appreciated that Article 15 (4) is an enabling provision like Article 16 (4) and the reservation under either provision should not exceed legiti- mate limits. In making reservations for the back- ward classes, the State cannot ignore the funda- mental rights of the rest of the citizens. The spe- cial provision under Article 15 (4) [sic 16 (4)] must therefore strike a balance between several rele- vant considerations and proceed objectively. In this connection reference may be made to the de- cisions of this Court in State of A.P. v. U.S.V. Bal- ram and C.A. Rajendran v. Union of India. It has been indicated in Indra Sawhney that clause (4) of Article 16 is not in the nature of an exception to clauses (1) and (2) of Article 16 but an instance of classification permitted by clause (1). It has also been indicated in the said decision that clause (4) of Article 16 does not cover the entire field covered by clauses (1) and (2) of Article 16. In Indra Sawhney case this Court has also indi- cated that in the interests of the backward class- es of citizens, the State cannot reserve all the ap- pointments under the State or even a majority of them. The doctrine of equality of opportunity in clause (1) of Article 16 is to be reconciled in such a manner that the latter while serving the cause of backward classes shall not unreasonably en- croach upon the field of equality." 31. In State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas, (1976) 2 SCC 310, the same proposition was enunciated by A.N. Ray, C.J. who had held: "26. The respondent contended that apart from Article 16 (4) members of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes were not entitled to any favoured treatment in regard to promotion. In T.Devadasan v. Union of India reservation was made for back- ward classes. The number of reserved seats which were not filled up was carried forward to the subsequent year. On the basis of "carry for- ward" it was found that such reserved seats might destroy equality. To illustrate, if 18 seats were reserved and for two successive years the re- served seats were not filled and in the third year there were 100 vacancies the result would be that 54 reserved seats would be occupied out of 100 vacancies. This would destroy equality. On that ground "carry forward" principle was not sus- tained in Devadasan`s case (supra). The same view was taken in the case of M.R.Balaji v. State of Mysore. It was said that not more than 50 per cent should be reserved for backward classes. This ensures equality. Reservation is not a con- stitutional compulsion but is discretionary ac- cording to the ruling of this Court in Rajendran`s case (supra)." 32. Therefore, we are of the firm opinion that MRC candidates who avail the benefit of Rule 16(2) and are eventually adjusted in the Reserved Category should be counted as part of the reserved pool for the purpose of computing the aggregate reservation quotas. The seats vacated by MRC candidates in the general pool will therefore be offered to General Category candidates. This is the only viable solution since allotting these General Category seats (vacated by MRC candidates) to relatively lower ranked Reserved Category candidates would result in aggregate reservations exceeding 50% of the total number of available seats. Hence, we see no hurdle to the migration of MRC candidates to the Reserved Category. Re: Question II 33. We have extracted Rule 16 of the Civil Service Examination Rules, as per notification dated 4.12.2004 issued by the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions (Department of Personnel and Training), New Delhi. A perusal of the rule discloses the following: Rule 16 (1) mandates that after the interview phase, the candidates will be arranged in the order of merit on the basis of aggregate marks obtained in the main examination. Later on, the UPSC shall fix a qualifying mark for recommending the candidates for the unreserved vacancies. Proviso to sub-rule (1) lays down that a candidate who belongs to the SC, ST & OBC categories and who has qualified on his own in the merit list shall not be recommended against the vacancies reserved for such classes if such candidate has not availed of any of the concessions or relaxations in the eligibility or the selection criteria. The other sub-rules provide as to how Meritorious Reserve Category candidates are to be adjusted and once they get services of their preference after availing the benefit of their reserved status (as SC, ST, OBC or any other applicable category), the candidates whose names are in the consolidated reserve lists are to be subsequently adjusted. The consolidated wait list includes the candidates from General Category and Reserved Category. If an MRC candidate who belongs to OBC category has availed the benefit of his status for better service allocation then the seat vacated by him will go to a General Category candidate. If he chooses not to avail the benefits of special status then he would be counted in General Category and the seat vacated by him in the Reserved Category will automatically go to a candidate who belongs to the same Reserved Category. 34. As per the submissions made before this Court, in the year 2005, 27 MRC candidates were adjusted against Reserved Category and 5 MRC candidates were adjusted in General Category. As already explained, the current process entails that a Reserved Candidate, although having done well enough in the examination to have qualified in the open category, does not automatically rescind his/her right to a post in the Reserved Category. Furthermore, Rule 16(2) operates to recognize the inter se merit amongst the Reserved Category Candidates. The two stage process is designed in a manner that no person included in the first recommended list is subsequently eliminated. However, since the wait list contains more candidates than available posts, it is inevitable that some persons in the wait list will necessarily be excluded. Such exclusion is on the basis of merit and the aggrieved parties were never promised a post. 35. The following chart presented by the Learned Solicitor General explains how service allocation has been done for the years 2005, 2006 and 2007: Service Allocation in the Years 2005, 2006, 2007 Vacancy Position Year General OBC SC ST Total Vacancies Vacancies Vacancies Vacancies Vacancies 2005 242 117 66 32 457 2006 273 144 80 36 533 2007 382 190 109 53 734 Candidates Recommended Against vacancies in the first case Year General OBC SC ST Total Candidat Candidate Candidates Candidate Candidate es s s s 2005 210 117 66 32 425 (including (including 31 merit 1 merit candidate Candidate) s) 2006 214 144 80 36 474 (including (including (including 41 merit 15 merit 2 merit candidate candidates) candidate s) s) 2007 286 190 109 53 638 (including (including (including 76 merit 19 merit 1 merit candidate candidates) candidate s) ) However, we have been apprised that on account of the intervening order of the CAT Chennai Bench (dated 17.09.07 in O.A. No. 690 and 775 of 2006), the Department of Personnel & Training (DOP&T) has not been able to proceed with service allocation against the second list. Similarly, for the years 2006 and 2007, the UPSC is maintaining a Consolidated Reserve List of 116 and 192 candidates respectively, but DOP&T has not sent any requisition for the second list as per Rule 16(5). 36. In State of Bihar v. M .Neeti Chandra, (1996) 6 SCC 36, this Court was confronted with broadly analogous issues. In that case, the Controller of Examinations, Health Services, Government of Bihar, Patna had issued the prospectus for a competitive examination for admission to post graduate courses in Patna Medical College (Patna), Darbhanga Medical College (Laheria Sarai), Rajendra Medical College (Ranchi) and Mahatma Gandhi Medical College (Jamshedpur) for the year 1992. The prospectus contained the following provisions with respect to reservations: "The reservation of seats for various categories shall be as per the decision of the government. There will be no economic criteria for the reservation. Scheduled Caste 14% Scheduled Tribe 10% Extremely Backward Class 14% Backward Class 9% Ladies 3% The Government of Bihar acting through the Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms published a resolution dated 7-2-1992, bearing No. 11/K1-1022/91-K 20 [Hereinafter "Resolution No. 20"]. Paragraph 6 of the same is reproduced below: "As there is provision in direct appointment to the effect that the candidates belonging to reserved classes, who are selected on the basis of merit would not be adjusted against reserved seats, similarly maintaining the same arrangement here also the candidates selected on the basis of merit for admission into professional training institutes would not be adjusted against the reserved quota for the candidates of the reserved classes". The High Court of Patna which considered the matter devised a method to remove the anomalies. It initiated a process of allotment of seats by which the reserved seats were offered first (i.e. before the general seats are filled first) to the candidates of the Reserved Category on merit, and after all the reserved seats were so filled up, all other qualifying candidates of the Reserved Category were `adjusted` against open seats in the General Category along with the general merit candidates and offered seats on merit-cum-choice basis. Furthermore, the High Court made arrangement for the Reserved Category of girls who could get seats under the reservation for girls or under those reserved for SCs /STs etc., thereby retaining a choice between one of the two reservations. The girls in excess of the reserved vacancies could seek admission on general
 
