Result of U.P. Higher Judicial Service (Main Written) Examination, 2014 Direct Recruitment to U.P. Higher Judicial Service held on 14th, 15th and 16th November, 2014 has been declared. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur notified Advertisement for recruitment additional district judges through M.P. Higher Judicial Service (Entry Level) Direct Recruitment for BAR, Exam 2015 Haryana Judicial Services Examination 2014-Pre is conducted on 10th of Jan 2015. The result is awaited. THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI will hold examination for direct recruitment against 14 vacancies to Delhi Higher Judicial Service on Sunday, the 06th April,2014-Last Date 06.02.2014 13/11/2013: While renewing the term of the appointment of the existing incumbents the State Government is required to consider their past performance and conduct in the light of the recommendations made by the District Judges and the District Magistrates. Therefore, the High Court could not have issued a Mandamus for renewal of the term of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and other similarly situated persons and thereby frustrated the provisions of LR Manual and Section 24 Cr.P.C .- SUPREME COURT.
HIGH COURT JUDGEMENT
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  Date 7/29/2009 12:00:00 AM
  Court Allahabad High Court
  Parties Pankaj Rai Vs. State Of U.P.
  Appeal Criminal Appeal - 341 of 2006
  Act Indian Penal Code - 304-B
  Judgement
  (Delivered by Hon. Vinod Prasad J.) Appellant Pankaj Rai has challenged his conviction under Sections 498-A, 304-B I.P.C. and 4 Dowry Prohibition Act recorded by Sessions Judge, Sonbhadra vide his impugned judgment and order dated 4.1.2006 rendered in S.T. No. 115 of 2001 (State Vs. Pankaj Rai and others). Under Section 498-A I.P.C., he has been sentenced to one year R.I., under Section 304-B life imprisonment and under Section 4 Dowry Prohibition Act six months R.I. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently. According to the prosecution version, as is mentioned in the FIR Ext Ka-1, Pramila D/o informant Lal Sahab Rai P.W. 1, tied her nupital knot with appellant Pankaj Rai S/o Rajnikant Rai, on 29.1.2001 according to the Hindu custom and rights. After the wed lock, Pramila (deceased) came to her in-laws house but just after 15 or 20 days, she informed the informant that her appellant husband, his father-in-law Rajnikant Rai and mother-in-law Smt. Lalpari Devi were demanding a four wheeler and for fulfillment of the said demand, she was being tortured and therefore she requested that she be brought back and if the said demand is not satisfied her life will not be spared. According to the informants case,he has given ornaments, cash, clothes etc. in the marriage. When the informant came to in -laws house at Obra to meet her daughter and take her back, present appellant along with his parents repeated the demand of a four wheeler and, on inability being shown by the informant in fulfilling the said demand, they refused to send back Pramila unless the demand is fulfilled. They even did not allow him to meet his daughter and, therefore, informant had to return back to Itarsi, where he was posted as Section Engineer in the Railways. Subsequent thereto appellant repeated his demand on telephone as well and even threatened the informant that the non fulfillment of it will result in ugly consequences. Pramila used to inform her mother regarding demand and torture. On 4.4.2001 at 1.30 a.m., an unknown telephone call informed the father informant that his daughter Pramila had bade a adieu to this ephemeral world. Informant rushed to Obra immediately and after reaching there, inquired from the neighbours who informed him that non fulfillment of dowry demand costed life of his daughter who was murdered by her husband and in-laws and, thereafter was burnt to conceal the evidences of murder crime committed by them. Informant, therefore, scribed a report, vide Ext. Ka-1, and lodged it at police station Obra on 5.4.2001 at 1.30 p.m. for offenses under Sections 498-A, 304-B I.P.C. and 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act, which was registered as crime no. 77 of 2001. On the basis of the said written report Head Moharrir, Sabhajit Pandey P.W. 5 prepared the chik FIR, Ext. Ka-33, and the relevant GD entry Ext. Ka-34. The investigation of the crime was commenced by Dy.S.P. C.B.C.I.D., S.N. Tiwari P.W. 6, who copied the chik FIR and the GD and then proceedings for the spot, where he recovered half of burnt clothes of the deceased and prepared its recovery memo. Subsequent thereto, he recorded the statement of head constable Sabhajit Pandey and that of the informant Lal Sahab Rai. At the pointing out of the informant, he