THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI will hold examination for direct recruitment against 14 vacancies to Delhi Higher Judicial Service on Sunday, the 06th April,2014-Last Date 06.02.2014 13/11/2013: While renewing the term of the appointment of the existing incumbents the State Government is required to consider their past performance and conduct in the light of the recommendations made by the District Judges and the District Magistrates. Therefore, the High Court could not have issued a Mandamus for renewal of the term of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and other similarly situated persons and thereby frustrated the provisions of LR Manual and Section 24 Cr.P.C .- SUPREME COURT. 12 Nov. 2013- Registration of FIR by police in cognizable offence is must and action must be taken against officials for not lodging a case on the complaint filed in such offences.- Supreme Court.(PTI) 09/11/2013: Supreme Court stayed Gauhati High Court order that declared CBI as unconstitutional. 06-11-2013 -"while we decline to hold and declare that the DSPE Act, 1946, is not a valid piece of legislation, we do hold that the CBI is neither an organ nor a part of the DSPE and the CBI cannot be treated as a ‘police force’ constituted under the DSPE Act, 1946"-GUWAHATI HIGH COURT
LATEST JUDGEMENTS OF VARIOUS HIGH COURTS
SEARCH JUDGEMENTS
Loading
 
Allahabad High Court

Judgement Dated: 22-Dec-2010

Head note: 156(3)Cr.pc-Interlocutory Order-no criminal revision will lie against the orders passed by the Magistrate directing investigation under section 156(3) Cr.P.C- ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT-FULL BENCH-DATED 20 DEC 2010

Judgement:
( Delivered by Hon’‘ble Amar Saran, J)

1.We have heard Sri. G.S. Chaturvedi Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Samit Gopal, Sri D.S. Mishra and Sri Dileep Gupta Advocates for the private parties and Sri Patanjali Mishra, A.G.A., Sri Neeraj Verma, A.G.A., and Sri D.R. Chaudhari, Governemnt Advocate for the State of U.P. Written arguments and case law were filed by the State. However inspite of time being allowed, no written arguments or case law were filed by the private counsel, except Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, who had filed some case law in 2008 in the leading petition, Crl. Revn. No. 1640 of 2000 on behalf of Father Thomas, and has also supplied us with some additional photocopies of relevant case law.

2.This Full Bench was constituted after an order dated 28.9.01 was passed by the Single Judge (Hon. J.C. Gupta, J), who was examining the power of the Court in a Criminal Revision to question an order of the Magistrate issuing a direction under section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereafter ‘‘Cr.P.C’‘ or ‘‘the Code’‘) to the police to register an FIR and to investigate the same.

3.The Single Judge was of the view that as the accused has no locus standi before an order is passed summoning the accused, and also as the order directing investigation is purely interlocutory in nature, in view of the statutory bar contained in section 397(2) of the Code, the said order was not revisable.

4.However, as it had been held in Ajay Malviya vs. State of U.P and others, reported in 2000(41) ACC 435 that as an order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C is a judicial order, hence any FIR registered on its basis could not be challenged by means of a writ petition. Dissenting from this view the Single Judge without disputing the position that an order under section 156(3) of the Code was a judicial order, observed that the said order was an interlocutory order, which could not be challenged by a prospective accused who had no locus standi at the stage of investigation, hence a Criminal Revision was not maintainable for challenging the said order. In this background the Single Judge raised doubts about the correctness of the decision of the division bench in Ajay Malviya which based its conclusions on the position that as an order under section 156(3) was a judicial order, hence it was ipso facto revisable, and therefore no FIR pursuant to such an order, could be challenged by means of a criminal writ. The learned single judge thereupon vacated all the stay orders granted in the connected Criminal Revisions, which are before us, and formulated the following three questions for consideration by a larger bench, which are now being examined by the present Full Bench.

5.A. Whether the order of the Magistrate made in exercise of powers under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C directing the police to register and investigate is open to revision at the instance of a person against whom neither cognizance has been taken nor any process issued?

B. Whether an order made under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C is an interlocutory order and remedy of revision against such order is barred under sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973?

C. Whether the view expressed by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ajay Malviya Vs. State of U.P and others reported in 2000(41) ACC 435 that as an order made under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is amenable to revision, no writ petition for quashing an F.I.R registered on the basis of the order will be maintainable, is correct?

Opinion of the bench on the three issues A. Locus standi of a prospective accused against whom neither cognizance has been taken nor process issued, to challenge an order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C in a Criminal Revision.

6.Before examining any of the questions posed in this case, it would be necessary to reproduce the words of section 156 which falls in Chapter XII of the Code.

7.156. Police officer’‘s powers to investigate cognizable cases.- (1) Any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII.

(2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate.

(3) Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation as above mentioned.

8.As pointed out in Suresh Chand Jain v State of M.P. & Ors., AIR 2001 SC 571, (paragraphs 7, 8 and 9) that there is a difference in the position of a prospective accused against whom an order is made under section 156(3) of the Code before cognizance is taken by the Magistrate, and an accused against whom investigation has been directed under section 202(1) of the Code. Although the nature of both the investigations is the same, but the former investigation is carried out by the police, essentially under Chapter XII of the Code which deals with: ““Information to the Police and Their Powers to Investigate.”“ The police officer-in-charge of the police station has the same powers for carrying out an investigation under section 156(1), without orders of the Magistrate as the Magistrate can direct under section 156 (3) of the Code. Section 154 (1) of the Code prescribes the steps to be taken on receipt of a report of a cognizable offence by such a police officer. 154(3) gives powers to the Superintendent to issue appropriate directions requiring a station officer to conduct investigation into a cognizable offence. This power is parallel to the power of the Magistrate to issue a similar direction to the Station officer under section 156(3) of the Code. The investigation culminates with the submission of the report by the police under section 173 of the Code. The post-cognizance investigation directed by the Magistrate under section 202(1) although it is of a limited nature at the stage of inquiry and is carried out mainly for helping the Magistrate decide whether or not there is sufficient ground for him to proceed further, but it is an investigation which is carried out on directions of the police after cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate on a complaint under sections 190(1)(a) and after examination of the complainant under section 200 of the Code.

9.For showing that a prospective accused has no right of being heard before process is issued or cognizance is taken, and therefore he cannot challenge the order directing investigation under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. in a criminal revision, the learned Single Judge has placed reliance on the following decisions of the Apex Court which speak of the absence of any right of an accused to intervene even in an inquiry under section 202 of the Code, which is conducted after cognizance has been taken, under section 190 (1)(a) and 200 of the Code:

10.In Smt. Nagawwa v. V.S. Konjalgi, AIR 1976(13) ACC 225 (SC), V.V. Panchal v. D.D. Ghadigaonkar, AIR (1961) ISCR 1, Chandra Deo Singh v. Prakash Chandra Bose, AIR (1963) I.S.C.R 202, Mansukh Lal V. Chauhan v. State of Gujarat, 1997 (35) ACC 501 (SC) and C.B.I. v. V.K. Sahgal & Others, JT 1999 (8) SC 170 it has been held that the scope of enquiry under section 202 of the Code is extremely limited, and it is only meant for adjudging whether prima facie on the basis of the intrinsic reliability of the material placed by the complainant, a case for issuing process against the accused was made out. The accused at this stage has a right only to remain personally present or through his agent and to be informed about what is going on, but he has no right to participate in the proceedings. At this stage the defence of the accused is not to be considered. Sufficiency of the material for conviction is beyond the scope of an inquiry under section 202 of the Code as the same is a matter for consideration during trial. The accused is only called upon to answer the allegations against him after process has been issued against him. The legislature had deliberately not provided for an accused to intervene at this stage as that would frustrate the object of the inquiry.

11.In Pratap v. State of U.P., 1991 (28) ACC 422, it has been observed that merely because process has been issued against a person, it cannot be said that a decision adversely affecting his rights has been taken, as he has merely been asked to face trial in a Court of law. Therefore no principle of natural justice is infringed if a Magistrate issues process against a person without first affording him an opportunity of hearing. The Code does not contemplate holding two trials, one before the issue of process and the other after the process is issued. The legislature has provided an elaborate procedure for hearing an accused after the trial begins in a Court of law.

12.The same view has also been taken in S.C. Mishra v. State, 2001 (1) ACC 342, and Anil Kumar v. State of U.P., 1991 (28) ACC 422. The aforesaid views in Pratap (supra) and the other abovementioned authorities have been approved by a Full Bench of this Court in Ranjeet Singh v. State of U.P., 2000 Cri.L.J 2738.

13.The thrust of the argument was that if after cognizance when the Court decides to conduct an inquiry under section 200 or 202 Cr.P.C, no right of hearing, beyond the right of the accused to be present personally or through counsel is permitted, where would the question arise of the accused having a right to be heard when an order by the Magistrate only directing the police to investigate a cognizable offence in exercise of powers under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was passed at the pre-cognizance stage.

14.In Union of India v. W.N. Chaddha, 1993 Cri.L.J 859 (SC) it has been held in paragraph 93: ““.......More so, the accused has no right to have any say as regards the manner and method of investigation. Save under certain exceptions under the entire scheme of the Code, the accused has no participation as a matter of right during the course of the investigation of a case instituted on a police report till the investigation culminates in filing of a final report under S. 173(2) of the Code or in a proceeding instituted otherwise than on a police report till the process is issued under S. 204 of the Code, as the case may be.

Even in cases where cognizance of an offence is taken on a complaint notwithstanding the said offence is triable by a Magistrate or triable exclusively by the Court of Session, the accused has no right to have participation till the process is issued. In case the issue of process is postponed as contemplated under S. 202 of the Code, the accused may attend the subsequent inquiry but cannot participate.