                   merit. The High Court held that by this procedure all the anomalies in the procedure for allotment of seats could be removed. In the meantime, another resolution was passed which was supposed to rectify the anomalies arising out of the operation of the previous Resolution. The Resolution dated 22-3-1994 provided that casual vacancies occurring at a later stage in the General Category or Reserved Category would be filled from amongst the candidates of the respective category on merit and in that process no candidate would be allotted a college/course below the choice of the college or course already allotted. The High Court observed that the resolution takes care of the grievances of the candidates who by reason of readjustment at the State for filling up subsequent vacancies often had to lose the college/course of their choice but it did not address the anomaly that arises when preparing the main merit list as per Resolution No. 20. State of Bihar moved this Court in appeal against the judgment of the Patna High Court and the main ground was that if the method suggested by the High Court was followed, all students of Reserved Category who had secured the minimum marks would have to be admitted even though there may not be adequate number of vacancies for them. A.M. Ahmadi, C.J. pronounced this contention to be very genuine and laid down: "10. Let us take a situation in which in a particular Reserved Category there are x number of seats but the candidates qualifying according to criteria fixed for that category are x+5 with the best among them also qualifying on merit as general candidates. According to the arrangement made by Circular No. 20, the first candidate gets a choice along with the General Category candidate but being not high enough in the list, gets a choice lesser than what he could secure in the Reserved Category to which he was entitled. The x number of seats could then be filled up with the four qualifying candidates being denied admission for want of seats. This would have been harsh for the best candidate as well as violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. On the other hand, if the direction of the High Court is followed, the first x number of candidates get seats according to merit against the reserved seats but the remaining will also have to be `adjusted` against the open seats for regular candidates. These will be those who are not qualified according to general merit criteria and so will necessarily displace 5 general candidates who would be entitled to seats on merit. 11. In a particular year, the number of such candidates may be much larger and thus the method evolved by the High Court may create much hardship. The method will also not be in tune with the principles of equality. Hence the method evolved by the High Court will have to be struck down. 12. If however, the word `adjusted `is read to mean considered along with the general merit list candidates, it will lose much of its value. As per the above illustration, the 5 candidates qualifying on Reserved Category criteria having not secured enough marks according to general criteria, cannot, at all be allotted any seat in the General Category. 13. At the same time, as pointed out above, all is not well with the Government Circular No.20 as it operates against the very candidates for whom the protective discrimination is devised. The intention of Circular No. 20 is to give full benefit of reservation to the candidates of the reserved. However, to the extent the meritorious among them are denied the choice of college and subject which they could secure under the rule of reservation, the circular cannot be sustained. The circular, therefore, can be given effect only if the Reserved Category candidate qualifying on merit with general candidates consents to being considered as a general candidate on merit-cum- choice basis for allotment of college/institution and subject." 37. Learned Counsel on behalf of the petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 297 of 2008 has relied upon the following observations of Jeevan Reddy J., in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (supra.) (para 811) : "811. ...it is well to remember that the reservations under Article 16 (4) do not operate like a communal reservation. It may well happen that some members belonging to, say, Scheduled Castes get selected in the open competition field on the basis of their own merit; they will not be counted against the quota reserved for Scheduled Castes; they will be treated as open competition candidates." The said observations are not of any assistance as no MRC candidate occupying a General Category slot is being counted against the quota for the Reserved Category. For example those MRC candidates belonging to the OBC category who cut across the general qualifying standard and are appointed to general posts are not being counted within the 27% quota earmarked for OBCs. However, MRC candidates who retain their reserved status and avail of the benefit of Rule 16 (2) to occupy a reserved post are counted against the reservation quota. When MRC candidates do not choose to accept the General Category slot available to them on account of their merit, but opt to occupy a slot reserved for reservation category candidates, because that post is more attractive, then counting him/ her against reservation quota will not violate the law laid down in Indra Sawhney (supra.). 38. In M. Nagaraj v. Union of India (2006) 8 SCC 212, a Constitution Bench of this Court held: "102. ... Equality has two facets- "formal equality" and "proportional equality". Proportional equality is equality "in fact" whereas "formal equality" is equality "in law". Formal equality exists in the rule of law. In the case of proportional equality the State is expected to take affirmative steps in favour of disadvantaged sections of society within the framework of liberal democracy. Egalitarian equality is proportional equality." 39. Article 16 (4) of the Constitution provides that nothing in Article 16 shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward classes of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State. Article 16(4) empowers the State to initiate measures in order to protect and promote the interests of backward classes (OBC, SC & ST). The impugned measures in no way offend the equality clause since this particular clause was inserted to safeguard the concerns of certain classes and shield their legitimate claims in the domain of public employment. On behalf of the respondents in the appeals, it was submitted Rules 16 (2), (3), (4) & (5) infringes Article 16(4). We do not accept this proposition since Rule 16 (2) and the subsequent sub-rules merely recognize and advance inter se merit among the Reserved Category candidates in the manner that has been demonstrated before us by Learned Solicitor General. 40. Therefore, Rule 16 protects the interests of a Reserved Category candidate selected in the general (unreserved) category by giving him the option either to retain his position in the open merit category or to be considered for a vacancy in the Reserved Category, if it is more advantageous to him/her. The need for incorporating such a provision is to arrest arbitrariness and to protect the interests of the Meritorious Reserved Category candidates. If such rule is declared redundant and unconstitutional vis-`-vis Article 14, 16 and 335 then the whole object of equality clause in the Constitution would be frustrated and the MRC candidates selected as per the general qualifying standard would be disadvantaged since the candidate of his/her category who is below him/her in the merit list, may by availing the benefits of reservation attain a better service when allocation of services is made. Rule 16 in essence and spirit protects the pledge outlined in the Preamble of the Constitution which conceives of equality of status and opportunity. Re: Question III 41. Central Administrative Tribunal, Chennai Bench in O.A. No. 690 of 2006 and 775 of 2006 had given the following directions -: "(i) The impugned Rule 16 (2) is declared as valid so long as it is confined to allocation of services and confirms to the ratio of Paras 4 to 6 of Anurag Patel order of the Hon`ble Apex Court. (ii) The Supplementary List issued by the second respondent to the first respondent dated 3.4.2007 is set aside. This would entail issue of a fresh supplementary result from the reserved list of 64 in such a way that adequate number of OBCs are announced in lieu of the OBCs who have come on merit and brought under General Category. The respondents are directed to rework the result in such a way the select list for all the 457 candidates are announced in one lot providing for 242-general, 117 OBC, 57 SC and 41 ST and also ensure that the candidates in OBC, SC & ST who come on merit and without availing any reservation are treated as general candidates and ensure that on equal number of such reserved candidates who are of merit under General Category, are recruited for OBC, SC & ST respectively and complete the select list for 457. Having done this exercise, the respondents should apply Rule 16 (2) to ensure that allocation of the service is in accordance with rank-cum- preference with priority given to meritorious reserved candidates for service allocation by virtue of Rule 16 (2) which is as per para 5 of Anurag Patel order. The entire exercise, as directed above, should be completed as per the order. (iii) Applying the ratio of Anurag Patel decision of Hon`ble Apex Court (Paras 6 & 7), if there is need for re-allocation of services, the respondents will take appropriate measures to that extent and complete this process also within two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order." The CAT had also issued the following direction as to how the results of the UPSC examinations (2005) should have been announced: "52. If the UPSC had followed the decision of the Hon`ble Apex Court cited supra and released the select list in one go for all the 457 vacancies then it would have ensured that the select list contained not only 117 OBCs but also an additional number of OBC candidates by this number, in additional to 117 under 27% reservation, while simultaneously be number of general candidates recruited will be less to the extent of OBCs recruited on merit and included in the general list in the result of Civil Services Examination, 2005. Once this order is met, the successful candidates list will include 242 candidates in the General Category which is inclusive of all those Reserved Category candidates coming on merit plus 117 OBC, 57 SC and 41 ST exclusively from these respective reserved categories by applying relaxed norms for them.. If such a list is subjected to Rule 16(2) of Civil Services Examination, 2005 in present form for making service allocation only and then services are allotted based on Rule 16(2) in this context, then the announcement of recruitment result and allocation services will be both in accordance with law as per various judgments the Hon`ble Apex Court and in accordance with the extent orders issued by the Respondent No.1 and also in keeping with spirit of Rule 16 (2) so that, the meritorious reserved candidates get higher preference service as compared to their lower ranked counter parts in OBC, ST,SC. In doing so, the respondents also would notice that the steps taken by them in accordance with the Rules 16 (3)(-)(5) are redundant once they issue the result of recruitment in one phase, instead of two as they have become primary cause for the litigation and avoidable confusion in the minds of the candidates seeking recruitment." 42. We may refer to the brief facts in Anurag Patel v. Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission, (supra.), referred to by the Tribunal. In the year 1990, the Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission [hereinafter `UPPSC`) conducted a combined State Services/Upper Subordinate Services examination for selection to various posts such as Deputy Collectors in U.P. Civil (Executive) Services, Deputy Superintendent of Police in U.P. Police Services, Treasury Officers/Account Officers in U.P. Finance and Accounts Services, Sales Tax Officers, Assistant Regional Transport Officers, District Supply Officers and various other posts. Pursuant to the notification issued by the UPPSC, a large number of candidates appeared for selection. The UPPSC published the list of selected candidates in August, 1992. Altogether 358 posts in various categories were filled up. The candidates belonging to the Backward Classes were entitled to get reservation in selection in respect of 57 posts in various categories, out of a total number of 358 posts. The posts in each category of service were filled up by choice of the candidate and the person who secured higher position in the merit list opted for U.P. Civil (Executive) Service and those who could not get the higher and important category of service had to be satisfied with posts in services of lesser importance. In each category of service, posts were reserved for SCs/STs, Backward Classes and handicapped persons etc. The UPPSC treated the candidates belonging to SC/ST and Backward Classes who got selection to the seats (posts) earmarked for general candidates as candidates in the General Category and allotted them to various services depending upon the rank secured by them in the select list. SC/ST and BC Candidates, who got lower rank in merit lists of general category candidates got posting in lesser important services. However, the SC/ST and BC Candidates who got selected to posts reserved in each category even though they secured lesser rank in the whole list got appointed to reserved posts in each category. This mode of appointments caused serious injustice to candidates who initially applied in the Reserved Category, yet they got selected to the general seats (posts) as they were meritorious and were entitled to get selected along with the general candidates. However, their merit and ability did not pay any dividends as they got appointment only to lesser important posts. This Court held: "4. ... The authorities should have compared the candidates who are to be appointed on general merit as also candidates who are to be appointed as against the reserved vacancies and while making appointments the inter se merit of the reserved candidates should have been considered and they must have been given the option treating each service separately. As this exercise was not followed, less meritorious candidates got appointment to higher posts whereas more meritorious candidates had to be satisfied with posts of lower category. 5. ...in the instant case, as noticed earlier, out of 8 petitioners in Writ Petition No. 22753 of 1993, two of them who had secured Ranks 13 and 14 in the merit list, were appointed as Sales Tax Officer II, whereas the persons who secured Ranks 38, 72 and 97, ranks lower to them, got appointment as Deputy Collectors and the Division bench of the High Court held that it is a clear injustice to the persons who are more meritorious and directed that a list of all selected Backward Class candidates shall be prepared separately including those candidates selected in the General Category and their appointments to the posts shall be made strictly in accordance with merit as per the select list and preference of a person higher in the select list will be seen first and the appointment given accordingly, while preference of a person lower in the list will be seen only later. We do not think any error or illegality in the direction issued by the Division Bench of the High Court. 6. If these candidates who got selection in the General Category are allowed to exercise preference and then are appointed accordingly the candidates who were appointed in the reserved categories would be pushed down in their posts and the vacancies thus left by the General Category candidates belonging to Backward Classes. There will not be any change in the total number of posts filled up either by the General Category candidates or by the Reserved Category candidates." 43. The decision in Anurag Patel (supra.) rectified the anomaly which had occurred since the U.P.P.S.C. had allotted services of lower preference to the candidates of backward classes who were meritorious enough to qualify as per the criteria laid down for General Category candidates. Such meritorious candidates were disadvantaged on account of qualifying on merit which was patently offensive to the principles outlined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. This Court had reached such conclusion to ensure that allocation of service is in accordance with the rank-cum- preference basis with priority given to meritorious candidates for service allocation. 44. The decision in Anurag Patel (supra.) in turn referred to the earlier decision in Ritesh R. Sah v. Dr. Y.L.Yamul and Others (supra.). However, we have already distinguished the judgment in Ritesh R. Sah. That decision was given in relation to reservation for admission to post-graduate medical courses and the same cannot be readily applied in the present circumstances where we are dealing with the examinations conducted by the UPSC. The ultimate aim of Civil Services aspirants is to qualify for the most coveted services and each of the services have quotas for reserved classes, the benefits of which are availed by MRC candidates for preferred service. As highlighted earlier, the benefit accrued by different candidates who secure admission in a particular educational institution is of a homogeneous nature. However, the benefits accruing from successfully qualifying in the UPSC examination are of a varying nature since some services are coveted more than others. 45. The order of the CAT is valid to the extent that it relied on the ratio propounded by this Court in Anurag Patel v. Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission (supra.). Even though that decision had in turn relied on the verdict of this Court in Ritesh R. Sah v. Dr. Y.L.Yamul and Others, (supra.), the latter case is distinguishable from the present case with respect to the facts in issue. However, we cannot approve of the conclusions arrived at in the Central Administrative Tribunal order as it failed to take note of the unique characteristics of the UPSC examinations. 46. Reference was also made to R.K. Sabharwal v. State of Punjab, (1995) 2 SCC 745, this Court had declared that the State shall not count a Reserved Category candidate selected in the open category against the vacancies in the Reserved Category. However, by this it could not be inferred that if the candidate himself wishes to avail a vacancy in the Reserved Category, he shall be prohibited from doing so. After considering the counsels` submissions and deliberations among ourselves, we are of the view that the ratio in that case is not applicable for the purpose of the present case. That case was primarily concerned with the Punjab Service of Engineers in the Irrigation Department of State of Punjab. The decision was rendered in the context of the posts earmarked for the Scheduled Castes/ Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes on the roster. It was noted that once such posts are filled the reservation is complete. Roster cannot operate any further and it should be stopped. Any post falling vacant in a cadre thereafter, is to be filled from the category - reserved or general - due to retirement or removal of a person belonging to the respective category. Unlike the examinations conducted by UPSC which includes 21 different services this case pertains to a single service and therefore the same cannot be compared with the examination conducted by UPSC. The examination conducted by UPSC is very prestigious and the top-most services of this nation are included in this examination. In this respect, it is obvious that there is fierce competition amongst the successful candidates as well to secure appointments in the most preferred services. This judgment is strictly confined to the enabling provision of Article 16 (4) of the Constitution under which the State Government has the sole power to decide whether there is a requirement for reservations in favour of the backward class in the services under the State Government. However, the present case deals with positions in the various civil services under the Union Government that are filled through the examination process conducted by the UPSC. Therefore, the fact-situation in R.K. Sabharwal`s case is clearly distinguishable. 47. The proviso to Rule 16 (1) and Rule 16 (2) operate in different dimensions and it is untenable to argue that these provisions are contradictory or inconsistent with each other. As mentioned earlier, in the examination for the year 2005, 32 reserved candidates (31 OBC candidates and 1 SC candi- date) qualified as per the general qualifying standard [Rule 16 (1)]. These MRC candidates did not avail of any of the concessions and relaxations in the eligibility criteria at any stage of the examination, and further they secured enough marks to place them above the general qualifying standard. MRC candidates are entitled to one of the two posts - one depending on their performance in the General list and oth- er depending on their position in the Reserved List. When MRC candidates are put in the General list on their own merit they do not automatically relinquish their reserved status. By the operation of Rule 16 (2), the reserved status of an MRC candidate is protected so that his/ her better performance does not deny such candidate the chance to be allotted to a more preferred service. Where, however, an MRC is able to obtain his preferred post by virtue of his /her ranking in the General List, he/ she is not counted as a Reserved Candidate and is certainly not counted amongst the respective reservation quota. 48. We must also remember that affirmative action mea- sures should be scrutinized as per the standard of propor- tionality. This means that the criteria for any form of differ- ential treatment should bear a rational correlation with a le- gitimate governmental objective. In this case a distinction has been made between Meritorious Reserved Category can- didates and relatively lower ranked Reserved Category can- didates. The amended Rule 16(2) only seeks to recognize the inter-se merit between these two classes of candidates for the purpose of allocation to the various civil services with due regard for the preferences indicated by the candidates. 49. With regard to the specific characteristics of the UPSC examinations we hold that Reserved Category candidates (belonging to OBC, SC or ST categories among others) who are selected on merit and placed in the list of general/unre- served Category candidates can choose to migrate to the re- spective reserved categories at the time of allocation of ser- vices. Such migration is enabled by Rule 16 (2) of the Civil Services Examination Rules, which is not inconsistent with Rule 16 (1) of the same or even the content of Articles 14, 16 (4) and 335 of the Constitution of India. 50. We sum up our answers-: i) MRC candidates who avail the benefit of Rule 16 (2) and adjusted in the reserved category should be counted as part of the reserved pool for the purpose of computing the aggre- gate reservation quotas. The seats vacated by MRC candi- dates in the General Pool will be offered to General category candidates. ii) By operation of Rule 16 (2), the reserved status of an MRC candidate is protected so that his/ her better perfor- mance does not deny him of the chance to be allotted to a more preferred service. iii) The amended Rule 16 (2) only seeks to recognize the inter se merit between two classes of candidates i.e. a) meri- torious reserved category candidates b) relatively lower ranked reserved category candidates, for the purpose of al- location to the various Civil Services with due regard for the preferences indicated by them. iv) The reserved category candidates "belonging to OBC, SC/ ST categories" who are selected on merit and placed in the list of General/Unreserved category candidates can choose to migrate to the respective reserved category at the time of allocation of services. Such migration as envisaged by Rule 16 (2) is not inconsistent with Rule 16 (1) or Articles 14, 16 (4) and 335 of the Constitution. 51. In view of the above, the civil appeals are allowed and the judgment of the Madras High Court is set aside. The writ petitions challenging the validity of Rule 16(2) are dis- missed. The validity of Rule 16 of Civil Service Examination Rules 2005 (vide notification dated 4.12.2004) is upheld. There will be no order as to costs. ....................................... CJI (K.G. BALAKRISHNAN) ........................................... J. (S.H. KAPADIA) ..........................................J. (R.V. RAVEENDRAN) .........................................J. (B. SUDERSHAN REDDY) ..........................................J. (P. SATHASIVAM) NEW DELHI MAY 07, 2010
 
 
 