prepared the site plan Ext. Ka-35. Following day on 6.4.2001, the accused persons were arrested and their statements were recorded. The Investigating Officer thereafter copied the postmortem report and recorded the statement of inquest witnesses. Subsequent thereto, he recorded the statement of Dr. Manik Chandra, P.W. 4, who had conducted the autopsy on the dead body of the deceased. On 10.4.2001, I.O. copied the inquest report and thereafter recorded the statements of S.D.M. Robertsganj, Duryodhan Yadav, on 13.4.2001, who had conducted the inquest on the dead body of the deceased and had signed the inquest report. Inquest report and connected papers, however were scribed by S.I. Intikhab Ahmad P.W.7 in the presence of the S.D.M. and he has proved them as Ext. Ka-37 to Ka-41.This witness had also collected half burnt clothes of the deceased and the match stick lying near the dead body and had prepared its recovery memo, Ext. Ka-42. On subsequent dates, between 19.4.2001 and 21.4.2001, I.O. recorded the statements of Ravindra Nath Rai, Jamwanti and, thereafter, that of Munindra Nath Rai, Ramawati, Shiv Pravesh Ram, Shiv Chandra Dubey, Km. Shilpi, and Indra Dev Rai. I.O., thereafter, interrogated Lallan Pratap, Surendra Singh and Mahendra. On 16.6.2001, he looked into the various documents dispatched by the informant regarding the telephonic conversation and purchases made by him in connection with the marriage of the deceased and jotted it in his case diary. Same day, he recorded the statement of Smt. Sheela Rai W/o informant and mother of the deceased and thereafter, concluding the investigation, finally drew and laid charge sheet, Ext. Ka-38, against the appellant and his acquitted parents in the Court. It is pertinent to record here that the inquest and the postmortem examination on the dead body of the deceased was conducted on the information given by acquitted accused Rajnikant Rai, father of the appellant and father-in-law of the deceased, to the police, with the averments that his daughter-in-law Pramila had committed suicide. Autopsy on the dead body was performed by Dr. Manik Chandra, P.W. 4, on 5.4.2001 at 4 p.m and the autopsy report Ext. Ka-31, showed that the deceased was 23 years of age and one day had lapsed since her death. Both arms, legs and hip were flexed and rigor mortis had passed off. Her both eyes were closed, tongue protruded and was burnt, hair were present in the nostrils. On external examination, the doctor found (1) There was a postmortem burn of bones of front of chest. P.M. burn of ant. surface of abdomen, P.M. burn of neck (ant. surface and lateral surface). (2) Posterior surface of neck, back of chest, abdomen and buttock were not burnt. (3) IInd degree burn on an interior aspect of upper limb. (4) IIIrd degree burn on the external aspects of lower limb. (5) Synging of ........... axillary hair present. (6) Base of ruptured bulle or vessels were white and yellow. On internal examination, skull membranes were congested, walls, ribs and cartilages were burnt. Pleura, Trachea and Larynx were roasted. There was absence of carbon particles in the trachea. Right and left lungs, pericardium, heart and peritoneum were roasted. The autopsy doctor could not found the cause of death and, therefore, he collected the contents of burnt body parts in three jars. The first jar contained stomach contents, Loops of small intestine, Jar II, roasted pieces of liver, gall bladder, and Jar III some portions of spleen and Kidney. Uterus of the deceased was not gravid and large intestine contained gases and faecal matter. The collected body parts along with recovered hair and clothes were sent for serologist examination whose report indicated absence of poison but the hair were human. After submission of the charge sheet, the case of the accused persons was committed to the court of sessions as S.T. No. 115 of 2001 (State Vs. Pankaj Rai and others). Sessions Judge, Sonbhadra frame charges against the accused under Sections 498-A, 304-B/34 I.P.C. and Section 4 Dowry Prohibition Act, on 20.11.2001, which charges were denied by them who claimed to be tried. Prosecution in order to bring home the guilt of the accused persons examined seven prosecution witnesses, out of whom informants Lal Sahab Rai P.W. 1(informant), Ravindra Nath Rai, P.W. 2 and Smt. Sheela Rai P.W. 3 were the witnesses of facts. Dr. Manik Chandra P.W. 4, Sabhajit Pandey P.W. 5, S.N. Tiwari P.W. 6 and S.I. Intikhab Ahmad P.W. 7 were the formal witnesses. In their depositions before the Court, the witness of fact supported the prosecution version as was contained in the FIR. They deposed regarding the marriage of the deceased with the appellant, demand of a four wheeler by the accused persons soon after the marriage, tortured