There are various judicial pronouncements to this effect but we feel that it is not necessary to recapitulate those decisions. At the same time, we would like to point out that there are certain provisions under the Code empowering the Magistrate to give an opportunity of being heard under certain specified circumstances.”“

15.Illustrative circumstances where the accused has been given a right of hearing during trial are spelt out in paragraphs 93 and 94 in W.N. Chaddha (supra). Thus under S. 227 of the Code dealing with discharge of an accused in a trial before a Court of Session under Chap. XVIII, the accused is to be heard and permitted to make his submissions before the stage of framing the charges. Under S. 228 of the Code, the trial Judge has to consider not only the records of the case and documents submitted with it, but also the submissions of the accused and the prosecution made under S. 227. Similarly, under S. 239 falling under Chapter XIX dealing with the trial of warrant cases, the Magistrate may give an opportunity to the prosecution and the accused of being heard and to discharge the accused for reasons to be recorded in case the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless. S. 240 of the Code dealing with framing of charges also requires examination of an accused under S. 239 before the charge is framed. Under S. 235(2), in a trial before a Court of Sessions and under S. 248(2) of the trial of warrant cases, the accused as a matter of right, is to be given an opportunity of being heard. On the other hand the provisions relating to investigation under Chapter XII of the Code do not confer any right of prior notice and hearing to the accused.

16.According to the decision in W.N. Chaddha the prospective accused can also not get any advantage of the principle of Audi Alteram Partem at the stage of investigation as no substantive rights of the accused who has not yet been summoned are involved. Moreover the accused will have all rights to be heard and to raise his defence pleas during the course of the trial.

17.In Bhagwan Samardha Sreepada Vallabha Venkata Vishwandaha Maharaj v. State of A.P. and others., JT 1999 (4) SC 537 it has been held that even after submission of a final report, the police in exercise of powers under section 173 (8) is empowered to further investigate the matter. No obligation is cast at that stage also to hear the accused, as casting such an obligation would unnecessarily place a burden on the Courts to search for all the potential accused and to provide them with an opportunity of being heard before further investigation could be conducted, defeating its purpose.

18.In C.B.I. and another v. Rajesh Gandhi and another, AIR 1977 SC 93 it has been observed in paragraph 8 that the decision to investigate and the agency which should investigate the offence does not attract the principles of natural justice and the accused has no say in the matter as to who should investigate the offence he is charged with.

19.In Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner of Police, 1985 (22) ACC 246 (SC) it was held that after consideration of the report under section 173(2) of the Code, where the Magistrate decides not to take cognizance and to drop the proceedings or reaches a conclusion that there was no sufficient ground for proceeding against some of the persons mentioned in the FIR, the Magistrate must give notice to the informant and provide him with an opportunity to be heard at the time of consideration of the report. Here again no right of hearing has been conferred on an accused when the Magistrate decides to hear the informant on receipt of the report under section 173 (2) of the Code, when he is of the opinion that no ground exists for proceeding against the accused.

20.In Karan Singh v. State of U.P., 1997 (34) ACC 163 it has been held by the referring single judge, Hon’‘ble J.C. Gupta that neither under the Code, nor under any principle of natural justice is the Magistrate required to issue notice or afford opportunity of hearing to the accused, where the police has submitted a final report, but the Magistrate on consideration of the material on record decides to take cognizance under section 190(1)(b) of the Code and directs issue of process to the accused. 21.In Karan Singh v. State it has been observed as follows:.

““Where an order is made under section 156 (3) Cr. P. C. directing the police to register FIR and investigate the same, the Code nowhere provides that the Magistrate shall hear the accused before issuing such a direction, nor any person can be supposed to be having a right asking the Court of law for issuing a direction that an FIR should not be registered against him. Where a person has no right of hearing at the stage of making an order under section 156(3) or during the stage of investigation until Courts takes cognizance and issues process, he cannot be clothed also with a right to challenge the order of the Magistrate by preferring a revision under the Code. He cannot be termed as an ““aggrieved person”“ for purpose of section 397 of the Code.”“

22.Pertinently it has been observed in Abdul Aziz v. State of U.P., 2009 Cri.L.J 1683 in paragraph 9: ““Thus at the stage of Section 156(3) Cr. P. C. any order made by the Magistrate does not adversely affect the right of any person, since he has got ample remedy to seek relief at the appropriate stage by raising his objections. It is incomprehensible that accused cannot challenge the registration of F.I.R. by the police directly, but can challenge the order made by the Magistrate for the registration of the same with the same consequences. The accused does not have any right to be heard before he is summoned by the Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure and that he has got no right to raise any objection till the stage of summoning and resultantly he cannot be conferred with a right to challenge the order passed prior to his summoning. Further, if the accused does not have a right to install the investigation, but for the limited grounds available to him under the law, it surpasses all suppositions to comprehend that he possesses a right to resist registration of F.I.R.”“

23.In the case of Chandan v. State of U. P. and another 2007(57) ACC 508 : (2007 (1) ALJ (NOC) 7 (All.) it was also held that the accused does not have any right to challenge an order passed under Section 156(3) Cr. P. C.

24.Similarly in Surya Kant Dubey & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Anr., 2008 Cri.L.J. 2556, Rakesh Mohan Sharm v. State of U.P. & Ors., 2007(57 ACC 488, Rakesh Puri v. State (2007 (1) ALJ 169) it has been held in Single Judge decisions that at the stage of 156(3) of the Code, the prospective accused can not step in before the Magistrate and interfere with the investigation by challenging a direction for registration of the FIR, when he cannot even participate in the investigation, which is conducted ex parte at this stage. 25.The learned Single Judge Hon’‘ble J.C. Gupta J also referred to Arun Vyas & others v. Anita Vyas, 1999 (39) SC 170 wherein it was observed that even if a statutory bar for taking cognizance is raised on the ground that the complaint was barred by limitation under section 468 of the Code, the appropriate stage for the accused to raise this objection was at the stage of framing of charges. 26.State of Punjab v. Raj Singh & Others, JT 1999 SC 145 was cited for the proposition that even where a jurisdictional bar to proceed with a case, in the absence of certain pre-conditions as required under section 195 Cr.P.C is claimed, no embargo can be placed on the power of the police to investigate. The bar, if at all, could only be considered at the stage when the Court decides to take cognizance of the case.

27.Sri D.S. Mishra on the other hand has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Raghu Raj Singh Rousha v. Shiva Sundaram Promoters Private limited and another, (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 801 for making a submission that at the stage of passage of an order under section 156 (3) Cr.P.C, the accused has a right to be heard.



28.It may be noted that the backdrop of Raghu Raj Singh Rousha’‘s case was that the complainant company had filed a complaint petition accompanied by an application under section 156 (3) of the Code before the Metropolitan Magistrate alleging commission of offences under sections 323, 382, 420, 465, 471, 120-B, 506 and 34 IPC against the accused. The Magistrate refused to direct investigation in terms of section 156(3) Cr.P.C, but directed the complainant to lead pre-summoning evidence. The High Court however in a criminal revision against the order of the Magistrate, where only the State was impleaded, without giving any opportunity to the accused to be heard set aside the order of the Magistrate and directed the Magistrate to examine the matter afresh after calling for a police report. The High Court’‘s order was set aside by the Apex Court on two counts. One that there was an infringement of section 401 (2) of the Code as the right of hearing to an accused, or any other person who may be aggrieved mandated by the aforesaid provision, was denied to the aggrieved party as a result of the High Court’‘s order. Two, according to the Apex Court the initial order of the Magistrate, who declined to entertain the application under section 156 (3) of the Code, but directed that the procedure of a complaint case be followed, and that the witnesses be examined under section 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. indicated that cognizance had been taken, hence a right of hearing had accrued to the accused. That would not have been the case, if only a pre-cognizance order of the Magistrate refusing to issue a direction under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. had been challenged in the High Court by the informant, where right of hearing had been denied to the accused in a Criminal Revision. These are the two basic distinctions from a direct order by a Magistrate to the police to investigate an offence. Here the direction under section 156(3) Cr.P.C has not been issued consequent to any direction by the High Court in a criminal revision at the instance of the informant where only the State is made a party, and the aggrieved accused is denied the opportunity of hearing contemplated under section 401(2) Cr.P.C. Also it is a pre-cognizance order only containing a direction of the Magistrate for investigation by the police, where no valuable right has accrued to the prospective accused, which is distinct from the post cognizance order in Rousha’‘s cases, where the Magistrate had decided to follow the procedure of a complaint case under section 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. We therefore find that Rousha’‘s case is no authority for the proposition that any right of hearing accrues to a prospective accused or that any criminal revision is maintainable against an order of the Magistrate simply directing the police officer in-charge of a police station to investigate a case in exercise of powers under section 156(3) of the Code.

29.From a consideration of the aforesaid authorities, it is apparent that even when a complaint is filed under section 190(1) (a) and the Court decides to take cognizance and to adopt the procedure provided for inquiry under section 200 and 202 Cr.P.C, the accused is only permitted to remain present during the proceedings, but not to intervene or to raise his defence, until the order issuing summons is passed. The right of hearing of a prospective accused at the pre-cognizance stage, when only a direction for investigation by the police is issued by the Magistrate under section 156(3) Cr.P.C., can only be placed at a lower pedestal. It is only during the course of trial that the accused has been conferred rights at different stages to raise his defence. As the authorities show, that in the absence of any statutory right of hearing to the prospective accused at the pre-cognizance stage, when the direction to investigate has only been issued by the Magistrate under section 156(3), the accused cannot be conferred with any right of hearing even under any principle of audi alteram partem.

30.We have also seen that during the stage of investigation the accused has no right of intervention as to the mode and manner of investigation and who should investigate.