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    Death Penalty commuted to Life by Supreme Court- 21/1/2014.         
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    6/12/2013:"The analysis of the materials placed before us clearly brings the case within the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights (supra). We hereby direct the respondents to hand over all the documents to the CBI within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order."-Supreme Court.         
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    21/11/2013: "Magistrate has to exercise judicial discretion and apply his mind to the contents of the petition. The refer report as well as the statement of the complainant would indicate that no offence has been made out so far as the second accused is concerned since, admittedly, no money was entrusted to her and that second accused is the divorced wife of the first accused"- Supreme Court         
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    20/11/2013: Held,"...not a fit case requiring interference in the excercise if inherent jurisdiction under section 482 cr.p.c."- Supreme Court.         
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    "While renewing the term of the appointment of the existing incumbents the State Government is required to consider their past performance and conduct in the light of the recommendations made by the District Judges and the District Magistrates...."- Supreme Court - 13/11/2013.         
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    Conclusion/Directions: 111) In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold: i) Registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of the Code, if the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation.         
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    11/11/2013-" What is a little disturbing about this case is that it is illustrative of the slow movement of the wheels of criminal justice delivery. The dowry death took place on 6th September, 1989. The Trial..."-Supreme Court.         
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    18/10/2013: OverAct- Aplication of 149 IPC defined- Converted to 324 from 302 IPC-" -Supreme Court.         
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    "The medical evidence to the large extent confirmed that deceased was prior to the suicide committed by her.Appeal dissmissed"-Supreme Court. Dated 24.7.2013         
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    'Special knowledge of accused- not explained- Effect"-Supreme Court. Dated 23.7.2013         
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    23 July 2013-"Once the possession of contraband material is established, the accused has to explain...."-Supreme Court.         
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    10 may 2013-New Plea when may be raised for the first time before the Apex Court-Supreme Court.         
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    "Life Imprisionment"-Meaning of- Discussed. "Para 66. Off and on, the issue has been the interpretation of “life sentence” – does it mean imprisonment for only 14 years or 20 years or does it mean for the life of the convict. This doubt has been laid to rest in several cases, more recently in Sangeet where it has been unequivocally laid down that a sentence of imprisonment for life means imprisonment for the rest of the normal life of the convict. The convict is not entitled to any remission in a case of sentence of life imprisonment, as is commonly believed. However, if the convict is sought to be released before the expiry of his life, it can only be by following the procedure laid down in Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or by the Governor exercising power under Article 161 of the Constitution or by the President exercising power under Article 72 of the Constitution. There is no other method or procedure. Whether the statutory procedure under Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be stultified for a period of 20 years or 30 years needs further discussion as observed in Sangeet..."- Supreme Court - Dated 25.4.2013         
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    Meaning of Life Imprisionment - Supreme Court: Yakub Abdul Razak Memon vs. The State of Maharashtra, through CBI , Bombay - See Para524 – "As rightly observed by this Court in Sangeet and Anr. vs. State of Haryana, 2012 (11) Scale 140, there is misconception that a prisoner serving life sentence has an indefeasible right to release on completion of either 14 years or 20 years imprisonment. A convict undergoing life imprisonment is expected to remain in custody till the end of his life, subject to any remission granted by the appropriate Government under Section 432 of the Code, which in turn is subject to the procedural checks mentioned in the said provision and to further substantive check in Section 433-A of the Code" - Supreme Court of India, Dated 21st. March 2013.         
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    UTTAR PRADESH L.R.MANUAL: ""....The order dated 3rd April, 2008, which we have reproduced above, clearly shows non-application of mind and non-recording of reasons, which leads only to one conclusion, that the said order was an arbitrary exercise of power by the State. We cannot find any fault with the reasoning of the High Court in that behalf. But we do find some merit in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant State that the High Court should not have directed appointments while regulating the age, as has been done by the High Court in operative part of its judgment. There is right of consideration, but none can claim right to appointment. Para 7.06 states that renewal beyond 60 years shall depend upon continuous good work, sound integrity and physical fitness of the counsel. These are the considerations which have been weighed by the competent authority in the State Government to examine whether renewal/extension beyond 60 years should be granted or not. That does not ipso facto means that there is a right to appointment upto the age of 60 years irrespective of work, conduct and integrity of the counsel. The rule provides due safeguards as it calls for the report of the District Judge and the District Officer granting renewal""- DISMISSED- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- DATED-13-12-2012         
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    HELD--The mere undertaking of a further investigation either by the Investigating Officer on his own or upon the directions of the superior police officer or pursuant to a direction by the concerned Magistrate to whom the report is forwarded does not mean that the report submitted under Section 173(2) is abandoned or rejected. It is only that either the Investigating Agency or the concerned Court is not completely satisfied with the material collected by the investigating agency and is of the opinion that possibly some more material is required to be collected in order to sustain the allegations of the commission of the offence indicated in the report.--SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- DATED:6-11-2012         
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    Issue-Whether the said offence is suicide or murder-Medical Evidence-However, what is clinching in the present case is the medicalevidence which clearly indicates that Remani was forcibly administeredFuradan; she had resisted this forcible administration; as a result of herresistance, she received several minor injuries on her body. Eventually,with a view to overcome her resistance, she was smothered and ultimatelyshe died as a result of the forcible administration of Furadan and smothering. No person other than her husband could have possibly causedRemani’s death, especially considering the motive or grudge that heharboured against her.-Held guilty of murder-SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- DATED: 30.10.2012         
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    It is the duty of an Appellate Court to look into the evidence adduced in the case arrive at an independent conclusion as to whether the said evidence can be relied upon or not and even it can be relied upon then whether the prosecution can be said to have proved beyond reasonable doubt on the said evidence. The credibility of a witness has to be adjudged by Appellate Court in drawing inference from proved and admitted facts-SUPREME COURT OF INDIA-DATED: 1ST OCT 2012         
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    It is the bounden duty of the Division Bench to carry out such exercise in the manner set out above and we feel it appropriate, therefore, to set aside the judgment impugned in this appeal for that reason and remit the matter back to the High Court for deciding the Reference under Section 366 Cr.P.C. in the manner it ought to have been decided. Inasmuch as the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant was by the judgment dated 09.03.2007 of the trial Court and the offence alleged was dated 16.01.2006, while remitting the matter back to the High Court, we direct the High Court to dispose of the Reference along with the Appeals expeditiously and in any case within three months from the date of receipt of the records sent back to the High Court. The appeal stands disposed of with the above directions to the High Court         
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    CBI is not justified in proceeding with the FIR No. R.C. 0062003A0019 dated 05.10.2003. In view of the above discussion, we are satisfied that the CBI exceeded its jurisdiction in lodging FIR No. R.C. 0062003A0019 dated 05.10.2003 in the absence of any direction from this Court in the order dated 18.09.2003 or in any subsequent orders - Supreme Court - Dated 6.7.2012         
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    "As has been held by this Court in Randhir Singh Rana v. State (Delhi Administration) [(1997) 1 SCC 361], once a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence under Section 190 Cr.P.C., he cannot order of his own further investigation in the case under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. but if subsequently the Sessions Court passes an order discharging the accused persons, further investigation by the police on its own would be permissible, which may also result in submission of fresh charge-sheet." - Supreme Court - Dated 7/6/2012.         
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    Supreme Court of India- Classification of Aggrevating and Mitigating Offences- Sec 302 IPC- Death Panelty converted into Life Imprisonment (21 Years).         
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    Sentences- Power of remmission under 432(1) Cr.P.C.- Scope and principles considered.- Supreme Court- Dated 20.11.2012.         
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    Quashing of FIR - Law discussed - Supreme Court         
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    Civil Laws-Section 64A(1)(a)-Goods Act, 1930-Receipt given to the petitioner for payment of the amount in the proforma invoice, it had been indicated that the prices prevailing on the date of billing would apply. --The billing was done on 5th of April, 1989. In the absence of any evidence of any deliberate intention on the part of the respondents to delay delivery of the vehicle, we are unable to agree with the petitioner that the increase in price has to be borne by the respondents -- It is the liability of the petitioner to pay the extra price when the excise duty had been enhanced prior to the delivery of the vehicle— -The Special Leave Petition fails and is dismissed-Supreme Court of India :Order Dated Feb 10, 2011         
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    Confession a very weak type of evidence-Confession in TADA Case-The alleged confession was subsequently retracted by the appellant. The alleged confession was not corroborated by any other material. We have held in Arup Bhuyan”“s case (supra) that confession is a very weak type of evidence, particularly when alleged to have been made to the police, and it is not safe to convict on its basis unless there is adequate corroborative material. In the present case there is no corroborative material:SUPREME COURT OF INDIA-10-02-2011.         
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    Civil Laws-Rule 4-Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board (Sale of Immovable Property) Rules 1997-It is clear that the allottees cannot postpone the payment of instalments merely on the ground that some of the amenities were not ready. If they were not entitled for postponement of the instalments, it follows that they will be liable to pay the normal interest on the delayed instalments up to date of payment. However, having regard to the fact that the Rules did not contemplate compound interest and penal interest and the Market Committee was yet to complete certain infrastructural work like water, sewerage disposal, as held in Shantikunj (supra), the Market Committee will not be entitled to claim any compound interest or penal interest.-Supreme Court of India -Order Dated: FEBRUARY 10, 2011         
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    One Bar One Vote:Supreme Court Dated 26/09/2011         
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    Under Constitution administrative powers vests in Chief Justice and not in Judges - "As pointed out above, under the constitutional scheme, Chief Justice is the supreme authority and the other Judges, so far as officers and servants of the High Court are concerned, have no role to play on the administrative side. Some Judges, undoubtedly, will become Chief Justices in their own turn one day, but it is imperative under the constitutional discipline that they work in tranquillity. Judges have been described as "hermits". They have to live and behave like "hermits" who have no desire or aspiration, having shed it through penance. Their mission is to supply light and not heat. This is necessary so that their latent desire to run the High Court administration may not sprout before time, at least, in some cases."-Verdict of Apex Court followed in CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7936 OF 2011 The Registrar General High Court of Judicature at Madras Vs. R. Perachi and others - Dated 19/09/2011.         
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    "The above decisions make it clear that though this Court is competent to entrust the investigation to any independent agency, once the investigating agency complete their function of investigating into the offences, it is the court in which the charge-sheet is filed which is to deal with all matters relating to the trial of the accused including matters falling within the scope of Section 173(8) of the Code. Thus, generally, this Court may not require further monitoring of the case/investigation. However, we make it clear that if any of the parties including CBI require any further direction, they are free to approach this Court by way of an application."- Supreme Court.         
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    Advocates Act and State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh Rules - The provisions of Rules 121 and 122-A (in particular) of the M.P. Rules are not ultra vires of the provisions, including the provisions of Section 15, of the Advocates Act. These rules also do not suffer from the vice of excessive delegation.

In view of the language of Section 15(3) of the Advocates Act and the factual matrix afore-noticed by us, it is clear that the amended rules of the M.P. Rules had received the approval of the Bar Council of India, particularly Rule 122-A. The Rules would not be invalidated for want of issuance of any notification, as it is not the requirement in terms of Section 15(3) of the Advocates Act and in any case would be a curable irregularity at best : Supreme Court.
        
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    Held "(a) Section 110 of the Land Reforms Act and the notification dated 8.3.94 are valid, and there is no excessive delegation of legislative power on the State Government.

(b) Non-laying of the notification dt.8.3.94 under Section 140 of the Land Reforms Act before the State Legislature is a curable defect and it will not affect the validity of the notification or action taken thereunder.

(c) The Acquisition Act is protected by Article 31A of the Constitution after having obtained the assent of the President and hence immune from challenge under Article 14 or 19 of the Constitution.
(d) There is no repugnancy between the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, and hence no assent of the President is warranted under Article 254(2) of the Constitution.

(e) Public purpose is a pre-condition for deprivation of a person from his property under Article 300A and the right to claim compensation is also inbuilt in that Article and when a person is deprived of his property the State has to justify both the grounds which may depend on scheme of the statute, legislative policy, object and purpose of the legislature and other related factors.

(f) Statute, depriving a person of his property is, therefore, amenable to judicial review on grounds hereinbefore discussed. 144.-Supreme Court
        
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    Seniority in Services : For the reasons aforesaid this Court holds that for determination of seniority of the officers who were recommended on the same date, age is the only valid and fair basis as such their seniority should be decided on the basis of age of the candidates who have been recommended.-Supreme Court.         
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    Determination of Age under Juvenile Act : "We are satisfied that the entry relating to date of birth entered in the mark sheet is one of the valid proof of evidence for determination of age of an accused person.

The School Leaving Certificate is also a valid proof in determining the age of the accused person.

Further, the date of birth mentioned in the High School mark sheet produced by the appellant has duly been corroborated by the School Leaving Certificate of the appellant of Class X and has also been proved by the statement of the clerk of Nehru High School, Dadheru, Khurd- O-Kalan and recorded by the Board.

.... Accordingly, the appellant was a juvenile on the date of occurrence that is 04.06.2007 as alleged in the FIR dated 04.06.2007.

We are also satisfied that Rule 12 of the Rules which was brought in pursuance of the Act describes four categories of evidence which have been provided in which preference has been given to school certificate over the medical report"- Supreme Court.
        
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    Article 136 of the Constitution -
"...this Court will be extremely loath to upset the judgment of conviction which is confirmed in appeal.
However, if it is found that the appreciation of evidence in a case, which is entirely based on circumstantial evidence, is vitiated by serious errors and on that account miscarriage of justice has been occasioned, then the Court will certainly interfere even with the concurrent findings recorded by the Trial court and the High Court.,
[Bharat Vs. State of M.P. 2003 (3) SCC 106] - Followed.-Supreme Court - Dated 13/07/2011.
        
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    " But in no event, the illegal recovery can be the foundation of a successful conviction under the provisions of Section 21 of the (NDPS) Act."- Supreme Court - Dated 07.07.2011. b>         
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    Excercising jurisdiction under Article 136 Constitution of India : "However, if this Court is of the opinion that the acquittal is not based on a reasonable view, then it may review the entire material and there will be no limitation on this Cour`s jurisdiction under Article 136 to come to a just decision quashing the acquittal"- 1985(4) SCC 476 para 45; 1996(7) SCC 471 para 4 - Followed.-Supreme Court- Dated 24/05/2011.         
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    Evidence of interested witness - Appreciation thereof - can be relied upon :"in the case of Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra [(2007) 14 SCC 150] and in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Ahmed Shaikh Babajan and Others [(2009) 14 SCC 267] which dealt with the question of appreciation of evidence of interested witnesses. Both those decisions follow the well-settled principle that just because evidence is given by the interested persons that is no ground for discarding the same. We have already held that in the instant case, the evidence given by PWs 5, 6, 7 and 8 is quite cogent and clearly established the prosecution case."- Supreme Court - Dated 16/05/2011.         
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    "We warn policemen that they will not be excused for committing murder in the name of `encounter' on the pretext that they were carrying out the orders of their superior officers or politicians, however high. In the Nuremburg trials the Nazi war criminals took the plea that `orders are orders', nevertheless they were hanged. If a policeman is given an illegal order by any superior to do a fake `encounter', it is his duty to refuse to carry out such illegal order, otherwise he will be charged for murder, and if found guilty sentenced to death. The `encounter' philosophy is a criminal philosophy, and all policemen must know this. Trigger happy policemen who think they can kill people in the name of `encounter' and get away with it should know that the gallows await them."-SUPREME COURT - Dated 13th.May,2011.         
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    POLICE ENCOUNTERS: "We warn policemen that they will not be excused for committing murder in the name of `encounter' on the pretext that they were carrying out the orders of their superior officers or politicians, however high. In the Nuremburg trials the Nazi war criminals took the plea that `orders are orders', nevertheless they were hanged. If a policeman is given an illegal order by any superior to do a fake `encounter', it is his duty to refuse to carry out such illegal order, otherwise he will be charged for murder, and if found guilty sentenced to death. The `encounter' philosophy is a criminal philosophy, and all policemen must know this. Trigger happy policemen who think they can kill people in the name of `encounter' and get away with it should know that the gallows await them."-SUPREME COURT - Dated 13/05/2011.         
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    Appointment of DGC/ADGC (Criminal)- Right of their renewal discussed in the light of prevailing judgements of Apex Court: Supreme Court Dated 4/5/2011         
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    The plaintiff in a suit for specific performance, cannot obviously succeed unless he proved that he was ready and willing to perform the contract. The exhaustive correspondence between the parties clearly discloses the respective stands of the parties. Even the prayer in the plaint shows that the appellant was not ready to pay the entire balance of Rs.34,00,000/- as agreed under the agreement of sale but that the plaintiff insisted upon the appellant to pay the municipal taxes before the sale, as a condition for sale. If appellant was not willing to pay Rs.34 lakhs at the time of sale, as specifically agreed under the agreement of sale, the appellant could not claim that it was ready and willing to perform its obligations. As noticed above, after appreciating the entire evidence, learned Single Judge and Division Bench of the High Court have recorded a finding that the appellant was not ready and willing and consequently dismissed the suit. Supreme Court of India- Dated: 04:09:2011         
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    Petitioner submits matter be considered by a larger Bench as the petition raises the following issues of Constitutional importance: (1) Whether the aforesaid two verdicts, viz. the 7-Judge Bench and 9-Judge Bench decisions of this Court referred to above really amount to amending Article 124(2) of the Constitution? (2) Whether there is any `Collegium' system for appointing Supreme Court or High Court Judges in the Constitution? 3 (3) Whether the Constitution can be amended by a judicial verdict or it can only be amended by Parliament in accordance with Article 368? (4) Whether the Constitutional scheme was that the Supreme Court and High Court Judges can be appointed by mutual discussions and mutual consensus between the judiciary and the executive; or whether the judiciary can alone appoint Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts? (5) Whether the word `consultation' in Article 224 means `concurrence'? (6) Whether by judicial interpretation words in the Constitution can be made redundant, as appears to have been done in the aforesaid two decisions which have made consultation with High Court Judges redundant while appointing a Supreme Court Judge despite the fact that it is permissible on the clear language of Article 124(2)? (7) Whether the clear language of Article 124(2) can be altered by judicial verdicts and instead of allowing the President of India to consult such Judges of the Supreme Court as he deems necessary (including even junior Judges) only the Chief Justice of India and four seniormost Judges of the Supreme Court can alone be consulted while appointing a Supreme Court Judge? (8) Whether there was any convention that the President is bound by the advice of the Chief Justice of India, and whether any such convention (assuming there was one) can prevail over the clear language of Article 124(2)? (9) Whether the opinion of the Chief Justice of India has any primacy in the aforesaid appointments? (10) Whether the aforesaid two decisions should be overruled by a larger Bench?-Supreme Court-Dated 4/4/2011 4         
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    POLICE CUSTODY DEATHS & RAPES-"In spite of the constitutional and statutory provisions aimed at safeguarding the personal liberty and life of a citizen, growing incidence of torture and deaths in police custody has been a disturbing factor. Experience shows that worst violations of human rights take place during the course of investigation, when the police with a view to secure evidence or confession often resorts to third-degree methods including torture and adopts techniques of screening arrest by either not recording the arrest or describing the deprivation of liberty merely as a prolonged interrogation. A reading of the morning newspapers almost everyday carrying reports of dehumanising torture, assault, rape and death in custody of police or other governmental agencies is indeed depressing. The increasing incidence of torture and death in custody has assumed such alarming proportions that it is affecting the credibility of the rule of law and the administration of criminal justice system. The community rightly feels perturbed. Societys cry for justice becomes louder. Custodial death is perhaps one of the worst crimes:SUPREME COURT OF INDIA-Dated 29/03/2011.         
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      Applicability of section 34 I.P.C. read with 302 - which accused actually caused the murder not certain But It is clear that all the three accused persons had taken part in the beating of deceased Deepak and all the accused persons dragged him   in the room and closed the door.
Therefore, it was up to the accused persons to explain as to how Deepak died. It is very clear that all the three accused persons had acted with common intention of causing the death and, therefore, all the three accused persons would be guilty with the aid of Section 34, IPC. The High Court has rightly held them guilty: Supreme Court.
        