meted out to her for non-fulfillment of the dowry demand, refusal by the accused to allow the father to meet the deceased, when he had come to Obra, telephonic message regarding demise of the deceased, and the gathered information by the informant father that she was murdered and then burnt. We do not propose to go into the details of those evidences recorded during the trial, which are vividly described in the impugned judgement, by the trial Judge, for the reasons that, before us, it was contended by learned senior counsel for the appellant, that so far as,convictions and sentences under Section 498-A I.P.C. and 4 Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, they are established and no criticism of the impugned judgment in that respect can be advanced by him as that will be a futile exercise and therefore he submitted that on those charges the appeal lacks merit and since the only mooted question before us relate only with the medical report and serologist report for establishing the guilt under section 304 B I.P.C. The accused persons in their statements under Section 313 Cr.P.C. took plea of denial and the appellant took defence that no demand of dowry was ever made by them nor the deceased was tortured for the said purpose. He further took the plea that he had gone on vacations on two or three places along with deceased. The police has conducted ex-parte investigation. No action was taken by the police regarding theft which was committed at his house. At the time of the incident none of the accused were present in the house and the appellant was present at his centre. His father had gone on duty and mother had gone to the house of Rameshwar Singh to return the money. Pramila (deceased) had shut herself inside the house when nobody was there. When the mother (Smt. Lalpari Devi) returned to the house she knocked at the door in vain and then she had sent for the appellant who had came there from his centre and with the help of ladder jumped into the courtyard (angan) and open the door. At that time, the deceased was lying at the kitchen door in a burnt condition and the smock was coming out. The appellant pulled her and poured water from a tank and thereafter wrapped quilt on her. Other people informed him that the deceased had lost her life. He had further deposed that he had gone to the centre at 7 a.m. and his father had gone on his duty at 9.30 a.m. In respect of his defence, the accused persons had examined Uma Shanker D.W. 1, Govind Prasad Rai D.W. 2 and Ram Singh D.W. 3. Sessions Judge, after looking into the evidence led before him came to the conclusion that the prosecution has successfully brought home the guilt only of the appellant for the charges mentioned above and, therefore, convicted him as is referred to above. However, it found that the prosecution has not been able to prove the charge against the father-in-law and mother-in-law, Rajnikant Rai and Smt. Lalpari Devi respectively and, therefore, it acquitted them of those charges. There is no appeal against acquittal of those two accused persons. Hence this appeal is by the appellant challenging his convictions and sentences. We have heard Sri V.P. Srivastava, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Sudhindra Kumar, on behalf of the appellant and learned AGA in opposition. Sri V.P. Srivastava, learned Senior Counsel, contended that the recorded conviction and sentences for the charge of offences under section 498-A I.P.C. and section 4 of D.P.Act do not suffer from any infirmity of law and fact and hence he can not question the legality of the impugned order on those counts and hence did not addressed us in respect of those charges. He,however, questioned the legality and sustainability of sentence and conviction under section 304-B I.P.C. and made a maiden argument before us that so far as charge under Section 304-B I.P.C. is concerned, the prosecution has not been able to substantiate and prove it. The sheet anchor of the said argument is the evidence of P.W. 4, Dr. Manik Chandra and serologist report. It was submitted that doctor has categorically stated that the cause of death could not be ascertained by him and, therefore, viscera was preserved. Inviting our attention on the viscera report dated 23.7.2001, it was contended that no poison was found in the viscera report in the organs of the deceased which were kept in three Jars and, therefore, the cause of death could not be ascertained and hence the deceased did not die unnatural death,consequently recorded conviction under Section 304-B I.P.C. can not be sustained and deserves to be set aside. He invited our attention to section 304-B, I.P.C. and on various decisions by the apex court in support of this contention. Learned Senior counsel