31.Even after submission of a final report, either when the police decides to order further investigation under section 173(8) Cr.P.C, or before accepting or rejecting the report, only the informant is required to be heard. The accused is not entitled to be heard even at this stage. In this view it would be unrealistic to confer a right of hearing when only an innocuous direction for investigation is passed by the Magistrate in a case disclosing a cognizable offence., especially when the allied order regarding the decision of a police officer to investigate in exercise of powers under section 156(1) is not vulnerable to challenge in the criminal revision. Also when objections to maintainability of a case are raised on the ground of limitation under section 468 or under section 195 Cr.P.C, the appropriate stage for raising these objections is at the time of cognizance or at the time of framing of charges, and not when a Magistrate issues a direction for investigation under section 156(3) Cr.P.C.

32.In the light of the aforesaid discussion, it is abundantly clear that the prospective accused has no locus standi to challenge a direction for investigation of a cognizable case under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C before cognizance or issuance of process against the accused. The first question is answered accordingly. B. Whether an order under Section 156(3) is an interlocutory order and revision against the said order is barred, under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C.

33.It was observed by the learned Single Judge that as no substantive rights and liabilities of the accused are involved at the stage when an order is passed by the Magistrate directing the police merely to investigate into a cognizable offence in exercise of powers under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and only the informant and the police are in the picture, the said proceedings are purely interocutory in nature, and are not revisable. It is only after investigation when a report under section 173 (2) of the Code is submitted by the police, that the Magistrate makes up his mind whether to take cognizance or to drop the proceedings.

34. S. 397 (2) of the Code reads as follows. ““The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding.”“

35.Only if cognizance is taken and process issued that the accused gets a right of hearing. Before that stage according to the learned Single Judge, any order, including an order under section 156(3) Cr.P.C, will be interlocutory in nature.

36.The Statement of Objects and Reasons of s. 397(2) as contained Clause (d) of Paragraph 5 of the accompanying the 1973 Code. runs thus: ““the powers of revision against interlocutory orders are being taken away, as it has been found to be one of the main contributing factors in the delay of disposal of criminal cases.”“

37.In support of his contention that a direction by the Magistrate to the police under section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. to register and investigate a criminal offence may not amount to an interlocutory order, but it could at best be described as an intermediate order, Sri D.S. Mishra Advocate has placed reliance on the Apex Court decision in Madhu Limaye v State of Maharashtra 1978 (15) ACC 184.



38. Madhu Limaye (supra) no doubt lays down that orders, such as the order in that case issuing process against the accused could not be described as a final order, but it was also not an interlocutory order, which could have attracted the bar to the maintainability of the criminal revision in view of section 397 (2) of the Code, because if the plea of the accused was rejected on a point which when accepted could have concluded the particular proceedings. Rather according to the said decision it should be described as a type of intermediate order falling in the middle course. In Madhu Limaye an objection had been raised by the appellant that the cognizance taken by the Sessions Court without commitment of the case to it in exercise of powers under section 199(2) Cr.P.C, on a complaint under section 500 IPC by the Public Prosecutor based on the sanction by the State government under section 199(4) Cr.P.C was incompetent, as no complaint had been made by the aggrieved person Sri A.R. Antulay, the Chief Minister, and the alleged defamatory statements related to acts done in his personal capacity, and not in the discharge of his public duties. If this contention was accepted, it would have resulted in the order of cognizance passed by the Sessions Judge without the case being committed to him, being set aside. Hence this objection would go to the root of the matter, and could not be ignored only by describing the order as interlocutory in nature.

39.In Amar Nath v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 SC 2185 interlocutory orders have been described thus in paragraph 6: ““It seems to us that the term ““interlocutory order”“ in S. 397 (2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the rights of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in S. 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses. adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under Section 397 (2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court.

40.In Amar Nath the order summoning the appellants in a mechanical manner after the police had submitted a final report against them leading to their release by the Judicial Magistrate, and the revision against that order before the Additional Sessions Judge preferred by the complainant had also failed. Even the subsequent complaint by the complainant had been dismissed on merits. Against the latter dismissal of the complaint when the complainant preferred a revision, the Sessions Judge set aside the order of the Judicial Magistrate and ordered further inquiry, whereupon the Magistrate straightaway summoned the appellants for trial. This order which appeared to infringe substantial rights acquired by the appellants was considered an order of moment and not a mere interlocutory order, which would invite the bar to entertaining the revision under S. 397(2) of the Code.

41.An order under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. passed by the Magistrate directing the police officer to investigate a cognizable case on the other hand is no such order of moment, which impinges on any valuable rights of the party. Were any objection to the issuance of such a direction to be accepted (though it is difficult to visualize any objection which could result in the quashing of a simple direction for investigation), the proceedings would still not come to an end, as it would be open to the complainant informant to move an application under section 154(3) before the Superintendent of Police (S.P.) or a superior officer under section 36 of the Code. He could also file a complaint under section 190 read with section 200 of the Code. This is the basic difference from the situations mentioned in Madhu Limaye and in Amar Nath’‘s cases, where acceptance of the objections could result in the said accused being discharged or the summons set aside, and the proceedings terminated. Also the direction for investigation by the Magistrate is but an incidental step in aid of investigation and trial. It is thus similar to orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, orders granting bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of pending proceedings which have been described as purely interlocutory in nature in Amar Nath (supra).

42.In this connection it has been aptly noted in Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy v Narayan Reddy, AIR 1976 SC 1672, that ““an order made under sub-section (3) of Section 156, is in the nature of a peremptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise their plenary powers of investigation under Section 156 (1).”“

43.The power conferred under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is of the same nature as the power under section 156(1), which is the power conferred on a police officer in-charge of a police station to investigate any cognizable case to investigate a case, without orders of the Magistrate, which the Magistrate of the local area would have power to inquire into or try. The police officer records an FIR in accordance with the procedure mentioned in section 154(1) of the Code. In the event of the failure of the police officer to record the information, the aggrieved informant has been given a right to approach the Superintendent of Police under section 154(3) for a direction for investigation. Such powers may also be exercised by any officer superior in rank to an officer in-charge of a police station in view of s. 36 of the Code. The powers of a Magistrate for giving directions under section 156(3) is thus allied to the powers of police officers under sections 154(1), 154(3) and 36 of the Code. It would thus be highly illogical to suggest that the Courts have no jurisdiction to interfere in a criminal revision or other judicial proceedings with the decision of the police officer in-charge of the police station to lodge an FIR under section 154(1) of the Code or by a superior officer under section 154(3), or the actual investigation conducted by the police under the aforesaid provisions, but the initial order of the Magistrate under section 156(3) Cr.P.C peremptorily reminding the police to perform its duty and investigate a cognizable offence could be subject to challenge in a criminal revision or other judicial proceeding.

44.We thus see that the orders for investigation are only an ancillary step in aid of the investigation or trial, and are clearly interlocutory in nature, similar to orders granting bail, or calling for records, or issuing search warrants, or summoning witnesses and other like matters which infringe no valuable rights of the prospective accused, and are not amenable to challenge in a criminal revision, in view of the bar contained in section 397(2) of the Code.

45.Also the situations in Madhu Limaye or in Amar Nath’‘s cases are clearly distinguishable, where refusal to consider the objections raised on behalf of the accused may have prevented his being discharged and may have caused him to be summoned to face trial, resulting in the orders being described as neither final nor interlocutory, but intermediate in nature. Revisions against the said intermediate orders would therefore not attract the bar under section 397(2). Acceptance of the objection to the direction for investigation under section 156(3) at the pre-cognizance stage, would however not result in the closure of the proceedings against the accused, as the complainant/informant could have sought summoning of the accused by filing a complaint under sections 190(a) read with 200 or by moving an application for investigation before the S.P. or other superior officer under section 154(3) or s. 36 of the Code (if that step had not earlier been taken). From the above discussion it follows that the said orders are clearly interlocutory in nature, and not revisable in view of the bar contained in section 397(2) of the Code.

46.As the direction for investigation passed by the Magistrate under section 156(3) is purely interlocutory in nature, and involves no substantial rights of the parties, we are of the view that the bar under section 397(2) Cr.P.C to the entertainment of a criminal revision can also not be circumvented by moving an application under section 482 Cr.P.C. As observed in State v. Navjot Sandhu, (2003) 6 SCC 641 in paragraph 29:

47.”“29........This power should not be exercised against an express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Criminal Procedure Code. This power cannot be exercised as against an express bar in some other enactment.”“ 48.An application under section 482 Cr.P.C would also not lie against an order for investigation under section 156(3) CrP.C., which is an adjunct to the police power to investigate in Chapter XII of the Code, because as held in Divine Retreat Centre v. State of Kerala & Othrs., AIR 2008 SC 1614 (paragraph 22, and Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. State of West Bengal & Anr., AIR 1972 SC 2639, (paragraph 35), whilst conducting an investigation into a offence cognizable offence the police authorities are exercising their statutory powers under sections 154 and 156 of the Code, and even the High Court in its inherent powers under section 482 Cr.P.C cannot interfere with the exercise of this statutory power.