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    On the basis of the materials on record, the enquiry officer held the writ petitioner guilty with which the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority agreed. It is well settled that High Court while exercising the power of judicial review from the order of the disciplinary authority do not act as a Court of appeal and appraise evidence. It interferes with the finding of enquiry officer only when the finding is found to be perverse. We are of the opinion that the Division Bench of the High Court erred in setting aside the order of learned Single Judge and quashing the order of compulsory retirement. The finding recorded by the enquiry officer is based on the materials on record and on proper appreciation of evidence which cannot be said to be perverse calling for interference by the High Court in exercise of its power of judicial review. SUPREME COURT OF INDIA-ORDER DATED 28 FEB 2011         
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    Order to conduct Trial Expediously- Supreme Court of India-Order Dated 28 Feb 2011         
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    The appellant filed a revision before the High Court which was dismissed, affirming the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Sections 420 and 471 of the I.P.C. Admittedly, the entire amount of Rs.60,000/- involved in the case, has been deposited by the appellant. The Chief Executive Officer of the Zila Parishad, Beed, has filed an application before this Court in which it is mentioned that since the entire amount has been deposited by the appellant, they have no objection if the sentence under Section 420 of the I.P.C. is compounded. The alleged incident took place 23 years ago and the appellant has already undergone a part of the sentence. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant, learned counsel for the State and learned counsel for the complainant. In our considered view, ends of justice would meet if, while upholding the conviction of the appellant, the sentence is reduced to the period already undergone by him. We direct accordingly. This order is subject to the appellant”“s paying additionally a fine of Rupees One Lakh within six weeks from today. This appeal is disposed of with these observations and directions. In case the amount of fine, as directed above is not deposited by the appellant, then this order would be of no avail to the appellant and he would have to serve out the remaining period of sentence.         
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    The Chief Executive Officer of the Zila Parishad, Beed, has filed an application before this Court in which it is mentioned that since the entire amount has been deposited by the appellant, they have no objection if the sentence under Section 420 of the I.P.C. is compounded. The alleged incident took place 23 years ago and the appellant has already undergone a part of the sentence.-Supreme Court Allowed the request.         
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    the decision of the High Court, permitting the State Govern- ment to continue with the recruitment process, initiated on the basis of the Amendment Rules, 2005 which have been declared by it to be illegal is clearly indefensible. Having clearly held that ““the requirement of ad- herence to the Statutory Regulations framed by the NCTE cannot be left to be determined at the discretion of the authorities of the State Govern- ment and that there was no compelling reason with the State to justify a departure from the Statutory Regulations, any action under illegal rules would be null and void”“, the High Court could not have permitted the State Government to perpetuate an illegality. To say the least, we are equally amazed by the stand of the State Government. Having failed to sustain the Amendment Rules, 2005 before the High Court, it would be improper for the State to go ahead with the recruitments under the said amended Rules which have been declared null and void, particularly when the decision of the High Court on that issue has not been ques- tioned by it. We are of the view that the impugned observation by the High Court would be clearly inimical to the rule of law. While it is trite that Courts can exercise judicial discretion in moulding the relief, however, such discretion cannot be exercised to perpetuate and encour- age an illegality.         
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    The High Court overlooked that what section 31(5) contemplates is not merely the delivery of any kind of a copy of the award but a copy of the award that is duly signed by the members of the arbitral tribunal. ---In the facts of the case the appellants would appear to be deriving undue advantage due to the omission of the arbitrator to give them a signed copy of the award coupled with the supply of a copy of the award to them by the claimant-respondent but that would not change the legal position and it would be wrong to tailor the law according to the facts of a particular case. ---In the light of the discussion made above this appeal must succeed.         
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    Having bestowed our anxious consideration, we are constrained to hold that the impugned judgment deserves to be set aside on the short ground that while deciding the case, the Tribunal has ignored the specific directions issued by this Court, vide order dated 30th August, 2001. It is evident from the impugned order, in particular from paras 15 and 16 that the Tribunal has not appreciated the facts obtaining in the present case in their correct perspective, which has resulted in vitiating its decision on the question of leviability of import duty. Although, from para 14 of the impugned order it is evident that the Tribunal was conscious of the direction of this Court that it was required to first record the correct facts and then in the factual perspective locate and apply the relevant law, yet in the very next paragraph it proceeds to hold that when it is accepted that Notification No. 118/59-Cus. did not exist at the time of clearance of the vessel from the ship yard, the persistent plea that the ship was manufactured in a warehouse located in India and therefore, it attracted 8 1994 Supp (3) SCC 606 9 (2009) 14 SCC 342 excise duty alone need not be considered at all. In our opinion, in light of the decision and directions of this Court in C.A. 1998 of 2000, judicial discipline obliged the Tribunal to examine the entire legal issue after ascertaining the foundational facts, regardless of its earlier view in the matter. Therefore, the decision of the Tribunal cannot be sustained         
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    The Trial Court to conduct the trial of the case on day-to-day basis and conclude the same as expeditiously as possible. Supreme Court of India- Dated:February 25, 2011.         
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    Learned Solicitor General submits that if the Bank is allowed to appropriate this amount, then he has no objection to the appeal of the appellant being heard on merit by the DRAT. We direct that the Indian Bank would be at liberty to appropriate the amount which is already with the Bank, however, this would be subject to the final decision of the appeal by the DRAT.-- In the facts and circumstances of this case, we direct the DRAT to hear and dispose of the appeal on all questions of law, as expeditiously as possible, in any event, within two months from the date of the communication of this order.--Supreme Court of India- Dated:February 25, 2011.         
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    where the appeal is against a conviction and sentence of death or of imprisonment, and the appellant dies during the pendency of the appeal, any of his near relatives may, within thirty days of the death of the appellant, apply to the Appellate Court for leave to continue the appeal; and if leave is granted, the appeal shall not abate; (b) the power to grant leave to continue the appeal is conferred on the court and not on the Registrar under Order VI of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966.--Supreme Court Of India- Order Dated:February 25, 2011         
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    On a consideration of the matter it cannot be said that there is no disproportion or even a sizeable disproportion.....There are also other possible errors in the calculations in regard to point (c). The finding becomes inescapable that the assets were in excess of the known sources of income. But on the question whether the extent of the disproportion is such as to justify a conviction for criminal misconduct...., a somewhat liberal view requires to be taken of what proportion of assets in excess of the known sources of income constitutes ““disproportion”“ for purposes of Section 5(1)(e) of the Act         
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    The pressures on state executive and judicial officers charged with the administration of the criminal law are great. But it is precisely the predictability of those pressures that makes imperative a resolute loyalty to the guarantees that the Constitution extends to us all. Order Dated-24-2-2011         
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    It is by now a settled law that the exemption notification has to be construed strictly and there has to be strict interpretation of the same by reading the same literally. In this connection reference can be made to the decision of this Court in Collector of Customs (Preventive), Amritsar vs. Malwa Industries Limited reported at (2009) 12 SCC 735 as also to the decision in Kartar Rolling Mills vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, New Delhi reported at (2006) 4 SCC 772 wherein also it was held by this Court that finding recorded by the Tribunal and the two authorities below are findings of fact and such findings in absence of evidence on record to the contrary is not subject to interference. In order to get benefit of such notification granting exemption the claimant has to show that he satisfies the eligibility criteria. Since the Tribunal and the authorities below have categorically held that the appellant does not satisfy the eligibility criteria on the basis of the evidence on record, therefore, we hold that the said exemption Notification is not applicable to the case of the appellants.         
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    An order passed by the Settlement Commission could be interfered with only if the said order is found to be contrary to any provisions of the Act. So far findings of the fact recorded by Commission or question of facts are concerned, the same is not open for examination either by the High Court or by the Supreme Court. In the present case the order of the Settlement Commission clearly indicates that the said order, particularly, with regard to the imposition of simple interest @ 10 per cent per annum was passed in accordance with the provisions of Rule 14 but the High Court wrongly interpreted the said Rule and thereby arrived at an erroneous finding.

So far as the second issue with respect to interest on Rs. 50 lacs is concerned, the same being a factual issue should not have been gone into by the High Court exercising the writ jurisdiction and the High Court should not have substituted its own opinion against the opinion of the Settlement Commission when the same was not challenged on merits.

In that view of the matter, we set aside the order passed by the Punjab & Haryana High Court by the impugned judgment and order and restore the order of the Settlement Commission leaving the parties to bear their own costs. ORDER DATED-February 21, 2011.
        
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    HELD--We have heard learned counsel for the parties and we are of the considered opinion that the Division Bench of the High Court should not have passed the impugned order for deposit of Rs.20,00,000/- for each of the appeals when the Appellate Authority had directed the appellant to make pre- deposit for Rs.5,00,000/- for both the appeals. The second proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the Act states that in the case of an appeal against a decision or order imposing a penalty or redemption charges, no such appeal shall be entertained unless the amount of the penalty or redemption charges has been deposited by the appellant. The third proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the Act, however, states ““where the Appellate Authority is of opinion that the deposit to be made will cause undue hardship to the appellant, it may, at its discretion, dispense with such deposit either unconditionally or subject to such conditions as it may impose.”“ Hence, under the Act discretion is vested in the Appellate Authority to dispense with a pre-deposit of penalty either unconditionally or subject to such condition as the Appellate Authority may impose. If in exercise of such discretion, the Appellate Authority in the present case dispensed with the pre-deposit penalty of Rs.1,30,00,000/- in each of the two appeals subject to the appellant depositing a sum of Rs.5,00,000/-, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court ought not to have enhanced the amount of pre-deposit to Rs.20,00,000/- for each of the two appeals.

As the two appeals of the appellant have not been heard on merits, we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi and the order of the learned Single Judge and direct that in case the appellant deposits the sum of Rs.5,00,000/- as directed by the Appellate Authority within two months from today, the two appellate orders of the Appellate Authority will stand quashed and the appeal will be heard on merits afresh by the Appellate Authority.

With the aforesaid directions, the appeals are allowed. No costs- ORDER DATED- February 21, 2011.
        
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    HELD--The High Court has gone on the premise that once the Appellant have themselves extended the benefit to the Respondent they cannot further classify the benefit of investment up to the date of amendment, putting the unit in the negative list. It appears that the High Court while arriving at the said finding has failed to appreciate the fact that the case of the Respondent was considered for exemption in the light of the judgment passed by this Court in the Mahabir Vegetable case (supra) reported at (2006) 3 SCC 620 wherein it was held that the Respondent is entitled to exemption. However, the issue of quantum was kept open. The High Court while giving the said finding has altogether closed itself in considering the said issue and on the contrary has held that only because the Respondent has been considered for grant of exemption, there is no issue of quantum and the Respondent is entitled to entire exemption. In our opinion the said finding is not in line with the observations made by this Court in the Mahabir Vegetable case (supra) reported at (2006) 3 SCC 620. The quantification made by the LLSC is in accord with the ratio laid by this Court.
Accordingly, we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment passed by the High Court leaving the parties to bear their own costs.- ORDER DATED February 21, 2011.
        