contended that for establishing the charge of dowry death, causing of death by homicide or suicide is sine-qua non and the definition of Dowry death does not imbibe in it, natural death. He submitted that once the doctor had failed to note the cause of death, there can not be any presumption of causing of death by the appellant, as a penal statute has to be construed strictly and hence, in absence of evidence of causing homicidal or suicidal death, offense under section 304-B I.P.C. is not made out nor the appellant can be convicted for the said offense. Learned counsel further contended that the initial burden of proof never shifts and it is only when the prosecution had discharged its initial burden of proof of brining the case within the ambit of section 304-B, I.P.C., that the presumption under section 113-B of the Evidence Act can be resorted to, for judging the guilt of the accused. It is, therefore, submitted that if the prosecution failed prove causing of death by burn or bodily injury or other wise than under normal circumstances, then the defence of the accused, howsoever fanciful, can not be relied upon to convict the accused. Defence of the accused can not the sole ground for convicting him retorted, learned senior counsel. It is contended that on the facts of the present case, prosecution has failed to discharge its burden and hence the conviction of the appellant under section 304-B,I.P.C. be set aside and he be acquitted of that offense only. Learned AGA, on the other hand contended that the cause of death of the deceased, even though in the estimation of the doctor could not be ascertained but the said opinion of the doctor is contrary to the findings recorded by him in the autopsy report, Ext.Ka 31. It is submitted that Dr. Manik Chandra, P.W. 4, ignored the facts recorded by him in his Autopsy report and, therefore, the guilt of the appellant is established as the deceased had died, not under normal circumstance, but by a homicidal death. Learned AGA, therefore, contended that the appeal lacks merit and deserves to be dismissed in toto. We have considered the arguments raised by both the sides and have carefully perused the postmortem examination report Ext. Ka-31 and the statement of the Dr. Manik Chandra P.W. 4.Before we dwell upon the contentions raised and refuted by either side a resume of law on the mooted question is inked below. Section 304-B, I.P.C., which lays down definition of dowry death and the punishment to be implanted therefor is as follows:- 304-B. Dowry Death- (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with any demand for dowry, such death shall be called dowry death and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation - For the purpose of this sub-section dowry shall have same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life. Thus, for proving a charge of dowry death four ingredients have to be satisfied and they are (1) that the death of a woman (wife) should be caused by burn, bodily injury or other wise than under normal circumstances (2) before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband and/or his relatives (3) the harassment or cruelty has to be in relation to or in connection with any demand of dowry (4) harassment and cruelty was done soon before her death and, therefore had close proximity with it in point of time (5) that death had occurred within seven years of her (deceased) marriage. If above five ingredients are satisfied then the accused can be charged and can be convicted under section 304-B, I.P.C. Theses aspects have been considered by the apex court as well in many of its decisions. In Harjit singh versus State of Punjab: (2006) 1 SCC 463 it has been held as under :- 17. From a conjoint reading of Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code and Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, it will be apparent that a presumption arising thereunder will operate if the prosecution is able to establish the circumstances as set out in Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code. 18. The ingredients of the aforementioned provisions are : (1) That the death of the woman caused by any burns or bodily injury or in some circumstances which is not normal; (2) Such death occurs within 7 years from the date of her marriage (3) That the victim was subjected or cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband; (4) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry, and (5) is established that such cruelty and harassment was made soon before her death. (Under line emphasis supplied) In Kamesh Panjiyar alias Kamlesh Panjiyar versus State of Bihar: AIR 2005 Supreme Court 785., the apex court has held as under :- The provision has application when death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relatives of her husband for, or in connection with any demand for dowry. 