49.Moreover the said inherent power needs to be utilized very sparingly and with circumspection and as held by the Apex Court while considering the jurisdiction of the High Court in Kurukshetra University vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1977 SC 2229, ( paragraph 2): ““It ought to be realised that inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice. That statutory power has to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases.”“

50.In para 9 in single judge decision in the case of Prof. Ram Naresh Chaudhary v. State of U. P., 2008 Cri.L.J 1515 the following observations have been made :- ““At this stage accused does not come into picture at all, nor can he be heard. He has no locus to participate in the proceedings. He can at the most stand and watch the proceedings. It must be remembered that it is pre-cognizance stage. The nature of the order passed by the Magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr. P.C. directing registration and investigation of case is only a peremptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise its power of investigation under Section 156(1) Cr. P. C, as has been held by Hon’‘ble Apex Court in the case of Devarappalli Lakshaminarayana Reddy and others vs. Narayana Reddy and others 1976 ACC 230 : (AIR 1976 SC 1672). How such a reminder is subject to revisional power of the Court is something which goes beyond comprehension. From the nature of the order itself, it is clear that it is an interlocutory order, not amenable to revisional power of the Court. Section 397(2) Cr. P. C. specifically bars revision filed against interlocutory orders.”“

51.Likewise in Rakesh Puri & Anr. v. State of U.P. (supra), Smt. Rekha Verma and others v. State of U. P. and others 2007 (57) ACC 241 and Abdul Aziz v. State of U.P., Paragraph 13 (supra) it has been held by single judge decisions of this Court that neither a Criminal Revision nor an Application under section 482 Cr.P.C. would lie against the direction of the Magistrate to register and investigate an FIR in exercise of powers under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. In Abdul Aziz it has further been held that only after an FIR can an accused move the High Court in its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing of the FIR, but prior to the registration of the F.I.R., the prospective accused has no right to challenge that order.

52.Piqued by the over flowing dockets of petitions under section 482 Cr.P.C on miscellaneous matters, which have created a huge back log affecting disposal by the High Court of grave matters under section 302 IPC etc., because the circumspection and caution required before admitting such petitions under section 482 Cr.P.C is not being exercised, Hon’‘ble G.P.Mathur J speaking for the bench has expressed his disquiet thus in paragraph 38 of Hamida V. Rashid, AIR 2007 (Supp) SC 361: ““38......... Ends of justice would be better served if valuable time of the Court is spent in hearing those appeals rather than entertaining petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. at an interlocutory stage which are often filed with some oblique motive in order to circumvent the prescribed procedure, as is the case here, or to delay the trial which will enable the accused to win over the witnesses by money or muscle power or they may become disinterested in giving evidence, ultimately resulting in miscarriage of justice.”“

53.As we have observed that the direction under section 156(3) of the Code refers to a pre-cognizance stage, it does not strictly relate to proceedings pending in a Court, but as mentioned herein-above it only relates to directions to the police to carry out the investigation in a cognizable case under Chapter XII of the Code. In this context it has been clarified in State of W.B. and Ors. vs. Sujit Kumar Rana [(2004) 4 SCC 129], that inherent powers of the High Court come into play only where an order has been passed by the Criminal Court which is required to be set aside to secure the ends of justice or where the proceedings pending before a court amounts to abuse of the process of Court.

54.As on the basis of the aforesaid reasoning we have already held the order under section 156(3) Cr.P.C not to be amenable to challenge in a criminal revision or an application under section 482 Cr.P.C, it is not necessary for this Court to go into the further question whether the said order is administrative in nature as urged by Sri G.S. Chaturvedi and the learned Government Advocate or judicial in nature as contended by Sri D.S. Mishra and Sri Dileep Gupta. Following the decision of the Apex Court in Asit Bhattacharjee v Hanuman Prasad Ojha and Others, (2007) 5 SCC 786, we are also not inclined to express any opinion on this issue, and leave the question open for decision in a subsequent proceeding where an answer to this question may become necessary.

55.In view of the aforesaid, our answer is that the revision against that the order under section 156(3) of the Code directing the police to investigate is clearly an interlocutory order and a Criminal Revision (as also an order under section 482 Cr.P.C against the same) is barred in view of section 397(2) of the Code.

56.C. Whether the view of the division bench in Ajay Malviya’‘s case( supra) that an order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C was amenable to revision, no writ petition would lie for challenging an FIR lodged pursuant to the order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C will be maintainable, is correct.

57.Ajay Malviya (supra) relied on the following lines from paragraph 4 in the decision in Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy (supra) ““........If instead of proceeding under Chapter XV, he has, in the judicial exercise of his discretion, taken action of some other kind, such as issuing a search warrant for the purpose of investigation, or ordering investigation by the police under section 156(3), he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any offence......”“ On that basis the Division Bench inferred that an order under section 156(3) was a judicial order, hence the said order was amenable to revision, and conversely a writ against an FIR which had been lodged on the basis of such an order was barred. However in view of our answers to the first two referred questions that the learned Single Judge who had not gone into the question whether an order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C was judicial or administrative in nature, has rightly held that the the said order was not open to challenge by a prospective accused at the pre-cognizance stage, and it was also an interlocutory order which is not revisable in view of the bar contained under section 397(2) of the Code. That being the position, the necessary inference is that the view of the Division Bench in Ajay Malviya that the said order is amenable to revision and no writ petition would lie for challenging the FIR can not be held to be correct.

58.However it is made clear that the initial order for investigation under section 156(3) is also not open to challenge in a writ petition, as it is now beyond the pale of controversy that the province of investigation by the police and the judiciary are not overlapping but complementary. As observed by the Privy Council in paragraph 37 in Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, AIR 1945 PC 18 when considering the scope of the statutory powers of the police to investigate a cognizable case under sections 154 and 156 of the Code, that it would be an unfortunate result if the Courts in exercise of their inherent powers could interfere in this function of the police. The roles of the Court and police are ““complementary not overlapping and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function.”“

59.In State of Bihar v. J. A. C. Saldanha (AIR 1980 S C 326) while dealing with the powers of investigation of a police officer as contemplated in Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the Apex Court has stated thus (at pp. 337-338 of AIR): ““There is a clear-cut and well demarcated sphere of activity in the field of crime detection and crime punishment. Investigation of an offence is the field exclusively reserved for the executive through the police department the superintendence over which vests in the State Government. The executive which is charged with a duty to keep vigilance over law and order situation is obliged to prevent crime and if an offence is alleged to have been committed it is its bounden duty to investigate into the offence and bring the offender to book. Once it investigates and finds an offence having been committed it is its duty to collect evidence for the purpose of proving the offence. Once that is completed and the investigating officer submits report to the Court requesting the Court to take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 of the Code its duty comes to an end.”“

60.The Magistrate can not interfere with the investigation so long as the police officer proceeds with the investigation in compliance with the statutory powers mentioned in paragraph XII of the Code. Only in a case where a police officer decides not to investigate an offence, that the concerned Magistrate can intervene and either direct an investigation or in the alternative, if he thinks fit, he himself can, at once proceed or depute any Magistrate subordinate to him to proceed to hold a preliminary inquiry into or otherwise to dispose of the case in the manner provided in the Code. (Vide S.N. Sharma vs. Bipen Kumar Tiwari and Ors., AIR 1970 SC 786, paragraph 7).

61.Even where the informant’‘s plea for a direction for investigation under section 156(3) Cr.P.C is refused by the Magistrate, as held by the three judge bench of the Supreme Court in Aleque Padamsee v. Union of India, AIR 2007 SC (Supp) 684, the remedy for the informant lies not in filing a writ petition, but in filing a complaint under section 190 (1)(b) read with section 200 of the Code. The legal position after review of the authorities as noted in Aleque Padamsee in paragraph 7 was as follows: ““The correct position in law, therefore, is that the police officials ought to register the FIR whenever facts brought to its notice show that a cognizable offence has been made out. In case the police officials fail to do so, the modalities to be adopted are as set out in Section 190 read with Section 200 of the Code.

62.In Sakhiri Vasu v State of U.P. and Ors., AIR 2008 SC 907, it has been observed in paragraph 27:”“The High Court should discourage the practice of filing a writ petitions or petitions under section 482 Cr.P.C. simply because a person has a grievance that his FIR has not been registered by the police. For this grievance, the remedy lies under sections 36 and 154(3) before the concerned police officers, and if that is of no avail, under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate or by filing a criminal complaint under section 200 Cr.P.C. and not be filing a writ petition or a petition under section 482 Cr.P.C.”“

63.It is only at the stage that an FIR has been lodged, and in the rarest cases where the FIR does not prima facie disclose the commission of a cognizable offence, or where there is legal bar to proceeding with the complaint/ FIR or if it is a case of no evidence or the evidence is wholly inadequate for proving the charge, or it is demonstrated that the FIR has been lodged in a mala fide manner, only in those circumstances, with the exercise of extreme circumspection can a writ petition be filed challenging the lodging of the FIR and that too strictly in accordance with the parameters and subject to the restrictions mentioned in State of Haryana v Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604 and the Full Bench decision of this Court in Ajit Singh @ Muraha v. State of U.P., 2006 (56) ACC 433 and a catena of decisions of the Apex Court and this Court on the issue. In view of what has been stated the view taken in Ajay Malviya’‘s case can not be held to be laying down the correct law and needs to be clarified as above.

64.In this view of the matter, the Opinion of the Full bench on the three questions posed is:

65.A. The order of the Magistrate made in exercise of powers under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C directing the police to register and investigate is not open to revision at the instance of a person against whom neither cognizance has been taken nor any process issued. B. An order made under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C is an interlocutory order and remedy of revision against such order is barred under sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. C. The view expressed by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ajay Malviya Vs. State of U.P and others reported in 2000(41) ACC 435 that as an order made under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is amenable to revision, and no writ petition for quashing an F.I.R registered on the basis of the order will be maintainable, is not correct.

( Delivered by Hon’‘ble Amar Saran, J)

1.We have heard Sri. G.S. Chaturvedi Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Samit Gopal, Sri D.S. Mishra and Sri Dileep Gupta Advocates for the private parties and Sri Patanjali Mishra, A.G.A., Sri Neeraj Verma, A.G.A., and Sri D.R. Chaudhari, Governemnt Advocate for the State of U.P. Written arguments and case law were filed by the State. However inspite of time being allowed, no written arguments or case law were filed by the private counsel, except Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, who had filed some case law in 2008 in the leading petition, Crl. Revn. No. 1640 of 2000 on behalf of Father Thomas, and has also supplied us with some additional photocopies of relevant case law.