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    HELD- Counsel appearing for the appellant also submitted that the punishment awarded to the appellant was too severe and harsh considering the nature and the degree of the offences established. The appellant belongs to Air Force, which is a disciplined service. The allegations made against the appellant were serious. The charge number (2) against him stood proved. The said charge is also serious and we are of the considered opinion that for an offence of the aforesaid nature the authority was justified in awarding him the punishment of dismissal from service. -- The scale of punishment provided in Section 73 of the Act clearly confirms the position that dismissal from service is a lesser punishment than that of detention in prison. By commuting the punishment of three months detention and imposing the punishment of dismissal, the Confirming Authority has strictly followed the scale of punishment provided for in Section 73 of the Act and, therefore, there is no justification for any interference with the nature of punishment awarded to the appellant-APPEAL DISMISSED- ORDER DATED- FEB 21, 2011         
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    Held- The only ground on which Article 14 has been put forward by the learned counsel for the respondent is that the fixation of the cut-off date for payment of the revised benefits under the two notifications concerned was arbitrary and it resulted in denying arrears of payments to certain Sections of the employees. This argument is no longer res integra. It has been held in a catena of judgments that fixing of a cut-off date for granting of benefits is well within the powers of the Government as long as the reasons therefor are not arbitrary and are based on some rational consideration.”“ -- We have sympathies for the appellant but, in a society governed by Rule of law, sympathies cannot override the Rules and Regulations. We may recall the observations made by this Court while considering the issue of compassionate appointment in public service. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Asha Ramachhandra Ambekar and Anr. (1994) 2 SCC 718, wherein the Court observed: ““The High Courts and the Administrative Tribunals cannot confer benediction impelled by sympathetic consideration.... Yielding to instinct will tend to ignore the cold logic of law. It should be remembered that ““law is the embodiment of all wisdom”“. Justice according to law is a principle as old as the hills. The Courts are to administer law as they find it, however, inconvenient it may be.- Order Dated Feb 21 ,2011         
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    HELD--The proliferating unaided private colleges, may need a full complement of students for their comfortable sustenance (meeting the cost of running the college and paying the staff etc.). But that cannot be at the risk of quality of education. To give an example, if 35% is the minimum passing marks in a qualifying examination, can it be argued by colleges that the minimum passing marks in the qualifying examination should be reduced to only 25 or 20 instead of 35 on the ground that the number of students/candidates who pass the examination are not sufficient to fill their seats? Reducing the standards to `fill the seats”“ will be a dangerous trend which will destroy the quality of education. If there are large number of vacancies, the remedy lies in (a) not permitting new colleges; (b) reducing the intake in existing colleges; (c) improving the infrastructure and quality of the institution to attract more students. Be that as it may. The need to fill the seats cannot be permitted to override the need to maintain quality of education. Creeping commercialization of education in the last few years should be a matter of concern for the central bodies, states and universities. 13. No student or college, in the teeth of the existing and prevalent rules of the State and the University can say that such rules should be ignored, whenever there are unfilled vacancies in colleges. In fact the State/University, may, in spite of vacancies, continue with the higher eligibility criteria to maintain better standards of higher education in the State or in the colleges affiliated to the University. Determination of such standards, being part of the academic policy of the University, are beyond the purview of judicial review, unless it is established that such standards are arbitrary or `adversely affect”“ the standards if any fixed by the Central Body under a Central enactment. The order of the Division Bench is therefore unsustainable. ORDER DATED:FEB 18, 2011         
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    HELD-- a permanent disability certificate by the said Medical Board. Therefore, the said certificate clearly establishes that Appellant had sustained permanent disability to his own body to the extent of 50% and even after several surgeries; he was not able to control his urination. We can well appreciate and imagine the problems and difficulties of a young boy aged 16 years, who is not able to control his urination and spoils his clothes even while attending school. We have been given to understand that he is required to go with additional sets of clothings so that he could change the same, in case they are spoiled. This is the state of affairs even as on date. We do not doubt the genuineness and correctness of the aforesaid certificate. Even otherwise, Respondents have also not contended that this certificate is forged or fabricated and has been obtained with an intention to get compensation-APPEAL ALLOWED- ORDER DATED- FEB 18, 2011         
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    HELD--the Tribunal should have considered the prospect of future income while computing compensation but the Tribunal has not done that. In the appeal, which was filed by the appellants before the High Court, the High Court instead of maintaining the amount of compensation, granted by the Tribunal, reduced the same. In doing so, the High Court had not given any reason. The High Court introduced the concept of split multiplier and departed from the multiplier used by the Tribunal without disclosing any reason therefore. The High Court has also not considered the clear and corroborative evidence about the prospect of future increment of the deceased. When the age of the deceased is between 51 and 55 years the multiplier is 11, which is specified in the II Column in the II Schedule in the Motor Vehicles Act, and the Tribunal has not committed any error by accepting the said multiplier. This Court also fails to appreciate why the High Court chose to apply the multiplier of 6.-SUPREME COURT OF INDIA -ORDER DATED : FEB 18 2011         
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    This is, however, a clear case where the admissions of the seven appellants took place due to the fault of the rule-making authority in not making the State Rules, 2008 in conformity of the MCI Regulations. For this fault of the rule-making authority if the appellants are discharged from the MBBS course, they will suffer grave injustice. On the peculiar facts of the case, we are thus of the view that this is a fit case where this Court should exercise its power under Article 142 of the Constitution to do complete justice between parties. In Delhi Judicial Service Association, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi v. State of Gujarat and Others. [(1991) 4 SCC 406] after examining the width of this power under Article 142 of the Constitution, this Court held: ““No enactment made by Central or State legislature can limit or restrict the power of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, though while exercising power under Article 142 of the Constitution, the court must take into consideration the statutory provisions regulating the matter in dispute. What would be the need of ““complete justice”“ in a cause or matter would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and while exercising that power the Court would take into consideration the express provisions of a substantive statute. Once this Court has taken seisin of a case, cause or matter, it has power to pass any order or issue direction as may be necessary to do complete justice in the matter. --In the facts of the present case, we have found that the appellants were not to be blamed for having secured admission in the MBBS course and the fault was entirely of the rule-making authority in making the 2008 Rules and the appellants have gone through the pains of appearing in the common entrance test and have been selected on the basis of their merit and admitted into the MBBS course in the college in accordance with the State Rules, 2008 and have pursued their studies for a year. Hence, even though under the MCI Regulations the appellants were not eligible for admission to the MBBS course in the academic year 2008-2009, for the purpose of doing complete justice in the matter before us, we direct that the admissions of the appellants to the MBBS course in the college during the academic year 2008-2009 will not be disturbed. This direction shall not, however, be treated as a precedent- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA - ORDER DATED- FEB 18,2011         
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    The liability of the Insurance Company to pay compensation was limited to six persons travelling inside the vehicle only and that the liability to pay the others was that of the owner, we, in this case, are faced with the same problem as had surfaced in Anjana Shyam's case (supra). The number of persons to be compensated being in excess of the number of persons who could validly be carried in the vehicle, the question which arises is one of apportionment of the amounts to be paid. Since there can be no pick and choose method to identify the five passengers, excluding the driver, in respect of whom compensation would be payable by the Insurance Company, to meet the ends of justice we may apply the procedure adopted in Baljit Kaur”“s case (supra) and direct that the Insurance Company should deposit the total amount of compensation awarded to all the claimants and the amounts so deposited be disbursed to the claimants in respect to their claims, with liberty to the Insurance Company to recover the amounts paid by it over and above the compensation amounts payable in respect of the persons covered by the Insurance Policy from the owner of the vehicle, as was directed in Baljit Kaur”“s case- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA-ORDER DATED: FEB 18,2011         
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    The Dean of King Edward Memorial Hospital as well as Ms. Pinky Virani (who claims to be the next friend of the petitioner) are directed to intimate the brother(s)/sister(s) or other close relatives of the petitioner that the case will be listed on 2nd March, 2011 in the Supreme Court and they can put forward their views before the Court, if they so desire. Learned counsel for the petitioner and the Registry of this Court shall communicate a copy of this Order forthwith to the Dean, KEM Hospital. The Dean, KEM Hospital is requested to file an affidavit stating his views regarding the prayer in this writ petition, and also the condition of the petitioner- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- ORDER DATED: FEB 18,2011         
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    The import manifest and the bill of entry having been filed before the Collectorate of Customs (Imports) Mumbai, the same having been assessed and clearance for home consumption having been allowed by the proper officer on importers executing bond, undertaking the obligation of export, in our opinion, the Collector of Customs (Preventive), not being a ““proper officer”“ within the meaning of Section 2(34) of the Act, was not competent to issue show cause notice for re- assessment under Section 28 of the Act. Nothing has been brought on record to show that the Collector of Customs (Preventive), who had issued the show cause notices was assigned the functions under Section 28 of the Act as ““proper officer”“ either by the Board or the Collector/Commissioner of Customs. We are convinced that Notifications No. 250-Cus and 251-Cus., both dated 27th August, 1983, issued by the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of the Section 4 of the Act, appointing Collector of Customs (Preventive) etc. to be the Collector of Customs for Bombay, Thane and Kolaba Districts in the State of Maharashtra did not ipso facto confer jurisdiction on him to exercise power entrusted to the ““proper officers”“ for the purpose of Section 28 of the Act. In that view of the matter, we do not find any substance in the contention of Mr. V. Shekhar, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the revenue in the second set of appeals, that the source of power to act as a ““proper officer”“ is Sections 4 and 5 of the Act and not sub-section 34 of Section 2 of the Act. The said sections merely authorize the Board to appoint officers of Customs and confer on them the powers and duties to be exercised/discharged by them, but for the purpose of Section 28 of the Act, an officer of customs has to be designated as ““proper officer”“ by assigning the function of levy and collection of duty, by the Board or the Commissioner of Customs. The argument is rejected accordingly. Similarly, revenue’‘‘‘s reliance on the decision of this court in Ram Narain Bishwanath & Ors. (supra) is clearly misplaced. In that case the issue for determination was that when goods imported and cleared at Paradip Port (Orissa State) were seized by the Customs authorities in West Bengal on the allegation that these had been imported on the strength of fictitious licences, whether the customs authorities at Paradip or West Bengal will have the jurisdiction to initiate adjudication proceedings. By a short order it was held that it was for the customs authorities at Paradip to initiate proceedings against the importer. Apart from the fact that none of the statutory provisions were considered in that case, the issue arising for consideration in the present appeals was not the subject matter therein. Thus, the said decision is of no avail to the revenue.- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- ORDER DATED: FEBRUARY 18, 2011         
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    HELD--With regard to recovery of the pistol, the learned counsel is right that the pistol was recovered from a public place but it was recovered from the place which could not have been easily located by anyone and, therefore, the accused cannot get benefit which the learned counsel wanted him to get. From the memo of recovery, it is clear that the pistol had been hidden by digging earth under a plant of Sarkanda about half a kilometer away from bridge of Ladhuwala Uttar. Thus, it is very clear that the pistol had been hidden by digging earth under the plant of Sarkanda about half a kilometer away on the eastern katcha path from bridge of Ladhuwala Uttar and, therefore, in our opinion, the recovery cannot be said to be from a place which could have been easily accessible to anyone.
--With regard to recovery memo, the mistake committed in writing the word "witness" or "witnesses" can not be said to be so material so as to adversely affect the case of the prosecution. – SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- ORDER DATED:FEB 18,2011
        
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    If the order has re-determined the valuable rights of the parties to the proceeding, whether without issuing any notice or after issuing notice, it is a judgment as per the tests laid down in Khimji's case.         
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    CRIMINAL LAWS-The letter which forms the basis of conviction by the Appellate Court was never produced during the investigation and for the first time produced by the witness during the course of trial, when she appeared as a witness. It is submitted that authenticity of the letter in question has not been proved and hence the appellate Court ought not to have reversed the judgment of acquittal and convicted the appellant. --Moreover, this letter had not been produced before the police during the course of the initial investigation and had been handed over to the police after several months. This fact, as also a reading of the letter, indicates that this was a concocted piece of evidence and the work of a legal mind, as no person would write such a letter meeting all legal requirements for implicating himself and his near relatives, in a claim for dowry. It has also been pointed out that view taken by the Trial Court was one of the possible views which the High Court in appeal ought not to have reversed.-SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- ORDER DATED: FEB 17,2011         
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    CIVIL LAWS--An agreement signed by the parties in the matter of collection of toll. While rejecting the argument of the writ petitioner that he was not liable to pay stamp duty under Article 35(b) read with Section 2(16) of the Act, the Division Bench observed: ““On bare reading of the section it becomes clear that all leases with respect to immovable property would be leases in terms of Section 2(16) but in addition to leases of immovable property in other three categories there would also be lease under category (c) in which any instrument by which tolls of any description are let would be a lease for the purpose of Section 2(16). The instrument by which right to collect toll is conveyed has to be treated as lease for the purposes of Stamp Act. Right to collect toll will never in any circumstances involve immovable property. Basically toll is collected for using a road or bridge and as such neither the road nor the bridge is leased out, only the right to collection is leased out and this right of leasing out the collection is ““lease”“ for the purposes of Stamp Act- APPEAL ALLOWED- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- ORDER DATED FEB 17, 2011         
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    Civil Laws-There is concurrent finding that a pond exists and the area covered by it varies in the rainy season. In such a case no part of it could have been allotted to anybody for construction of house building or any allied purposes. It is important to notice that the material resources of the community like forests, tanks, ponds, hillock, mountain etc. are nature”“s bounty. They maintain delicate ecological balance. They need to be protected for a proper and healthy environment which enables people to enjoy a quality life which is the essence of the guaranteed right under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Government, including the Revenue Authorities i.e. Respondents 11 to 13, having noticed that a pond is falling in disuse, should have bestowed their attention to develop the same which would, on one hand, have prevented ecological disaster and on the other provided better environment for the benefit of the public at large. Such vigil is the best protection against knavish attempts to seek allotment in non-abadi sites- Appeal Dismissed- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- ORDER DATED FEB 17, 2011         
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    Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. ...Appellant(s) versus Union of India & Ors. ...Respondent(s) - Case         
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    HELD--In the present case the acquisition proceeding commenced with the notification under Section 4 issued on 06.03.1965 and it culminated in passing of the award by the Collector on 09.07.1980, i.e., before 30.04.1982, the date from which the amending Act 68 of 1984 was made applicable to the pending and subsequent proceedings. Therefore, in terms of the law laid down by the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case of K.S. Paripoornan (supra) the respondents are not entitled to the benefit of Section 23(1A).

All the appeals, therefore, are partly allowed to the aforesaid extent and disposed of leaving the parties to bear their own costs. -SUPREME COURT OF INDIA-ORDER DATED FEB 17,2011
        
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    HELD--The High Court unfortunately took a very technical view in the matter of applying the multiplier. The High Court cannot keep out of its consideration the claim of the daughter of the first claimant, since the daughter was impleaded, and was 49 years of age. Admittedly, the deceased was looking after the entire family. In determining the age of the mother, the High Court should have accepted the age of the mother at 65, as given in the claim petition, since there is no controversy on that. By accepting the age of mother at 67, the High Court further reduced the multiplier from 6 to 5, even if we accept the reasoning of the High Court to be correct. The reasoning of the High Court is not correct in view of the ratio in Sarla Verma (supra). Following the same the High Court should have proceeded to compute the compensation on the age of the deceased.

Thus, the finding of the High Court is contrary to the ratio in Sarla Verma (supra), which is the leading decision on this question and which we follow.

This Court, therefore, cannot sustain the High Court judgment and is constrained to set aside the same. The award of MACT is restored.