10. In order to attract application of Section 304-B IPC, the essential ingredients are as follows :- (i) The death of a woman should be caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under a normal circumstance. (ii) Such a death should have occurred within seven years of her marriage. (iii) She must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband. (iv) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry. (v) Such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted out to the woman soon before her death. There are other decisions also on this aspect of the matter of which take note of Suresh Kumar Singh Versus State of U.P.: 2009 (4) Supreme 529; Hira Lal Versus State of Delhi: 2003 Cr.L.J. 3711; Savitri Singh and Others versus State of U.P.: 2001 (43) ACC 912; Balwant singh versus State of Punjab:2005 (1) JIC 7; State of Rajasthan Versus Teg Bahadur: 2005 JIC(1) 19. Here in the present appeal , we are concerned only with the first ingredient that the death has be caused by bodily injury, burn or other wise than under normal circumstances, to establish the charge of dowry death. So far as the first two reasons (Bodily injury or burn) are concerned , there is no dispute that if the bodily injury or burn is the cause of death, it is either homicidal or suicidal, and therefore under both causes it can be presumed that the death has been caused by the accused. Therefore, in those case,if, rest of the ingredients are established, then the charge of dowry death stands substantiated. However the difficulty arises, when the third reasons is relied upon by the prosecution to establish the charge of dowry death. What is meant by words Otherwise than under normal circumstances ? These words occur after two or in the statue and therefore it has to be interpreted as to foster the same idea of causing death by bodily injury or by burn. The natural corollary of such an exposition is that natural death has been kept out of the purview of dowry death. If, death has occurred under normal circumstances, it can not be said to be an unnatural death. Therefore, for a death to be not under normal circumstances, it has to be unnatural, both in its cause and circumstances in which it had occurred. If the cause of death is not unnatural, it can not be taken to be an unnatural death. A normal death, though surrounded by unnatural circumstances, can not be a death occurring under abnormal circumstances as the cause of death is natural and hence will not be covered within the ambit of Dowry Death to make an accused liable for that charge . Consequently , for establishing the charge of dowry death in case of or otherwise under natural circumstances, the prosecution must prove that not only the circumstances in which death occurred were unnatural,but the cause of death was also unnatural. In our this view we draw support from two decisions of the apex court, the first one is Akula Ravinder and others, versus The State of A.P. : AIR 1991 Supreme Court 1142 and the other is Kamesh Panjiyar alias Kamlesh Panjiyar (Supra). In the former decision Akula Ravinder ( Supra) the apex court has held as under :- 3. A perusal of the S.304B shows that one of the essential ingredients that has to be established is that death was otherwise than in normal circumstances. In this case no doubt, the other circumstance namely that the death occurred within seven years of the marriage and that before her death they have harassed her for demand of dowry are established. Coming to the other ingredient we find that the prosecution has miserably failed to establish that death was otherwise than in normal circumstances. The learned counsel appearing for the State, however, submits that the deceased was young and the death was not due to natural cause nor it was due to an accident and the only inference that can be drawn is that it was otherwise than under normal circumstances. In a case of this nature where the prosecution has failed to establish that it was an unnatural death it cannot be surmised that death must be due to unnatural circumstance. In this context the framing of the charge and the circumstances that are put to accused u/ S. 313, Cr. P.C. also assume importance. The charge was u/ S. 302, IPC and the contents of the charge are to the effect that death was only due to asphyxia. In the examination of S. 313 it was not even indicated that the death could be due to poisoning. In any event in view of the facts and circumstances regarding the death, it has become very difficult, rather impossible, to hold that the death was otherwise than the normal circumstances and consequently we are constrained to hold