2.This Full Bench was constituted after an order dated 28.9.01 was passed by the Single Judge (Hon. J.C. Gupta, J), who was examining the power of the Court in a Criminal Revision to question an order of the Magistrate issuing a direction under section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereafter ‘‘Cr.P.C’‘ or ‘‘the Code’‘) to the police to register an FIR and to investigate the same.

3.The Single Judge was of the view that as the accused has no locus standi before an order is passed summoning the accused, and also as the order directing investigation is purely interlocutory in nature, in view of the statutory bar contained in section 397(2) of the Code, the said order was not revisable.

4.However, as it had been held in Ajay Malviya vs. State of U.P and others, reported in 2000(41) ACC 435 that as an order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C is a judicial order, hence any FIR registered on its basis could not be challenged by means of a writ petition. Dissenting from this view the Single Judge without disputing the position that an order under section 156(3) of the Code was a judicial order, observed that the said order was an interlocutory order, which could not be challenged by a prospective accused who had no locus standi at the stage of investigation, hence a Criminal Revision was not maintainable for challenging the said order. In this background the Single Judge raised doubts about the correctness of the decision of the division bench in Ajay Malviya which based its conclusions on the position that as an order under section 156(3) was a judicial order, hence it was ipso facto revisable, and therefore no FIR pursuant to such an order, could be challenged by means of a criminal writ. The learned single judge thereupon vacated all the stay orders granted in the connected Criminal Revisions, which are before us, and formulated the following three questions for consideration by a larger bench, which are now being examined by the present Full Bench.

5.A. Whether the order of the Magistrate made in exercise of powers under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C directing the police to register and investigate is open to revision at the instance of a person against whom neither cognizance has been taken nor any process issued?

B. Whether an order made under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C is an interlocutory order and remedy of revision against such order is barred under sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973?

C. Whether the view expressed by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ajay Malviya Vs. State of U.P and others reported in 2000(41) ACC 435 that as an order made under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is amenable to revision, no writ petition for quashing an F.I.R registered on the basis of the order will be maintainable, is correct?

Opinion of the bench on the three issues A. Locus standi of a prospective accused against whom neither cognizance has been taken nor process issued, to challenge an order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C in a Criminal Revision.

6.Before examining any of the questions posed in this case, it would be necessary to reproduce the words of section 156 which falls in Chapter XII of the Code.

7.156. Police officer’‘s powers to investigate cognizable cases.- (1) Any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII.

(2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate.

(3) Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation as above mentioned.

8.As pointed out in Suresh Chand Jain v State of M.P. & Ors., AIR 2001 SC 571, (paragraphs 7, 8 and 9) that there is a difference in the position of a prospective accused against whom an order is made under section 156(3) of the Code before cognizance is taken by the Magistrate, and an accused against whom investigation has been directed under section 202(1) of the Code. Although the nature of both the investigations is the same, but the former investigation is carried out by the police, essentially under Chapter XII of the Code which deals with: ““Information to the Police and Their Powers to Investigate.”“ The police officer-in-charge of the police station has the same powers for carrying out an investigation under section 156(1), without orders of the Magistrate as the Magistrate can direct under section 156 (3) of the Code. Section 154 (1) of the Code prescribes the steps to be taken on receipt of a report of a cognizable offence by such a police officer. 154(3) gives powers to the Superintendent to issue appropriate directions requiring a station officer to conduct investigation into a cognizable offence. This power is parallel to the power of the Magistrate to issue a similar direction to the Station officer under section 156(3) of the Code. The investigation culminates with the submission of the report by the police under section 173 of the Code. The post-cognizance investigation directed by the Magistrate under section 202(1) although it is of a limited nature at the stage of inquiry and is carried out mainly for helping the Magistrate decide whether or not there is sufficient ground for him to proceed further, but it is an investigation which is carried out on directions of the police after cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate on a complaint under sections 190(1)(a) and after examination of the complainant under section 200 of the Code.

9.For showing that a prospective accused has no right of being heard before process is issued or cognizance is taken, and therefore he cannot challenge the order directing investigation under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. in a criminal revision, the learned Single Judge has placed reliance on the following decisions of the Apex Court which speak of the absence of any right of an accused to intervene even in an inquiry under section 202 of the Code, which is conducted after cognizance has been taken, under section 190 (1)(a) and 200 of the Code:

10.In Smt. Nagawwa v. V.S. Konjalgi, AIR 1976(13) ACC 225 (SC), V.V. Panchal v. D.D. Ghadigaonkar, AIR (1961) ISCR 1, Chandra Deo Singh v. Prakash Chandra Bose, AIR (1963) I.S.C.R 202, Mansukh Lal V. Chauhan v. State of Gujarat, 1997 (35) ACC 501 (SC) and C.B.I. v. V.K. Sahgal & Others, JT 1999 (8) SC 170 it has been held that the scope of enquiry under section 202 of the Code is extremely limited, and it is only meant for adjudging whether prima facie on the basis of the intrinsic reliability of the material placed by the complainant, a case for issuing process against the accused was made out. The accused at this stage has a right only to remain personally present or through his agent and to be informed about what is going on, but he has no right to participate in the proceedings. At this stage the defence of the accused is not to be considered. Sufficiency of the material for conviction is beyond the scope of an inquiry under section 202 of the Code as the same is a matter for consideration during trial. The accused is only called upon to answer the allegations against him after process has been issued against him. The legislature had deliberately not provided for an accused to intervene at this stage as that would frustrate the object of the inquiry.

11.In Pratap v. State of U.P., 1991 (28) ACC 422, it has been observed that merely because process has been issued against a person, it cannot be said that a decision adversely affecting his rights has been taken, as he has merely been asked to face trial in a Court of law. Therefore no principle of natural justice is infringed if a Magistrate issues process against a person without first affording him an opportunity of hearing. The Code does not contemplate holding two trials, one before the issue of process and the other after the process is issued. The legislature has provided an elaborate procedure for hearing an accused after the trial begins in a Court of law.

12.The same view has also been taken in S.C. Mishra v. State, 2001 (1) ACC 342, and Anil Kumar v. State of U.P., 1991 (28) ACC 422. The aforesaid views in Pratap (supra) and the other abovementioned authorities have been approved by a Full Bench of this Court in Ranjeet Singh v. State of U.P., 2000 Cri.L.J 2738.

13.The thrust of the argument was that if after cognizance when the Court decides to conduct an inquiry under section 200 or 202 Cr.P.C, no right of hearing, beyond the right of the accused to be present personally or through counsel is permitted, where would the question arise of the accused having a right to be heard when an order by the Magistrate only directing the police to investigate a cognizable offence in exercise of powers under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was passed at the pre-cognizance stage.

14.In Union of India v. W.N. Chaddha, 1993 Cri.L.J 859 (SC) it has been held in paragraph 93: ““.......More so, the accused has no right to have any say as regards the manner and method of investigation. Save under certain exceptions under the entire scheme of the Code, the accused has no participation as a matter of right during the course of the investigation of a case instituted on a police report till the investigation culminates in filing of a final report under S. 173(2) of the Code or in a proceeding instituted otherwise than on a police report till the process is issued under S. 204 of the Code, as the case may be.

Even in cases where cognizance of an offence is taken on a complaint notwithstanding the said offence is triable by a Magistrate or triable exclusively by the Court of Session, the accused has no right to have participation till the process is issued. In case the issue of process is postponed as contemplated under S. 202 of the Code, the accused may attend the subsequent inquiry but cannot participate.

There are various judicial pronouncements to this effect but we feel that it is not necessary to recapitulate those decisions. At the same time, we would like to point out that there are certain provisions under the Code empowering the Magistrate to give an opportunity of being heard under certain specified circumstances.”“

15.Illustrative circumstances where the accused has been given a right of hearing during trial are spelt out in paragraphs 93 and 94 in W.N. Chaddha (supra). Thus under S. 227 of the Code dealing with discharge of an accused in a trial before a Court of Session under Chap. XVIII, the accused is to be heard and permitted to make his submissions before the stage of framing the charges. Under S. 228 of the Code, the trial Judge has to consider not only the records of the case and documents submitted with it, but also the submissions of the accused and the prosecution made under S. 227. Similarly, under S. 239 falling under Chapter XIX dealing with the trial of warrant cases, the Magistrate may give an opportunity to the prosecution and the accused of being heard and to discharge the accused for reasons to be recorded in case the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless. S. 240 of the Code dealing with framing of charges also requires examination of an accused under S. 239 before the charge is framed. Under S. 235(2), in a trial before a Court of Sessions and under S. 248(2) of the trial of warrant cases, the accused as a matter of right, is to be given an opportunity of being heard. On the other hand the provisions relating to investigation under Chapter XII of the Code do not confer any right of prior notice and hearing to the accused.

16.According to the decision in W.N. Chaddha the prospective accused can also not get any advantage of the principle of Audi Alteram Partem at the stage of investigation as no substantive rights of the accused who has not yet been summoned are involved. Moreover the accused will have all rights to be heard and to raise his defence pleas during the course of the trial.

17.In Bhagwan Samardha Sreepada Vallabha Venkata Vishwandaha Maharaj v. State of A.P. and others., JT 1999 (4) SC 537 it has been held that even after submission of a final report, the police in exercise of powers under section 173 (8) is empowered to further investigate the matter. No obligation is cast at that stage also to hear the accused, as casting such an obligation would unnecessarily place a burden on the Courts to search for all the potential accused and to provide them with an opportunity of being heard before further investigation could be conducted, defeating its purpose.