The appeal is allowed. No costs
        
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    HELD--The language of the circular dated 13.12.1995 makes it crystal clear that the Government took a fresh decision in supersession of earlier instructions that promotion to Grade-IV may be given from amongst officials in Grade-III on the basis of their seniority in the basic grade. Hence, the decision of the Government to make promotions to Grade-IV on the basis of their seniority in the basic grade could take effect only from 13.12.1995 and not from a prior date and the respondents, who had filed O.A. No.2484 of 1997 and O.A. No.2099 of 1997 in the Central Administrative Tribunal could not claim any promotion to Grade-IV on the basis of their seniority in the basic cadre with effect from any date prior to 13.12.1995. The Central Administrative Tribunal was, therefore, not right in allowing O.A. No.2484 of 1997 and O.A. No.2099 of 1997 by order dated 11.08.2000, directing the Government to consider promoting the applicants to Grade-IV with effect from the dates their immediate juniors in the basic grade seniority were so promoted subject to their being found fit with consequential benefits of seniority as well as arrears of pay and allowance and of retiral benefits in the case of those of the applicants in the O.As. who had retired on superannuation. In our considered opinion, the High Court ought to have interfered with the decision of the Tribunal. 18. We accordingly allow these appeals and set aside the impugned orders dated 22.05.2003 of the High Court and the common order dated 11.08.2000 of the Central Administrative Tribunal in O.A. No. 2484 of 1997 and O.A. No.2099 of 1997. The two O.As. stand rejected. There will be no order as to costs.- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- ORDER DATED: FEB 17, 2011         
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    Held- The appellant has preferred this appeal against the final judgment dated 10.09.2007 before this Court. This appeal is also barred by limitation of 114 days. There is no satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay before this Court also. -Supreme Court of India -Order Dated: Feb 17,2011 The Union of India ought to have been careful particularly in filing this Civil Appeal because the Division Bench, by the impugned order, has dismissed the appeal before it on the ground of delay. It is a matter of deep anguish and distress that majority of the matters filed by the Union of India are hopelessly barred by limitation and no satisfactory explanations exist for condoning inordinate delay in filing those cases. On consideration of the totality of the facts and circumstances, we are constrained to dismiss this appeal on the ground of delay. However, in the larger interest, we are keeping the question of law open         
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    Held- It is, therefore, difficult for us to uphold the impugned judgment and order of the Division Bench of the High Court and hence we quash and set aside the same. If, however, the writ petitioner, respondents herein, has/have any other alternative remedy or forum to claim allotment of the land, they obviously will have to first of all get the letter of the State Government quashed and set aside which has ordered stopping the allotment of rehabilitation land forthwith. Unless the respondents succeed in doing so, no allotment of the land could have been made specially without any enquiry as to whether the predecessor-in-interest had left any land at all in Pakistan when he migrated to India. Besides this, learned counsel for the appellants-State further informed that the writ petitioner, predecessor-in- interest of the respondents herein had already been allotted land under the rehabilitation scheme way back in the year 1952 and, therefore, claim for allotment for the second time should not have been allowed by the High Court contrary to the government instructions. We find force in this submission also, and, therefore, this aspect was required to be examined and enquired before any order was passed in favour of the respondents-claimants- Supreme Court of India- Order Dated Feb 15, 2011         
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    Held- Supreme Court of India-Order Dated Feb 15, 2011- The DNA test of Rimpa by CDFD, a pioneer institute in Hyderabad matched with that of blood of her parents and brother. The Doctors at AIIMS have put the parts of the deceased girls which have been recovered by the Doctors of AIIMS together. These bodies have been recovered in the presence of the Doctors of AIIMS at the pointing out by the accused Surendra Koli. Thus, recovery is admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.
On the facts of the case we see no reason to interfere with the findings of the trial court and the High Court that the appellant Surendra Koli is guilty of murdering Rimpa Haldar. Both Courts have gone into the evidence in great detail and we have perused the same. The appellant appears to be a serial killer, and these cases in our opinion fall within the category of rarest of the rare cases as laid down in Bachan singh Vs State of Punjab, 1982 SCC 689 which has been subsequently followed in Atbir Vs Government of NCT of Delhi, 2010 SCC (9) 1.
The killings by the appellant Surendra Koli are horrifying and barbaric. He used a definite methodology in committing these murders. He would see small girls passing by the house, and taking advantage of their weakness lure them inside the house no. D-5, Sector 31, Nithari Village, Noida and there he would strangulate them and after killing them he tried to have sex with the body and would then cut off their body parts and eat them. Some parts of the body were disposed off by throwing them in the passage gallery and drain (nala) beside the house. House no. D-5, Sector 31 had become a virtual slaughter house, where innocent children were regularly butchered.
In our opinion, this case clearly falls within the category of rarest of rare case and no mercy can be shown to the appellant Surendra Koli.
The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.
        
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    Held-Supreme Court of India- Order Dated: Feb 15, 2011-Coming to the case at hand we are of the opinion that the High Court was not justified in imposing the extreme penalty of death upon the appellants. We say so for reasons more than one. Firstly, because the appellants are not professional killers. Even according to the prosecution they were only a part of the coal mafia active in the region indulging in theft of coal from the collieries. The deceased being opposed to such activities appears to have incurred their wrath and got killed. Secondly, because even when the deceased was a politician there was no political angle to his killing. Thirdly, because while all culpable homicides amounting to murder are inhuman, hence legally and ethically unacceptable yet there was nothing particularly brutal, grotesque, diabolical, revolting or dastardly in the manner of its execution so as to arouse intense and extreme indignation of the community or exhaust depravity and meanness on the part of the assailants to call for the extreme penalty. Fourthly, because there was difference of opinion on the question of sentence to be awarded to the convicts. The Trial Court did not find it to be a rarest of rare case and remained content with the award of life sentence only which sentence the High Court enhanced to death. Considering all these circumstances, the death sentence awarded to the appellants in our opinion deserves to be commuted to life imprisonment.-Appeal Allowed         
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    HELD- In view of the fact that the inspection and verification in regard to renewal of permission for the second, third, fourth and fifth years will be restricted only to the consideration of the additional faculty and additional infrastructure, it may not be necessary to apply the lengthy time schedule prescribed for initial permission, to renewal of permissions during the next four years. The DCI Regulations presently contemplate almost similar time schedules in regard to applications for establishment of new dental colleges, for opening of higher courses of study, for increase of admission capacity, and for renewal of permissions, with 15th July being the last date both for grant of permission or renewal of permission. DCI and Central Government may consider amendment to the DCI Regulations suitably to provide for a shorter and distinct time schedule for renewal of permissions, so that the dental colleges could file applications till end of February and the process of grant or refusal of renewal is completed by 15th of June. Conclusion 22. In view of the above, these writ petitions are allowed as follows : (a) The condition imposed by the Central Government (requiring the dental colleges to secure appropriate orders from this court approving the renewals of permission) in the letters of renewal of permission issued to the petitioners in July/August/September, 2010, is quashed; (b) It is however declared that the renewal of permissions issued by Central Government to the petitioners for the academic year 2010-2011, are valid.- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- ORDER DATED: FEB 15,2011         
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    Held- Learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents submits that the suit is pending before the Small Causes Court, Pune. We direct the proceedings in the suit to continue, however, no final order in the suit be passed until the disposal of the writ petition to be filed by the appellants before the Bombay High Court. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we request the Bombay High Court to dispose of the writ petition, if filed (by the appellants within four weeks from today) as expeditiously as possible, in any event, within a period of one year from the date of filing of the writ petition. In case, the writ petition is not filed within a period of four weeks, this order would be of no avail to the appellants- Supreme Court of India -Order Dated: Feb 15 2011         
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    The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there was no justification for the High Court, in exercise of power of judicial review, to interfere with the findings of the revisional authority and the punishment imposed, which had been accepted by the Administrative Tribunal It is impermissible in law.
--The revisional authority did not interfere with the findings recorded by the appellate authority that respondent was not guilty of charges 2,3,4 and 5. The appellate authority found that as only charges 1,6 and 7 were proved and the other charges relating mis- appropriation of additional fare were not proved, the punishment of dismissal was excessive and consequently set aside the same and imposed a lesser punishment of reduction in rank.
-On the facts and circumstances, the said order of the appellate authority did not call for interference and that too in exercise of power of revision.
Therefore we are of the view that the High Court was justified in restoring the decision of the appellate authority imposing a lesser punishment.
However while the High Court was justified in restoring the order of reinstatement with imposition of lesser punishment of reduction in service with continuity of service, the High Court was not justified in granting the reliefs of seniority and 25% back wages. When the High Court has upheld the finding that the respondent was guilty of charges 1,6 and 7, any direction for back wages would amount to rewarding the guilty, which is not permissible. Nor will he be entitled to restoration of his seniority as ordered by the High Court.
we allow this appeal in part and set aside the order of the High Court awarding backwages of 25% and restoring the seniority.- Supreme Court of India –Order Dated :Feb 14, 2011
        
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    Appeal-Civil Laws-The appellant has pointed out that apart from being a Member of the Bar, he is a former President of the Student Union of the AMU, former elected Member of AMU Court, Life Member of AMU Old Boys Association and Donor Life Member of the AMU-- He had produced documents in support of the said averments. The said averments are not shown to be false. The appellant claims that his only interest in filing the writ petition was to ensure that AMU continues to be an Institution of academic excellence and that no action of the University should dilute its academic excellence. On the other hand, the respondents contend that the writ petition was filed with the oblique motive of maligning the Vice Chancellor of the University. It is not necessary to examine that aspect now-Held- he has sufficient interest to file the writ petition in public interest. The High Court ought not to have dismissed the public interest litigation only on the ground of locus standi of appellant to file the writ petition. Appeal Allowed-Supreme Court of India-Order Dated: Feb 14 2011         
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    Appeal- Sec 302-Indian Penal Code-Medical Officer of Mauza Burdwan Medical College, opined that the death was due to the effect of the injuries as noted anti-mortem in nature; that all the injuries as noted in the post mortem examination report might be caused if a person pushed against the wall and it may be homicidal in nature- Appeal Dismised- Supreme Court of India- Order Dated Feb 14, 2011         
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    Appeal- Civil Laws- Post of Ticket Collector is categorised in Annexure IV in Class B-2 but while doing so the underlying object of division of staff into three broad groups A, B and C for vision tests of candidates and of serving Railway employees in non-Gazetted Railway services seems to have been overlooked. Broadly, Class B-2 covers a certain staff in workshops and engine rooms engaged on duties. It has been so done because failing eyesight may endanger themselves or other employees from moving parts of the machinery and crane drivers on open line. This is in consonance with the objective of group B viz; `in the interest of the employee himself or his fellow workers or both”“. Insofar as Ticket Collectors are concerned, vision tests for them are not required `in the interest of employee himself or his fellow workers or both”“ as contemplated in group B but it is required in the interest of administration only - the objective contemplated in group C. In this view of the matter, there seems to be no rational basis, in relation to the object set out in Para 510 of IRMM, of categorizing the post of Ticket Collectors under Class B-2 in Annexure IV. However, it is for the respondents to have a fresh look insofar as categorisation of posts pertaining to non-Gazetted Railway services in Annexure IV is concerned. Suffice it to say that categorization of posts for the purpose of vision tests must have nexus with the object set out in Para 510. Having regard to the objective of division of groups/ classes for the purpose of vision tests under Para 510 of IRMM, the post of Ticket Collectors can not be held to be covered by Class B-2 but rather will be covered by Class C-2. Any inconsistency in categorization of Railway posts in Annexure IV, in our view, must not operate against the appellant in getting promotion to the post of Ticket Collector. --the appellant could not have been denied promotion to the post of Ticket Collector as he had passed written test and viva voce and was provisionally selected for the post of Ticket Collector and had been declared medically fit in Class C-2. --Appeal is allowed- Supreme Court of India- Order Dated: Feb 14, 2011         
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    Writ- Transfer Petition- Transfer Petition pending at the District Judge (MACT Court, Gautam Budh Nagar, U.P.) to the competent Court at Pune, Maharashtra. The petitioners allege in the petition that the MACT Court, Gautam Budh Nagar, U.P. has no jurisdiction in the matter. - An order of transfer of a case can be passed where both the courts, namely, the transferor court as well as the transferee court, have jurisdiction to hear the case and the party seeking transfer of the case alleges that the transferee court would be more convenient because the witnesses are available there or for some other reason it will be convenient for the parties to have the case heard by the transferee court. There is no question of transfer of a case which has been filed in a court which has no jurisdiction at all to hear it.-With these observations, the transfer petition is dismissed-Supreme Court of India- Order Dated Feb 14, 2011         
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    In the facts of this case, we deem it appropriate to direct that the appeal, which was dismissed in default for not depositing the amount in time, shall be restored to its original number and be heard expeditiously by the Tribunal.-Supreme Court of India-Order Dated February 11, 2011.         
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    Criminal Laws--Handed over the sample parcel, duly sealed and sample impression of seal to Constable for depositing the same in the office of Chemical Examiner. --None had tampered with the aforesaid case property and the seal which remained in his custody. --Deposited the case property in the office of Chemical Examiner on the same day and tendered receipt. --Report of the Chemical Examiner (Ex. PJ) which indicates that the seals were intact when the sample was received and tallied with the sample impression of the seal.
--It is note worthy that such a report of the Chemical Examiner would be admissible under Section 293 of the Cr.P.C. Considering the aforesaid clear evidence, it cannot be said that there is any infirmity in the link evidence merely because there was a delay of few days in sending the sample to the office of the Chemical Examiner.-Appeal Dismissed- Supreme Court of India –Order Dated-February 11, 2011.
        
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    Civil Laws-Assigning of lesser marks to Sardar Mahinder Singh not only denied him the first place in the panel, but also unjustly and undeservedly gave the first respondent, the first place in the panel. The manner of assigning marks showed a clear intention to favour the first respondent at the cost of the other applicants. It is this finding that persuaded the General Manager of IOC to scrap the selection. The High Court having recorded a finding that the appellant was satisfied about the illegality committed by the selection committee, ought to have rejected the writ petition, as the decision of the appellants to scrap the selection was reasonable and not arbitrary.-Appeal Allowed- Supreme Court of India-Order dated:Feb 14, 2011         
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    Criminal Laws-Appeal-Sections 120-B and 409- IPC, Sections 5(1)(c) and 5(2) -PC Act-- The prosecution has established - a) By awarding both the works of Idamalayar at a very high and exorbitant rate with special conditions having heavy financial implications. b) By reducing the retention and security amount. c) By allowing the contractor to return only fifty per cent of the empty cement bags. Having arrived at such conclusion, - High Court failed to appreciate in its proper sense the materials placed by the prosecution and brushed aside several important items of evidence adduced by the prosecution.- Unable to accept the conclusion of the High Court, namely, ““the proved circumstances are not sufficient to hold that there was conspiracy as alleged by the prosecution”“. - Satisfied that the Special Court after framing various points for consideration and after thorough discussion has accepted the case of the prosecution insofar as the work of driving the surge shaft, lining the surge shaft, balance driving the power tunnel and other allied works of Idamalayar Hydro Electric Power Project at a higher or exorbitant rates to the contractor K.P. Poulose and the accused persons have abused their official positions. -The Special Court has also accepted the prosecution case founding that A1 along with K.P. Poulose, Paul Mundakkal and other accused persons entered into criminal conspiracy and rightly convicted them. -The High Court committed a grave error in acquitting the accused without adverting to the reliable and acceptable evidence adduced by the prosecution.- Appeal Allowed- Supreme Court of India –Order Dated: FEBRUARY 10, 2011         
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    Civil Laws- Appeal- A bare perusal of the said order would also indicate that he has given deductions for the items held as immovable. -The Commissioner having considered the aforesaid issue carefully and after proper scrutiny, the Tribunal was not justified in rejecting the said findings by mere conclusion and without trying to meet the findings recorded by the Commissioner–Appeal Allowed , Set aside order passed by Tribunal and restore the order of Commissioner- Supreme Court of India. –Order Dated:FEBRUARY 10, 2011.         
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    Even assuming, however, that the bus crew ought to have been examined as that would have greatly enhanced the value of the prosecution evidence, but their non-examination case would not mean that the entire prosecution story would fall through as there were several other credible witnesses including an injured one-- The appeal is accordingly dismissed.-Supreme Court of India -Order Dated- 4 Feb 2011.         
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    SUICIDE NOTE- DEFENCE TOOK BY ACCUSED THAT SUICIDE NOTE WRITTEN BY DECEASED-FAILURE TO REBUT THE PRESUMTION THAT HE HAD CAUSED DOWRY DEATH-APPEAL DISMISSED- In the instant case, evidently, the suicide note, Ext.P-2 purported to have been written by Sarla (deceased) had been taken by appellant as his defence while making his statement under section 313 Cr.P.C. Therefore, the onus was on him to establish his defence by leading sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that he has caused the dowry death. The appellant miserably failed to discharge that onus.--SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, DATED- 14/01/2011         
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    TRANSFER PETITION ALLOWED-CR.P.C-The petitioner has been able to show the circumstances from which it can be reasonably inferred that it has become difficult for the witnesses to safely depose truth because of fear of being haunted by those against whom they have to depose. The reluctance of the witnesses to go to the court at Haridwar in spite of receipt of repeated summons is bound to hamper the course of justice.