that this important aspect of S. 304B is not met out. Consequently the appellants are entitled to acquittal of the said offence. (underline emphasis supplied) In the second decision Kamesh Panjiyar alias Kamlesh Panjiyar (Supra) the apex court has held as under :- 15. In the instant case, great stress has been laid on the opinion of the doctor that possible cause of death was not ascertainable. As noted by the trial Court and the High Court, black stained rough skin on both sides of neck was found. It has also been noticed by the doctor who conducted the post-mortem examination that blood stained fluid was trickling from the side of mouth and brain matters were found congested. The doctor unfortunately did not consider the effect of the marks on the neck and trickling of blood stained fluid from the mouth. The I.O. (PW-9) had seized a blood stained pillow. There was no evidence that the death was due to normal reasons. Evidence of PWs 1, 3 and 6 amply established demand of dowry and ill-treatment of the deceased shortly before the date of occurrence. The trial Court and the High Court were justified in drawing the conclusion about guilt of the accused. (underline emphasis supplied) Reverting back to the facts of the present appeal, the bizarre aspect of the autopsy by Dr. Manik Chandra P.W. 4, is that he had found the tongue protruded and burnt, even blister present on the body. According to his opinion, blisters were postmortem burns and, the cause of death could not be ascertained. But we find that the said opinion by the doctor is not right. Rigor mortis had passed off from the body and brain was congested. From theses four facts it was easy to cogitate that at the time of burning deceased was already dead. Roasting of main body parts had diminished evidences of congestion of those parts. Stoppage of oxygen supply to brain indicates stopped of supply of oxygen to other parts of body as well. In case of natural death tongue will not protrude nor it will get burnt. Had the doctor been more careful in his examination, there was no difficulty for him to draw a positive conclusion of homicidal death than leaving the whole thing in a realm of suppositions. Opining thus, we find that it was for the appellant to explain as to who had burnt the deceased after she had died and how she had died. No explanation has been offered by him in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. consistent with the proven facts. Plea of accidental burn and statement of the appellant under section 313 Cr.P.C. are wholly false and most surreal. The defence has already admitted charge of offences under Section 498-A I.P.C. and 4 Dowry Prohibition Act proved to the hilt. In such circumstances, we can very safely apply the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act in the present case as all ingredients for making out an offence under Section 304-B I.P.C. stands proved by the prosecution. At this juncture, we would like to deal with one argument of the matter, which was argued before us that it is the primary responsibility of the prosecution to prove its case to the hilt and only after that presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act can be invoked. This aspect of the matter should not vex our mind any more because the law on this score is well settled. The burden of proof on the prosecution never shifts. It is always for the prosecution to prove its case to the hilt first. If the prosecution fails to prove the charge through prosecution evidences, the accused has to be acquitted. It is only when the prosecution has established the charge that the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act can be resorted to. If the prosecution is unsuccessful in bringing home the ingredients of offences under Section 304-B I.P.C. the question of applying presumption under Section 113-B Evidence Act does not arise at all. It is for the prosecution to establish that the marriage was solemnized within 7 years, there was demand of dowry, the death was caused because of the said demand by the husband or his relatives and the said demand was proximate in time from the occurred death. In absence of any of ingredients, the charge under Section 304-B I.P.C. cannot be said to be established and in such a situation, application of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act cannot at all be resorted to. Moreover, presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is a Rule of evidence. First the primary offence is to be established and only then application of the Rule of evidence comes into question. In such a view, the contention raised by learned counsel for the appellant, in this respect, is well founded. Since, we are of the view that the deceased was first murdered and