18.In C.B.I. and another v. Rajesh Gandhi and another, AIR 1977 SC 93 it has been observed in paragraph 8 that the decision to investigate and the agency which should investigate the offence does not attract the principles of natural justice and the accused has no say in the matter as to who should investigate the offence he is charged with.

19.In Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner of Police, 1985 (22) ACC 246 (SC) it was held that after consideration of the report under section 173(2) of the Code, where the Magistrate decides not to take cognizance and to drop the proceedings or reaches a conclusion that there was no sufficient ground for proceeding against some of the persons mentioned in the FIR, the Magistrate must give notice to the informant and provide him with an opportunity to be heard at the time of consideration of the report. Here again no right of hearing has been conferred on an accused when the Magistrate decides to hear the informant on receipt of the report under section 173 (2) of the Code, when he is of the opinion that no ground exists for proceeding against the accused.

20.In Karan Singh v. State of U.P., 1997 (34) ACC 163 it has been held by the referring single judge, Hon’‘ble J.C. Gupta that neither under the Code, nor under any principle of natural justice is the Magistrate required to issue notice or afford opportunity of hearing to the accused, where the police has submitted a final report, but the Magistrate on consideration of the material on record decides to take cognizance under section 190(1)(b) of the Code and directs issue of process to the accused. 21.In Karan Singh v. State it has been observed as follows:.

““Where an order is made under section 156 (3) Cr. P. C. directing the police to register FIR and investigate the same, the Code nowhere provides that the Magistrate shall hear the accused before issuing such a direction, nor any person can be supposed to be having a right asking the Court of law for issuing a direction that an FIR should not be registered against him. Where a person has no right of hearing at the stage of making an order under section 156(3) or during the stage of investigation until Courts takes cognizance and issues process, he cannot be clothed also with a right to challenge the order of the Magistrate by preferring a revision under the Code. He cannot be termed as an ““aggrieved person”“ for purpose of section 397 of the Code.”“

22.Pertinently it has been observed in Abdul Aziz v. State of U.P., 2009 Cri.L.J 1683 in paragraph 9: ““Thus at the stage of Section 156(3) Cr. P. C. any order made by the Magistrate does not adversely affect the right of any person, since he has got ample remedy to seek relief at the appropriate stage by raising his objections. It is incomprehensible that accused cannot challenge the registration of F.I.R. by the police directly, but can challenge the order made by the Magistrate for the registration of the same with the same consequences. The accused does not have any right to be heard before he is summoned by the Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure and that he has got no right to raise any objection till the stage of summoning and resultantly he cannot be conferred with a right to challenge the order passed prior to his summoning. Further, if the accused does not have a right to install the investigation, but for the limited grounds available to him under the law, it surpasses all suppositions to comprehend that he possesses a right to resist registration of F.I.R.”“

23.In the case of Chandan v. State of U. P. and another 2007(57) ACC 508 : (2007 (1) ALJ (NOC) 7 (All.) it was also held that the accused does not have any right to challenge an order passed under Section 156(3) Cr. P. C.

24.Similarly in Surya Kant Dubey & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Anr., 2008 Cri.L.J. 2556, Rakesh Mohan Sharm v. State of U.P. & Ors., 2007(57 ACC 488, Rakesh Puri v. State (2007 (1) ALJ 169) it has been held in Single Judge decisions that at the stage of 156(3) of the Code, the prospective accused can not step in before the Magistrate and interfere with the investigation by challenging a direction for registration of the FIR, when he cannot even participate in the investigation, which is conducted ex parte at this stage. 25.The learned Single Judge Hon’‘ble J.C. Gupta J also referred to Arun Vyas & others v. Anita Vyas, 1999 (39) SC 170 wherein it was observed that even if a statutory bar for taking cognizance is raised on the ground that the complaint was barred by limitation under section 468 of the Code, the appropriate stage for the accused to raise this objection was at the stage of framing of charges. 26.State of Punjab v. Raj Singh & Others, JT 1999 SC 145 was cited for the proposition that even where a jurisdictional bar to proceed with a case, in the absence of certain pre-conditions as required under section 195 Cr.P.C is claimed, no embargo can be placed on the power of the police to investigate. The bar, if at all, could only be considered at the stage when the Court decides to take cognizance of the case.

27.Sri D.S. Mishra on the other hand has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Raghu Raj Singh Rousha v. Shiva Sundaram Promoters Private limited and another, (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 801 for making a submission that at the stage of passage of an order under section 156 (3) Cr.P.C, the accused has a right to be heard.



28.It may be noted that the backdrop of Raghu Raj Singh Rousha’‘s case was that the complainant company had filed a complaint petition accompanied by an application under section 156 (3) of the Code before the Metropolitan Magistrate alleging commission of offences under sections 323, 382, 420, 465, 471, 120-B, 506 and 34 IPC against the accused. The Magistrate refused to direct investigation in terms of section 156(3) Cr.P.C, but directed the complainant to lead pre-summoning evidence. The High Court however in a criminal revision against the order of the Magistrate, where only the State was impleaded, without giving any opportunity to the accused to be heard set aside the order of the Magistrate and directed the Magistrate to examine the matter afresh after calling for a police report. The High Court’‘s order was set aside by the Apex Court on two counts. One that there was an infringement of section 401 (2) of the Code as the right of hearing to an accused, or any other person who may be aggrieved mandated by the aforesaid provision, was denied to the aggrieved party as a result of the High Court’‘s order. Two, according to the Apex Court the initial order of the Magistrate, who declined to entertain the application under section 156 (3) of the Code, but directed that the procedure of a complaint case be followed, and that the witnesses be examined under section 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. indicated that cognizance had been taken, hence a right of hearing had accrued to the accused. That would not have been the case, if only a pre-cognizance order of the Magistrate refusing to issue a direction under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. had been challenged in the High Court by the informant, where right of hearing had been denied to the accused in a Criminal Revision. These are the two basic distinctions from a direct order by a Magistrate to the police to investigate an offence. Here the direction under section 156(3) Cr.P.C has not been issued consequent to any direction by the High Court in a criminal revision at the instance of the informant where only the State is made a party, and the aggrieved accused is denied the opportunity of hearing contemplated under section 401(2) Cr.P.C. Also it is a pre-cognizance order only containing a direction of the Magistrate for investigation by the police, where no valuable right has accrued to the prospective accused, which is distinct from the post cognizance order in Rousha’‘s cases, where the Magistrate had decided to follow the procedure of a complaint case under section 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. We therefore find that Rousha’‘s case is no authority for the proposition that any right of hearing accrues to a prospective accused or that any criminal revision is maintainable against an order of the Magistrate simply directing the police officer in-charge of a police station to investigate a case in exercise of powers under section 156(3) of the Code.

29.From a consideration of the aforesaid authorities, it is apparent that even when a complaint is filed under section 190(1) (a) and the Court decides to take cognizance and to adopt the procedure provided for inquiry under section 200 and 202 Cr.P.C, the accused is only permitted to remain present during the proceedings, but not to intervene or to raise his defence, until the order issuing summons is passed. The right of hearing of a prospective accused at the pre-cognizance stage, when only a direction for investigation by the police is issued by the Magistrate under section 156(3) Cr.P.C., can only be placed at a lower pedestal. It is only during the course of trial that the accused has been conferred rights at different stages to raise his defence. As the authorities show, that in the absence of any statutory right of hearing to the prospective accused at the pre-cognizance stage, when the direction to investigate has only been issued by the Magistrate under section 156(3), the accused cannot be conferred with any right of hearing even under any principle of audi alteram partem.

30.We have also seen that during the stage of investigation the accused has no right of intervention as to the mode and manner of investigation and who should investigate.

31.Even after submission of a final report, either when the police decides to order further investigation under section 173(8) Cr.P.C, or before accepting or rejecting the report, only the informant is required to be heard. The accused is not entitled to be heard even at this stage. In this view it would be unrealistic to confer a right of hearing when only an innocuous direction for investigation is passed by the Magistrate in a case disclosing a cognizable offence., especially when the allied order regarding the decision of a police officer to investigate in exercise of powers under section 156(1) is not vulnerable to challenge in the criminal revision. Also when objections to maintainability of a case are raised on the ground of limitation under section 468 or under section 195 Cr.P.C, the appropriate stage for raising these objections is at the time of cognizance or at the time of framing of charges, and not when a Magistrate issues a direction for investigation under section 156(3) Cr.P.C.

32.In the light of the aforesaid discussion, it is abundantly clear that the prospective accused has no locus standi to challenge a direction for investigation of a cognizable case under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C before cognizance or issuance of process against the accused. The first question is answered accordingly. B. Whether an order under Section 156(3) is an interlocutory order and revision against the said order is barred, under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C.

33.It was observed by the learned Single Judge that as no substantive rights and liabilities of the accused are involved at the stage when an order is passed by the Magistrate directing the police merely to investigate into a cognizable offence in exercise of powers under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and only the informant and the police are in the picture, the said proceedings are purely interocutory in nature, and are not revisable. It is only after investigation when a report under section 173 (2) of the Code is submitted by the police, that the Magistrate makes up his mind whether to take cognizance or to drop the proceedings.

34. S. 397 (2) of the Code reads as follows. ““The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding.”“

35.Only if cognizance is taken and process issued that the accused gets a right of hearing. Before that stage according to the learned Single Judge, any order, including an order under section 156(3) Cr.P.C, will be interlocutory in nature.