If such a situation is permitted to continue, it will pave way for anarchy, oppression, etc., resulting in breakdown of criminal justice system. In order to see that the incapacitation of the eye-witnesses is removed and justice triumphs, it has become necessary to grant the relief claimed in the instant petition. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case this Court is of the opinion that interest of justice would be served if transfer of the case from Haridwar to Delhi is ordered.
        
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    Accused caused single blow in quarrel--Converted from Culpable homicide amounting to Culpable homicide not amounting to murder- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- DATED-06/01/2011         
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    BAIL- GRANTED-DELAY IN CONCLUDING THE TRAIL-SUPREME COURT OF INDIA -dated--03/01/2011-
In deciding bail applications an important factor which should certainly be taken into consideration by the Court is the delay in concluding the trial. Often this takes several years, and if the accused is denied bail is ultimately acquitted, who will restore so many years of his life spent in custody? Is Article 21 of the constitution, which is the most basic of all the fundamental rights in our Constitution, not violated in such a case? Of course this is not the only factor, but it is certainly one of the important factors in deciding whether to grant bail.
        
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    No Intention - as mentioned U/s 300 IPC- considering the nature of the injuries sustained by the deceased as opined by Medical Expert- the conviction from Section 302 to Section 323 is altered.- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- dated--03/01/2011         
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    No intention to murder- Section 302 converted into 304 Part-II- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- dated--03/01/2011         
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    Dyeing Declaration - All witnesses hostiled - Conviction maintained on the basis of dyeing declaration alone : Supreme Court.         
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    Evidence on record - The deceased was subjected to crueltyand harassment by her husband, the appellant herein and the harassment was in connection with the demand of dowry- victim (deceased) died within oneyear and two months of the marriage- to set aside the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code but in the facts and circumstances of this case we proceed to convict the appellant under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code and sentence him to 9 years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.10,000/-         
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    Question of revival of the repealed clauses of L.R. Manual in case the substituted clauses are struck down by the court, would not arise. In view of this, the interim order would amount to substituting the legal policy by the judicial order, and thus not sustainable:Supreme Court         
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    APPOINTMENTS OF District Government Counsels/Asst.District Government Counsels in Uttar Pradesh under amended provisions of L.R.Manual : Supreme COURT Dated 3/12/2010.         
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    the first respondent set up the case in the plaint that the appellant was a trespasser in the subject room. The first appellate court has also recorded a categorical finding, which has not been disturbed by the High Court, that the appellant was occupying the subject room as trespasser. In the circumstances, the suit was clearly not maintainable for want of written permission from the Competent Authority and was rightly dismissed by the trial court- Appeal Dismissed- Supreme Court of India- Order Dated- 01 Dec 2010         
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    The recovery of blood stained loan form application bearing name and address of appellant Rameshbhai Mohanbhai Koli from the scene of offence and the serological report which opines the blood to be of group -O- which is the blood group of the deceased conclusively establishes the presence of accu sedat the scene of offence. Even though the panch-witness Vijaybhai has turned hostile to the prosecution but the spot panchnama has been cogently and convincingly proved through the testimony of the Investigating Officer.-conviction maintained :Supreme Court.         
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    Held " I. Absence of appellant from duty as Guard Commander for 25 minutes was bona fide and permissible under the statutory rules. II. Imposition of punishment of punishment drill for 10 days for the said absence was unwarranted. III. Protest by the appellant against the imposition of the said punishment could not warrant enhancement of punishment of the appellant for confinement in cell for ten days. IV. Disobedience of the enhanced punishment could not, in this case, warrant initiation of disciplinary proceedings by the Commandant concerned against the appellant. V. The Commandant could not himself become the Judge of his own cause. VI. The Commandant could not appoint his own subordinate as the inquiry officer. VII. The Commandant could have referred the matter to his superior officer for appropriate action in terms of Rules 1991. VIII. Once the Commandant concerned appeared as a witness himself in the enquiry, he could not pass the order of punishment. IX. The Authority who initiated the disciplinary proceedings against the appellant became a witness before the inquiry officer appointed by him, who is subordinate to him in his office and also accepted the enquiry report and passed the order of punishment. Thus, the order of punishment stood vitiated. X. The Appellate Authority could not consider the past conduct of the appellant to justify the order of punishment passed by the disciplinary authority without bringing it to the notice of the appellant. XI. As the punishment order had been passed in violation of the statutory rules and the principles of natural justice as well, it is rendered null and void. Thus, it remained inexecutable. XII. Past conduct of an employee should not generally be taken into account to substantiate the quantum of punishment without bringing it to the notice of the delinquent employee. XIII. The error of violating the principles of natural justice by the Disciplinary Authority has been of such a grave nature that under no circumstance can the past conduct of the appellant, even if not satisfactory, be taken into consideration.- Supreme Court.         
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    ALL WITNESSES TURNED HOSTILE - WHEATHER CONVICTION CAN BE BASED ON FIR AND STATEMENTS U/S 161 CR.P.C.? YES.

"The FIR had been lodged promptly, naming the appellant as the person who committed the offence. All the eye-witnesses, including the injured witnesses, attributed the commission of the offence only to the appellant in their statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. It is difficult to imagine that the complainant and the eye- witnesses had all falsely named the appellant as being the person responsible for the offence at the initial stage itself - SUPREME COURT"

Standard of Proof:

• Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 159; • State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh Baljit Singh & Anr., AIR 1973 SC 2407; • Shankarlal Gyarasilal Dixit v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1981 SC 765; • Mousam Singha Roy & Ors. v. State of West Bengal, (2003)12 SCC 377; and • Aloke Nath Dutta & Ors. v. State of West Bengal,(2007) 12 SCC 230). • In Sarwan Singh Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 637, Supreme Court observed : "Considered as a whole the prosecution story may be true; but between `may be true` and `must be true` there is inevitably a long distance to travel and the whole of this distance must be covered by legal, reliable and unimpeachable evidence [before an accused can be convicted]."

Circumstantial Evidence:

• In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622, Supreme Court observed that it is well settled that the prosecutions case must stand or fall on its own legs and cannot derive any strength from the weakness of the defence put up by the accused. However, a false defence may be called into aid only to lend assurance to the court where various links in the chain of circumstantial evidence are in themselves complete. The Court also discussed the nature, character and essential proof required in a criminal case which rests on circumstantial evidence alone and held as under: (1) The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established; (2) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty; (3) The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; (4) They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and (5) There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. A similar view has been reiterated by Supreme Court in - • State of Uttar Pradesh v. Satish, (2005) 3 SCC 114; • Krishnan v. State represented by Inspector of Police, (2008) 15 SCC 430; • Ramesh Bhai & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 12 SCC 603; • Subramaniam v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr., (2009) 14 SCC 415; • Babu v. State of Kerala, JT 2010 (8) SC 560, observing that the evidence produced by the prosecution should be of such a nature that it makes the conviction of the accused sustainable.

Hostile Witness:

State of Gujarat v. Anirudhsing, (1997) 6 SCC 514, State of Rajasthan v. Bhawani & Anr., (2003) 7 SCC 291) Radha Mohan Singh @ Lal Saheb & Ors. v. State of U.P., (2006) 2 SCC 450, observed as under:".....It is well settled that the evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross-examined him. The evidence of such witness cannot be treated as effaced or washed off the record altogether but the same can be accepted to the extent his version is found to be dependable on a careful scrutiny thereof... In Mahesh v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 13 SCC 271, Supreme Court considered the value of the deposition of a hostile witness and held as under: ".....If PW 1, the maker of the complaint has chosen not to corroborate his earlier statement made in the complaint and recorded during investigation, the conduct of such a witness for no plausible and tenable reasons pointed out on record, will give rise to doubt the testimony of the investigating officer who had sincerely and honestly conducted the entire investigation of the case. In these circumstances, we are of the view that PW.1 has tried to conceal the material truth from the Court with the sole purpose of shielding and protecting the appellant for reasons best known to the witness and therefore, no benefit could be given to the appellant for unfavourable conduct of this witness to the prosecution". In Rajendra & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2009) 13SCC 480, Supreme Court observed that merely because a witness deviates from his statement made in the FIR, his evidence cannot be held to be totally unreliable. Supreme Court reiterated a similar view in Govindappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2010) 6 SCC 533, observing that the deposition of a hostile witness can be relied upon at least upto the extent he supported the case of the prosecution. So, In view of the above, it is evident that the evidence of a person does not become effaced from the record merely because he has turned hostile and his deposition must be examined more cautiously to find out as to what extent he has supported the case of the prosecution.

Abscondance of Accused :

In Matru @ Girish Chandra v. The State of U.P., AIR 1971 SC 1050, Supreme Court repelled the submissions made by the State that as after commission of the offence the accused had been absconding,therefore, the inference can be drawn that he was a guilty person, observing as under: "The appellants conduct in absconding was also relied upon. Now, mere absconding by itself does not necessarily lead to a firm conclusion of guilty mind. Even an innocent man may feel panicky and try to evade arrest when wrongly suspected of a grave crime such is the instinct of self- preservation. The act of absconding is no doubt relevant piece of evidence to be considered along with other evidence but its value would alwaysdepend on the circumstances of each case Normally the courts are disinclined to attach much importance to the act of absconding, treating it as a very small item in the evidence for sustaining conviction. It can scarcely be held as a determining link in completing the chain of circumstantial evidence which must admit of no other reasonable hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused. In the present case the appellant was with Ram Chandra till the FIR was lodged. If thereafter he felt that he was being wrongly suspected and he tried to keep out of the way we do not think this circumstance can be considered to be necessarily evidence of a guilty mind attempting to evade justice. It is not inconsistent with his innocence." A similar view has been reiterated in Rahman v.State of U.P., AIR 1972 SC 110; State of M.P. v. Paltan Mallah & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 733; Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of West Bengal, JT 2010 (7) SC 379. So, Abscondance by a person against whom FIR has been lodged, having an apprehension of being apprehended by the police, cannot be said to be unnatural. Thus, mere abscondance by the appellant after commission of the crime and remaining untraceable for a period of six days itself cannot establish his guilt. Absconding by itself is not a conclusive proof of either of guilt or of a guilty conscience.

Statement u/s 313 Cr.P.C.

An accused can be questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C. only for the purpose of enabling him personally to explain any circumstance appearing in the evidence against him. No matter how weak or scanty the prosecution evidence is in regard to certain incriminating material, it is the duty of the Court to examine the accused and seek his explanation on incriminating material which has surfaced against him. Section 313 Cr.P.C. is based on the fundamental principle of fairness. The attention of the accused must specifically be brought to inculpatory pieces of evidence to give him an opportunity to offer an explanation if he chooses to do so. Therefore, the court is under a legal obligation to put the incriminating circumstances before the accused and solicit his response. This provision is mandatory in nature and casts an imperative duty on the court and confers a corresponding right on the accused to have an opportunity to offer an explanation for such incriminatory material appearing against him. Circumstances which were not put to the accused in his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. cannot be used against him and have to be excluded from consideration. ( Sharad Birdhichand ; and State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh & Anr., AIR 1992 SC 2100). In S. Harnam Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), AIR 1976 SC 2140, Supreme Court held that non-indication of inculpatory material and its relevant facts by the trial court to the accused adds to the vulnerability of the prosecution case. The recording of the statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is not a purposeless exercise. If any appellate Court or revisional court comes across the fact that the trial Court had not put any question to an accused, even if it is of a vital nature, such an omission alone should not result in the setting aside of the conviction and sentence as an inevitable consequence. An inadequate examination cannot be presumed to have caused prejudice. Every error or omission in compliance of the provisions of Section 313 Cr.P.C., does not necessarily vitiate trial. Such errors fall within category of curable irregularities and the question as to whether the trial is vitiated, in each case depends upon the degree of error and upon whether prejudice has been or is likely to have been caused to accused. Efforts should be made to undo or correct the lapse. Wasim Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1956 SC 400; Bhoor Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab, AIR 1974 SC 1256; Labhchand Dhanpat Singh Jain v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1975 SC 182; State of Punjab v. Naib Din, AIR 2001 SC 3955; Parsuram Pandey & Ors. v. State of Bihar, (2004) 13 SCC 189). In Asraf Ali v. State of Assam, (2008) 16 SCC 328, Supreme Court observed: "Section 313 of the Code casts a duty on the court to put in an enquiry or trial questions to the accused for the purpose of enabling him to explain any of the circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. It follows as a necessary corollary therefrom that each material circumstance appearing in the evidence against the accused is required to be put to him specifically, distinctly and separately and failure to do so amounts to a serious irregularity vitiating trial, if it is shown that the accused was prejudiced." In Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 2622, Supreme Court observed as under :"It is trite law, nevertheless fundamental, that the prisoner's attention should be drawn to every inculpatory material so as to enable him to explain it. This is the basic fairness of a criminal trial and failures in this area may gravely imperil the validity of the trial itself, if consequential miscarriage of justice has flowed. However where such an omission has occurred it does not ipso facto vitiate the proceedings and prejudice occasioned by such defect must be established by the accused. In the event of evidentiary material not being put to the accused, the court must ordinarily eschew such material from consideration. It is also open to the appellate court to call upon the counsel for the accused to show what explanation the accused has as regards the circumstances established against him but not put to him and if the accused is unable to offer the appellate court any plausible or reasonable explanation of such circumstances, the court may assume that no acceptable answer exists and that even if the accused had been questioned at the proper time in the trial court he would not have been able to furnish any good ground to get out of the circumstances on which the trial court has relied for its conviction." (Emphasis added). In Ganesh Gogoi v. State of Assam, (2009) 7 SCC 404, Supreme Court relying upon its earlier decision in Basavaraj R. Patil & Ors.v. State of Karnataka, (2000) 8 SCC 740, held that the provisions of Section 313 Cr.P.C. are not meant to nail the accused to his disadvantage but are meant for his benefit. The provisions are based on the salutary principles of natural justice and the maxim "audi alteram partem" has been enshrined in them. Therefore, an examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. has to be of utmost fairness. In Shaikh Maqsood v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 6 SCC 583; and Ranvir Yadav v. State of Bihar (2009) 6 SCC 595, Supreme Court held that it is the duty of the trial court to indicate incriminating material to the accused. Section 313 Cr.P.C. is not an empty formality. An improper examination/inadequate questioning underSection 313 Cr.P.C. amounts to a serious lapse on the part of the trial Court and is a ground for interference with the conviction. In Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar, AIR 1994 SC 2420, Supreme Court rejected the submission that as no question had been put to the accused on motive, no motive for the commission of the crime could be attributed to the accused, nor the same could be reckoned as circumstance against him observing that it could not be pointed out as to what in fact was the real prejudice caused to the accused by omission to question the accused on the motive for the crime. No material was placed before the court to show as to what and in what manner the prejudice, if any, was caused to the accused. More so, the accused/appellant was aware of accusation and charge against him. Thus, it is evident from the above that the provisions of Section 313 Cr.P.C make it obligatory for the court to question the accused on the evidence and circumstances against him so as to offer the accused an opportunity to explain the same. But, it would not be enough for the accused to show that he has not been questioned or examined on a particular circumstance, instead he must show that such non- examination has actually and materially prejudiced him and has resulted in the failure of justice. In other words, in the event of an inadvertent omission on the part of the court to question the accused on any incriminating circumstance cannot ipso facto vitiate the trial unless it is shown that some material prejudice was caused to the accused by the omission of the court.
        