then burnt, within a short span of time, or probably simultaneously, as is clear from the contents of the postmortem report, we are not inclined to accept that the cause of death of the deceased was not known. She definitely died homicidal death and then an endeavour was made to obliterate the evidence of crime. In this respect, we also show our serious displeasure on the laxity on the part of the Sessions Judge, Sonbhadra for not framing charge under Section 201 I.P.C. against the appellant and other accused. It was a case where the charges under Section 201 I.P.C. ought to have been framed and accused should have been tried for the said charge as well. We therefore, come to a conclusion that the guilt of the appellant is well cemented and he has been rightly convicted for the charged offences. Coming to the sentence part, we find that the sentence of life imprisonment awarded on the appellant, on the facts and circumstances of the appeal under Section 304-B I.P.C. is excessive. No reason much less to say an acceptable and a legal one has been indicated by the trial Judge to impose extreme penalty. It seems that the trial Judge was swayed away by the fact that a young bride, within two months of her marriage was done to death and an endeavour was also made to obliterate the evidence of crime . Under Section 304-B I.P.C., sentence of life imprisonment should be awarded only in rarest of rare cases when ghastliness of the crime and the manner in which it was executed to cause death revolts the conscience. That is not the case here before us. From the statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., we find that the appellant was just 27 years of age. He had no criminal history nor had any criminal antecedents. The offence was committed or probably death occurred because of sudden impulsive action on the part of the appellant. His subsequent act no doubt aggravated the magnitude of the crime but that seems to be because of fear psycosis of being punished in a charge of murder. Otherwise also offence under section 201 I.P.C. is punishable only with maximum 3 years, where the maximum punishment for the primary offence is life imprisonment, as is the case here. Rapacity had diminished all appellants sane senses. Wealth is one of three proginator vices. Two of his parents have been acquitted by the trial court. If the appellant would not have attempted to burn the corpse, his crime would have been like any other dowry death case. No doubt he has committed a scurrilous crime which he ought not to have been committed being a human being but this does not call for maximum penalty to be imposed on him. We also note it here that the crime was aggravated because of the burning of the corpse. However, for the said fact, the appellant was neither charged nor was prosecuted. The trial Judge in that score committed an error but we should not looked the site of the fct that once the appellant was neither prosecuted of the said charge while sentencing him, we cannot take that change into consideration and hence gravity of the offence is slightly diminished. Moreover, once the cause of death was not known, it cannot be said that the appellant acted in a manner which boggles the mind and, therefore, also we consider it appropriate to reduce the part of sentence. We, therefore, while dismissing the appeal of the appellant and confirming his convictions on all the three offences alter his sentence for offence under Section 304-B I.P.C. only, from life imprisonment to a period of 10 years R.I. with a fine of Rs. 2 lacs. Appellant is allowed two months time to deposit entire amount of fine. In case of default in payment of fine, he shall under go 2 years further rigorous imprisonment. If the fine is deposited by the appellant, the same shall be transmitted by the trial Court to the informant as a mark of scanty respect to his innocent daughter. In the result, this appeal is party allowed. Conviction of the appellant on all the offences under section 498-A, 304- B I.P.C. and section 4 D.P. Act and his sentences of 1 year RI under section 498-A I.P.C. and 6 months RI, under section 4 D.P. Act, as awarded by the trial court is maintained but his sentence under section 304-B , I.P.C. is altered from life imprisonment to 10 years R.I. with fine of Rs. Two lacs. Appellant is allowed two months time to deposit entire amount of fine with the trial court. In case of default in payment of fine , he shall under go two years further RI. If the fine awarded is deposited by the appellant, it shall be handed over to the informant by the trial court in full after noticing him. Appellant is in jail. He will remain in jail to serve out the sentences. Let a copy of this order be notified to the trial court for its intimation.