36.The Statement of Objects and Reasons of s. 397(2) as contained Clause (d) of Paragraph 5 of the accompanying the 1973 Code. runs thus: ““the powers of revision against interlocutory orders are being taken away, as it has been found to be one of the main contributing factors in the delay of disposal of criminal cases.”“

37.In support of his contention that a direction by the Magistrate to the police under section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. to register and investigate a criminal offence may not amount to an interlocutory order, but it could at best be described as an intermediate order, Sri D.S. Mishra Advocate has placed reliance on the Apex Court decision in Madhu Limaye v State of Maharashtra 1978 (15) ACC 184.



38. Madhu Limaye (supra) no doubt lays down that orders, such as the order in that case issuing process against the accused could not be described as a final order, but it was also not an interlocutory order, which could have attracted the bar to the maintainability of the criminal revision in view of section 397 (2) of the Code, because if the plea of the accused was rejected on a point which when accepted could have concluded the particular proceedings. Rather according to the said decision it should be described as a type of intermediate order falling in the middle course. In Madhu Limaye an objection had been raised by the appellant that the cognizance taken by the Sessions Court without commitment of the case to it in exercise of powers under section 199(2) Cr.P.C, on a complaint under section 500 IPC by the Public Prosecutor based on the sanction by the State government under section 199(4) Cr.P.C was incompetent, as no complaint had been made by the aggrieved person Sri A.R. Antulay, the Chief Minister, and the alleged defamatory statements related to acts done in his personal capacity, and not in the discharge of his public duties. If this contention was accepted, it would have resulted in the order of cognizance passed by the Sessions Judge without the case being committed to him, being set aside. Hence this objection would go to the root of the matter, and could not be ignored only by describing the order as interlocutory in nature.

39.In Amar Nath v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 SC 2185 interlocutory orders have been described thus in paragraph 6: ““It seems to us that the term ““interlocutory order”“ in S. 397 (2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the rights of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in S. 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses. adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under Section 397 (2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court.

40.In Amar Nath the order summoning the appellants in a mechanical manner after the police had submitted a final report against them leading to their release by the Judicial Magistrate, and the revision against that order before the Additional Sessions Judge preferred by the complainant had also failed. Even the subsequent complaint by the complainant had been dismissed on merits. Against the latter dismissal of the complaint when the complainant preferred a revision, the Sessions Judge set aside the order of the Judicial Magistrate and ordered further inquiry, whereupon the Magistrate straightaway summoned the appellants for trial. This order which appeared to infringe substantial rights acquired by the appellants was considered an order of moment and not a mere interlocutory order, which would invite the bar to entertaining the revision under S. 397(2) of the Code.

41.An order under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. passed by the Magistrate directing the police officer to investigate a cognizable case on the other hand is no such order of moment, which impinges on any valuable rights of the party. Were any objection to the issuance of such a direction to be accepted (though it is difficult to visualize any objection which could result in the quashing of a simple direction for investigation), the proceedings would still not come to an end, as it would be open to the complainant informant to move an application under section 154(3) before the Superintendent of Police (S.P.) or a superior officer under section 36 of the Code. He could also file a complaint under section 190 read with section 200 of the Code. This is the basic difference from the situations mentioned in Madhu Limaye and in Amar Nath’‘s cases, where acceptance of the objections could result in the said accused being discharged or the summons set aside, and the proceedings terminated. Also the direction for investigation by the Magistrate is but an incidental step in aid of investigation and trial. It is thus similar to orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, orders granting bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of pending proceedings which have been described as purely interlocutory in nature in Amar Nath (supra).

42.In this connection it has been aptly noted in Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy v Narayan Reddy, AIR 1976 SC 1672, that ““an order made under sub-section (3) of Section 156, is in the nature of a peremptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise their plenary powers of investigation under Section 156 (1).”“

43.The power conferred under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is of the same nature as the power under section 156(1), which is the power conferred on a police officer in-charge of a police station to investigate any cognizable case to investigate a case, without orders of the Magistrate, which the Magistrate of the local area would have power to inquire into or try. The police officer records an FIR in accordance with the procedure mentioned in section 154(1) of the Code. In the event of the failure of the police officer to record the information, the aggrieved informant has been given a right to approach the Superintendent of Police under section 154(3) for a direction for investigation. Such powers may also be exercised by any officer superior in rank to an officer in-charge of a police station in view of s. 36 of the Code. The powers of a Magistrate for giving directions under section 156(3) is thus allied to the powers of police officers under sections 154(1), 154(3) and 36 of the Code. It would thus be highly illogical to suggest that the Courts have no jurisdiction to interfere in a criminal revision or other judicial proceedings with the decision of the police officer in-charge of the police station to lodge an FIR under section 154(1) of the Code or by a superior officer under section 154(3), or the actual investigation conducted by the police under the aforesaid provisions, but the initial order of the Magistrate under section 156(3) Cr.P.C peremptorily reminding the police to perform its duty and investigate a cognizable offence could be subject to challenge in a criminal revision or other judicial proceeding.

44.We thus see that the orders for investigation are only an ancillary step in aid of the investigation or trial, and are clearly interlocutory in nature, similar to orders granting bail, or calling for records, or issuing search warrants, or summoning witnesses and other like matters which infringe no valuable rights of the prospective accused, and are not amenable to challenge in a criminal revision, in view of the bar contained in section 397(2) of the Code.

45.Also the situations in Madhu Limaye or in Amar Nath’‘s cases are clearly distinguishable, where refusal to consider the objections raised on behalf of the accused may have prevented his being discharged and may have caused him to be summoned to face trial, resulting in the orders being described as neither final nor interlocutory, but intermediate in nature. Revisions against the said intermediate orders would therefore not attract the bar under section 397(2). Acceptance of the objection to the direction for investigation under section 156(3) at the pre-cognizance stage, would however not result in the closure of the proceedings against the accused, as the complainant/informant could have sought summoning of the accused by filing a complaint under sections 190(a) read with 200 or by moving an application for investigation before the S.P. or other superior officer under section 154(3) or s. 36 of the Code (if that step had not earlier been taken). From the above discussion it follows that the said orders are clearly interlocutory in nature, and not revisable in view of the bar contained in section 397(2) of the Code.

46.As the direction for investigation passed by the Magistrate under section 156(3) is purely interlocutory in nature, and involves no substantial rights of the parties, we are of the view that the bar under section 397(2) Cr.P.C to the entertainment of a criminal revision can also not be circumvented by moving an application under section 482 Cr.P.C. As observed in State v. Navjot Sandhu, (2003) 6 SCC 641 in paragraph 29:

47.”“29........This power should not be exercised against an express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Criminal Procedure Code. This power cannot be exercised as against an express bar in some other enactment.”“ 48.An application under section 482 Cr.P.C would also not lie against an order for investigation under section 156(3) CrP.C., which is an adjunct to the police power to investigate in Chapter XII of the Code, because as held in Divine Retreat Centre v. State of Kerala & Othrs., AIR 2008 SC 1614 (paragraph 22, and Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. State of West Bengal & Anr., AIR 1972 SC 2639, (paragraph 35), whilst conducting an investigation into a offence cognizable offence the police authorities are exercising their statutory powers under sections 154 and 156 of the Code, and even the High Court in its inherent powers under section 482 Cr.P.C cannot interfere with the exercise of this statutory power.

49.Moreover the said inherent power needs to be utilized very sparingly and with circumspection and as held by the Apex Court while considering the jurisdiction of the High Court in Kurukshetra University vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1977 SC 2229, ( paragraph 2): ““It ought to be realised that inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice. That statutory power has to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases.”“

50.In para 9 in single judge decision in the case of Prof. Ram Naresh Chaudhary v. State of U. P., 2008 Cri.L.J 1515 the following observations have been made :- ““At this stage accused does not come into picture at all, nor can he be heard. He has no locus to participate in the proceedings. He can at the most stand and watch the proceedings. It must be remembered that it is pre-cognizance stage. The nature of the order passed by the Magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr. P.C. directing registration and investigation of case is only a peremptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise its power of investigation under Section 156(1) Cr. P. C, as has been held by Hon’‘ble Apex Court in the case of Devarappalli Lakshaminarayana Reddy and others vs. Narayana Reddy and others 1976 ACC 230 : (AIR 1976 SC 1672). How such a reminder is subject to revisional power of the Court is something which goes beyond comprehension. From the nature of the order itself, it is clear that it is an interlocutory order, not amenable to revisional power of the Court. Section 397(2) Cr. P. C. specifically bars revision filed against interlocutory orders.”“

51.Likewise in Rakesh Puri & Anr. v. State of U.P. (supra), Smt. Rekha Verma and others v. State of U. P. and others 2007 (57) ACC 241 and Abdul Aziz v. State of U.P., Paragraph 13 (supra) it has been held by single judge decisions of this Court that neither a Criminal Revision nor an Application under section 482 Cr.P.C. would lie against the direction of the Magistrate to register and investigate an FIR in exercise of powers under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. In Abdul Aziz it has further been held that only after an FIR can an accused move the High Court in its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing of the FIR, but prior to the registration of the F.I.R., the prospective accused has no right to challenge that order.

52.Piqued by the over flowing dockets of petitions under section 482 Cr.P.C on miscellaneous matters, which have created a huge back log affecting disposal by the High Court of grave matters under section 302 IPC etc., because the circumspection and caution required before admitting such petitions under section 482 Cr.P.C is not being exercised, Hon’‘ble G.P.Mathur J speaking for the bench has expressed his disquiet thus in paragraph 38 of Hamida V. Rashid, AIR 2007 (Supp) SC 361: ““38......... Ends of justice would be better served if valuable time of the Court is spent in hearing those appeals rather than entertaining petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. at an interlocutory stage which are often filed with some oblique motive in order to circumvent the prescribed procedure, as is the case here, or to delay the trial which will enable the accused to win over the witnesses by money or muscle power or they may become disinterested in giving evidence, ultimately resulting in miscarriage of justice.”“

53.As we have observed that the direction under section 156(3) of the Code refers to a pre-cognizance stage, it does not strictly relate to proceedings pending in a Court, but as mentioned herein-above it only relates to directions to the police to carry out the investigation in a cognizable case under Chapter XII of the Code. In this context it has been clarified in State of W.B. and Ors. vs. Sujit Kumar Rana [(2004) 4 SCC 129], that inherent powers of the High Court come into play only where an order has been passed by the Criminal Court which is required to be set aside to secure the ends of justice or where the proceedings pending before a court amounts to abuse of the process of Court.