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    Remmission of Sentence : Part A and Part B of Punjab Government`s order for remission of sentences discussed- earlier order reviewed - the special remission of one year under the Government Order dated 14.8.2002 was available to persons convicted for a term of seven years for the offence under section 304-B of IPC - Supreme Court.         
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    Electricity arrears do not constitute a charge over the property. Therefore in general law, a transferee of a premises cannot be made liable for the dues of the previous owner/occupier - Supreme Court.         
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    Abatement to suicide : Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this Court is clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and that act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide - defination of suicide ? - Supreme Court.         
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    Belated apology cannot be accepted because it has not been given in good faith--Even if it is not belated where apology is without real contrition and remorse and was merely tendered as a weapon of defence, the Court may refuse to accept it.         
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    The reserved category candidates "belonging to OBC, SC/ ST categories" who are selected on merit and placed in the list of General/Unreserved category candidates can choose to migrate to the respective reserved category at the time of allocation of services         
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    The National Human Rights Commission had published `Guidelines for the Administration of Polygraph Test (Lie Detector Test) on an Accused` in 2000. These guidelines should be strictly adhered to and similar safeguards should be adopted for conducting the `Narcoanalysis technique` and the `Brain Electrical Activation Profile` test. The text of these guidelines has been reproduced below: (i) No Lie Detector Tests should be administered except on the basis of consent of the accused. An option should be given to the accused whether he wishes to avail such test. (ii) If the accused volunteers for a Lie Detector Test, he should be given access to a lawyer and the physical, emotional and legal implication of such a test should be explained to him by the police and his lawyer. (iii) The consent should be recorded before a Judicial Magistrate. (iv) During the hearing before the Magistrate, the person alleged to have agreed should be duly represented by a lawyer. (v) At the hearing, the person in question should also be told in clear terms that the statement that is made shall not be a `confessional` statement to the Magistrate but will have the status of a statement made to the police. (vi) The Magistrate shall consider all factors relating to the detention including the length of detention and the nature of the interrogation. (vii) The actual recording of the Lie Detector Test shall be done by an independent agency (such as a hospital) and conducted in the presence of a lawyer. (viii) A full medical and factual narration of the manner of the information received must be taken on record.         
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    Police Custody Remand : Police remand can only be made during the first period of remand after arrest and production before the Magistrate, but not after the expiry of the said period.- Anupam J. Kulkarni case [sc] followed : Supreme Court.         
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    It is not only desirable but imperative that electronic and news media should also play positive role in presenting to general public as to what actually transpires during the course of the hearing and it should not be published in such a manner so as to get unnecessary publicity for its own paper or news channel. Such a tendency, which is indeed growing fast, should be stopped. We are saying so as without knowing the reference in context of which the questions were put forth by us, were completely ignored and the same were misquoted which raised unnecessary hue and cry.         
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    1) The appellate Court has all the necessary powers to re- evaluate the evidence let in before the trial Court as well as the conclusions reached. It has a duty to specify the compelling and substantial reasons in case it reverses the order of acquittal passed by the trial Court. In the case on hand, the High Court by adhering to all the ingredients and by giving cogent and adequate reasons reversed the order of acquittal. 2) The presence of the accused at the scene of crime is proved through the ocular testimonies of PWs 1, 2, 6, 20, 23, 24 and 70, corroborated by Ex PW 12/D-I as well as 3 PCR calls Ex PW 11/A, B and C. 3) Phone calls made immediately after an incident to the police constitutes an FIR only when they are not vague and cryptic. Calls purely for the reason of getting the police to the scene of crime do not necessarily constitute the FIR. In the present case, the phone calls were vague and therefore could not be registered as the FIR. The FIR was properly lodged as per the statement of Shyan Munshi PW-2. 4) Delay in recording the statement of the witnesses do not necessarily discredit their testimonies. The court may rely on such testimonies if they are cogent and credible. 5) The laboratory reports in the present case are vague and ambiguous and, therefore, they cannot be relied upon to reach any specific conclusion regarding the incident. 6) The evidence regarding the actual incident, the testimonies of witnesses, the evidence connecting the vehicles and cartridges to the accused - Manu Sharma, as well as his conduct after the incident prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The High Court has analyzed all the evidence and arrived at the correct conclusion. 7) The public prosecutor is under a duty of disclosure under the Cr.P.C., Bar Council Rules and relevant principles of common law. Nevertheless, a violation of this duty does not necessarily vitiate the entire trial. A trial would only be vitiated if non-disclosure amounts to a material irregularity and causes irreversible prejudice to the accused. In the present case, no such prejudice was caused to the accused, and therefore the trial is not vitiated. 8) No prejudice had been caused to the right of the accused to fair trial and non-furnishing of the copy of one of the ballistic reports had not hampered the ends of justice. The right of the accused to disclosure has not received any set back in the facts and circumstances of the case. 9) The High Court has rightly convicted the other two accused, namely, Amardeep Singh Gill @ Tony Gill and Vikas Yadav after appreciation of the evidence of PWs 30 and 101. 10) Normally, the judgment/order should be set aside or affirmed as the case may be but preferably without offering any undesirable comments, disparaging remarks or indications which would impinge upon the dignity and respect of judicial system. 11) Every effort should be made by the print and electronic media to ensure that the distinction between trial by media and informative media should always be maintained. Trial by media should be avoided particularly, at a stage when the suspect is entitled to the constitutional protections. Invasion of his rights is bound to be held as impermissible : Supreme Court.         
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    it is now a settled law that a confessional statement duly recorded by a police officer in a case related to TADA Act and the rules framed thereunder would continue to remain admissible for the offences under any other law which were tried along with TADA offences under Sections 12 read with Section 15 of the Act notwithstanding that the accused was acquitted of offences under the TADA Act in the same trial. But, here is a case where the allegation was mainly for the offences under the IPC and some offences under the TADA Act were also incorporated initially but later on the same were dropped. Consequently, charges in the said case were framed only for offences under 14 the IPC and not under the TADA Act and the trial is also only for offences under the IPC and not under the TADA Act. Therefore, such confessional statement as made by the respondent no. 4 under the TADA Act, in a different case, cannot be used or utilised by the prosecution in the present case as the charges were framed only for the offences under the Indian Penal Code.         
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    The priciple reteriated that whenever a person complains and claims that there is a violation of any provision of law or a Constitutional provision,it does not automatically involve breach of fundamental right for the enforcement of which alone Article 32 of the Constitution is attracted.         
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    This court cannot sit in judgment over whether investigations should be launched against politicians for alleged acts of corruption. The Supreme Court of India functions as a Constitutional Court as well as the highest appellate court in the country. If the Supreme Court gives direction for prosecution, it would cause serious prejudice to the accused, as the direction of this Court may have far reaching persuasive effect on the Court which may ultimately try the accused. It is always open to the petitioners to approach the investigative agencies directly with the incriminating materials and it is for the investigative agencies to decide on the further course of action: Supreme Court         
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    The Appellate Tribunal for Electricity-- has no jurisdiction to decide --the validity of the Regulations framed by the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission-- under Section 178 of the Electricity Act, 2003. The validity of the Regulations may, however, be challenged by seeking judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.         
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    Indian Penal Code,1860 -Section 304 Part II-Bail Bond cancelled- It is well settled that in a case where the Trial Court has recorded acquittal, the Appellate Court should be slow in interfering with the judgment of acquittal. On evaluation of the evidence, if the two views are possible, the Appellate Court should not substitute its own view and discard the judgment of the Trial Court. But, in the instant case, the High Court clearly came to the conclusion that the entire approach of the Trial Court cannot be sustained both on the law and the facts.         
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    Whether the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, can direct the Central Bureau of Investigation established under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 , to investigate a cognizable offence, which is alleged to have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of a State, without the consent of the State Government ? -Yes. : Constitution Bench Supreme Court.         
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    Death Penalty when to be awarded : Supreme Court         
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    "Section 304-B merely raises a presumption of dowry death and lays down that the minimum sentence should be 7 years, but it may extend to imprisonment for life. Therefore, awarding the extreme punishment of imprisonment for life should be used in rare cases and not in every case." -Three Judge Bench verdict of SC in the case of Hemchand v. State of Haryana followed : Supreme Court         
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    Sections 147, 148, 341, 504,506, 324, 326 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code-- The Trial Court did not find the Appellants guilty of the aforesaid offences and hence they were acquitted—High Reversed the Order and sentenced U/s-- Section 326 of the I.P.C. and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- each and simple imprisonment.         
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    Section 148, 302, 324, 323-IPC-Substantial part of the prosecution story has been disbelieved--Conviction of the appellant rests solely on the testimony of (PW-2) who does not seem to have particular respect for truth as observed by the trial court. --High Court assumed that he had received injuries in the same occurrence in which deceased was killed--set aside the judgments of the High Court and the trial court and acquit him of the charges under sections 302 & 324         
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    Indian Penal Code 306 IPC-- Appellant was convicted by the Assistant Sessions Judge, under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code-- High Court upheld the judgment of the learned Assistant Sessions Judge—the sentence of rigorous imprisonment of 10 years was reduced to 5 years- the conviction of the appellant cannot be sustained –Appeal Allowed         
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    The benefit must always go to the accused and not to the prosecution. If the prosecution wants to prove the fact, the same must be proved by leading evidence, which is reliable and trustworthy, which pinpoints and conclusively proves the guilt of the accused. This is not a case where we can safely hold that the evidence led was trustworthy and conclusively establishes that it is the accused only, who had committed the offence. Considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the order of acquittal: Supreme Court.         
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    The insurance companies in genuine and bona fide claims of the insurers should not adopt the attitude of avoiding payments on one pretext or the other.This attitude puts a serious question mark on their credibility and trustworthiness of the insurance companies. Incidentally by adopting honest approach and attitude the insurance companies would be able to save enormous litigation costs and the interest liability: Supreme Court.         
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    one of the grounds for cancellation of bail would be where material evidence brought on record have been ignored and that too without any reasons : Supreme Court         
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    . A Deputy General Manger is not a person who is responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company. He does not fall under any of the categories (a) to (g) listed in section 5 of the Companies Act . He cannot be made vicariously liable under Section 141(1) of the Act. If he has to be made liable under Section 141(2), the necessary averments relating to consent/connivance/negligence should have been made: Supereme Court         
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    Non Compliance of section 50 and non examination of two recovery witness ruled fatal for prosecution, order of acquittal confirmed : Supereme Court         
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    Transfusing wrong blood group to the patient which caused death , Mismatching of blood confirmed by the Senior Resident Doctor,Held a case of serious negligence by PGI and attending doctors, the order of state commision confirmed : Supereme Court         
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    The inherent powers can be exercised in those exceptional cases where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if are taken on their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused : Supereme Court         
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    As already undergone two years of imprisonment as well appeal may not heard in the near future- Intriem Bail Granted : Supereme Court         
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    Since the High Court had not kept the relevant parameters in view, while granting bail, order of bail set aside : Supreme Court         
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    No common object and not a member of unlawfull assembly-acquittal restored:Supereme Court         
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    As the appellant has established breach by the respondents, the award of Rs. 1,000 as damages for breach by the trial court is also upheld. As a consequence of the finding that the breach is on the part of the respondents and not on the appellant, the trial court was justified in giving a declaration that the respondents were not entitled to recover any extra cost involved in getting the work completed from the appellant. But it could not have granted the further relief of directing the respondents to refund the security deposit amount and retention deposit amount, as the appellant had neither quantified the said security deposit/retention deposit nor paid court fee thereon. Therefore, the decree granted by the trial court, to the extent it directs refund of the security deposit and retention amount, cannot be sustained.         
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    Dowry death-Harassment for dowry by In-laws of the deceased on various occasions-Deceased sent to her fathers home to arrange dowry about 10 days before the occurrence-Deceased returned to her matrimonial home on request of the accused persons-Deceased found dead under suspicious circumstances and cremated hurriedly         
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    The State should bear in mind the dicta of this Court in Mundrika Prasad Singh (supra) as regard the necessity to consult the District Judge. While making appointments of District Government Counsel, therefore, the State should give primacy to the opinion of the District Judge. Such a course of action would demonstrate fairness and reasonableness of action and, furthermore, to a large extent the action of the State would not be dubbed as politically motivated or otherwise arbitrary. As noticed hereinbefore, there also does not exist any rationale behind deletion of the provision relating to consultation with the High Court in the matter of appointment of the Public prosecutors in the High Court.
The said provision being a salutary one, it is expected that the State of U.P. either would suitably amend the same or despite deletion shall consult the High Court with a view to ensure fairness in action : Supreme Court Dated 21/4/2004.
        
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    Recruitment-Post of Lecturer-Order of Vice Chancellor declining to accord approval to appellant`s selection-Re-advertisement of the post- Appellant appeared before Selection Committee without any protest-Whether appellant could challenge earlier order of Vice Chancel-lor-Held, no-She was estopped by her conduct --Service Law         
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    Suit for partition-Defendant claiming through gift deed- Plaintiff alleging the document to have been brought fraudulently-Suit decreed by trial court-Execution of gift deed disbelieved-Defendant`s appeal allowed- High Court dismissed plaintiff`s second appeal holding that there was no specific denial by plaintiff and the proviso to Section 68 would apply         
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    Death of a woman in her matrimonial house after three years of marriage-Death found to be not under ordinary circumstances-Husband and other close relatives tried under Sections 304-B, 498-A and 306 IPC-Presumption of law under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act drawn-All the accused convicted of all the offences charged- Appeal filed by accused in the High Court against conviction and sentence         
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    In appeal appeal the High Court acquitted the respondent, holding that the prosecutrix was not proved beyond reasonable doubt to be below 16 years of age, that though the factum of respondent having committed sexual intercourse was proved, but the absence of injuries on the person of the prosecutrix infers the possibility of the prosecutrix being the con-senting party to the act, that the delay in lodging FIR was not satisfactorily explained, and that the delay coupled with non-examination renders the prosecution case doubtful.         
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    Constitution is Supreme- No authority created under constitution is Supreme- the Constitution is supreme.-Supreme Court- Bench Strength 11.-Dated 27.2.1967.         
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    Short Listing Criterea         
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