54.As on the basis of the aforesaid reasoning we have already held the order under section 156(3) Cr.P.C not to be amenable to challenge in a criminal revision or an application under section 482 Cr.P.C, it is not necessary for this Court to go into the further question whether the said order is administrative in nature as urged by Sri G.S. Chaturvedi and the learned Government Advocate or judicial in nature as contended by Sri D.S. Mishra and Sri Dileep Gupta. Following the decision of the Apex Court in Asit Bhattacharjee v Hanuman Prasad Ojha and Others, (2007) 5 SCC 786, we are also not inclined to express any opinion on this issue, and leave the question open for decision in a subsequent proceeding where an answer to this question may become necessary.

55.In view of the aforesaid, our answer is that the revision against that the order under section 156(3) of the Code directing the police to investigate is clearly an interlocutory order and a Criminal Revision (as also an order under section 482 Cr.P.C against the same) is barred in view of section 397(2) of the Code.

56.C. Whether the view of the division bench in Ajay Malviya’‘s case( supra) that an order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C was amenable to revision, no writ petition would lie for challenging an FIR lodged pursuant to the order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C will be maintainable, is correct.

57.Ajay Malviya (supra) relied on the following lines from paragraph 4 in the decision in Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy (supra) ““........If instead of proceeding under Chapter XV, he has, in the judicial exercise of his discretion, taken action of some other kind, such as issuing a search warrant for the purpose of investigation, or ordering investigation by the police under section 156(3), he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any offence......”“ On that basis the Division Bench inferred that an order under section 156(3) was a judicial order, hence the said order was amenable to revision, and conversely a writ against an FIR which had been lodged on the basis of such an order was barred. However in view of our answers to the first two referred questions that the learned Single Judge who had not gone into the question whether an order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C was judicial or administrative in nature, has rightly held that the the said order was not open to challenge by a prospective accused at the pre-cognizance stage, and it was also an interlocutory order which is not revisable in view of the bar contained under section 397(2) of the Code. That being the position, the necessary inference is that the view of the Division Bench in Ajay Malviya that the said order is amenable to revision and no writ petition would lie for challenging the FIR can not be held to be correct.

58.However it is made clear that the initial order for investigation under section 156(3) is also not open to challenge in a writ petition, as it is now beyond the pale of controversy that the province of investigation by the police and the judiciary are not overlapping but complementary. As observed by the Privy Council in paragraph 37 in Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, AIR 1945 PC 18 when considering the scope of the statutory powers of the police to investigate a cognizable case under sections 154 and 156 of the Code, that it would be an unfortunate result if the Courts in exercise of their inherent powers could interfere in this function of the police. The roles of the Court and police are ““complementary not overlapping and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function.”“

59.In State of Bihar v. J. A. C. Saldanha (AIR 1980 S C 326) while dealing with the powers of investigation of a police officer as contemplated in Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the Apex Court has stated thus (at pp. 337-338 of AIR): ““There is a clear-cut and well demarcated sphere of activity in the field of crime detection and crime punishment. Investigation of an offence is the field exclusively reserved for the executive through the police department the superintendence over which vests in the State Government. The executive which is charged with a duty to keep vigilance over law and order situation is obliged to prevent crime and if an offence is alleged to have been committed it is its bounden duty to investigate into the offence and bring the offender to book. Once it investigates and finds an offence having been committed it is its duty to collect evidence for the purpose of proving the offence. Once that is completed and the investigating officer submits report to the Court requesting the Court to take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 of the Code its duty comes to an end.”“

60.The Magistrate can not interfere with the investigation so long as the police officer proceeds with the investigation in compliance with the statutory powers mentioned in paragraph XII of the Code. Only in a case where a police officer decides not to investigate an offence, that the concerned Magistrate can intervene and either direct an investigation or in the alternative, if he thinks fit, he himself can, at once proceed or depute any Magistrate subordinate to him to proceed to hold a preliminary inquiry into or otherwise to dispose of the case in the manner provided in the Code. (Vide S.N. Sharma vs. Bipen Kumar Tiwari and Ors., AIR 1970 SC 786, paragraph 7).

61.Even where the informant’‘s plea for a direction for investigation under section 156(3) Cr.P.C is refused by the Magistrate, as held by the three judge bench of the Supreme Court in Aleque Padamsee v. Union of India, AIR 2007 SC (Supp) 684, the remedy for the informant lies not in filing a writ petition, but in filing a complaint under section 190 (1)(b) read with section 200 of the Code. The legal position after review of the authorities as noted in Aleque Padamsee in paragraph 7 was as follows: ““The correct position in law, therefore, is that the police officials ought to register the FIR whenever facts brought to its notice show that a cognizable offence has been made out. In case the police officials fail to do so, the modalities to be adopted are as set out in Section 190 read with Section 200 of the Code.

62.In Sakhiri Vasu v State of U.P. and Ors., AIR 2008 SC 907, it has been observed in paragraph 27:”“The High Court should discourage the practice of filing a writ petitions or petitions under section 482 Cr.P.C. simply because a person has a grievance that his FIR has not been registered by the police. For this grievance, the remedy lies under sections 36 and 154(3) before the concerned police officers, and if that is of no avail, under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate or by filing a criminal complaint under section 200 Cr.P.C. and not be filing a writ petition or a petition under section 482 Cr.P.C.”“

63.It is only at the stage that an FIR has been lodged, and in the rarest cases where the FIR does not prima facie disclose the commission of a cognizable offence, or where there is legal bar to proceeding with the complaint/ FIR or if it is a case of no evidence or the evidence is wholly inadequate for proving the charge, or it is demonstrated that the FIR has been lodged in a mala fide manner, only in those circumstances, with the exercise of extreme circumspection can a writ petition be filed challenging the lodging of the FIR and that too strictly in accordance with the parameters and subject to the restrictions mentioned in State of Haryana v Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604 and the Full Bench decision of this Court in Ajit Singh @ Muraha v. State of U.P., 2006 (56) ACC 433 and a catena of decisions of the Apex Court and this Court on the issue. In view of what has been stated the view taken in Ajay Malviya’‘s case can not be held to be laying down the correct law and needs to be clarified as above.

64.In this view of the matter, the Opinion of the Full bench on the three questions posed is:

65.A. The order of the Magistrate made in exercise of powers under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C directing the police to register and investigate is not open to revision at the instance of a person against whom neither cognizance has been taken nor any process issued. B. An order made under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C is an interlocutory order and remedy of revision against such order is barred under sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. C. The view expressed by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ajay Malviya Vs. State of U.P and others reported in 2000(41) ACC 435 that as an order made under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is amenable to revision, and no writ petition for quashing an F.I.R registered on the basis of the order will be maintainable, is not correct.

66.As we have recorded a finding that no criminal revision will lie against the orders passed by the Magistrate directing investigation under section 156(3) Cr.P.C., no useful purpose will be served in sending back the said Criminal Revisions to the Single Judge bench hearing criminal revisions. The stay orders have already been vacated by the Single Judge. All the connected criminal revisions accordingly fail and are dismissed. There shall be no orders as to costs. 66.As we have recorded a finding that no criminal revision will lie against the orders passed by the Magistrate directing investigation under section 156(3) Cr.P.C., no useful purpose will be served in sending back the said Criminal Revisions to the Single Judge bench hearing criminal revisions. The stay orders have already been vacated by the Single Judge. All the connected criminal revisions accordingly fail and are dismissed. There shall be no orders as to costs.

                   
                     

                     

Court Delhi High Court
Head Note 2.4.2014- Judgement-- Nitish Katara Murder Case- After hearing Mr. Ram Jethmalani Senior Counsel for Vishal Yadav, Mr. U.R Lalit Senior Counsel for Vikas Yadav and Mr. Ravindra Kumar Kapoor learned counsel for Sukhdev Appellant the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi Dismissed all the appeals.   Read Judgement

Court Guwahati High Court
Head Note 06 Nov-2013-"while we decline to hold and declare that the DSPE Act, 1946, is not a valid piece of legislation, we do hold that the CBI is neither an organ nor a part of the DSPE and the CBI cannot be treated as a ‘police force’ constituted under the DSPE Act, 1946."--GUWAHATI HIGH COURT   Read Judgement

Court Delhi High Court
Head Note Conclusion: "We have held that the Delhi Legislative Assembly did not have the legislative competence to amend the Court Fees Act,1870. We have also held that the Court Fees (Delhi Amendment) Act, 2012 adversely impacts the Part-III rights and results in violation of Article 38 and 39A of the Constitution of India….   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note 13 sept.2013-"The impugned judgment of the trial Court has failed to notice and take into account the probabilities, material contradictions and the embellishments.."   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note 13/9/2013: Held,"The impugned judgment of the trial Court has failed to notice and take into account the probabilities, material contradictions and the embellishments that have been highlighted above and therefore, in our opinion, the impugned order of conviction and sentence cannot be sustained and is liable to be reversed." - Allahabad High Court.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note 3/9/2013: Hostility of witnesses - Hon'ble Court took serious note-Allahabad High Court.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note 2 Sept.2013- The earlier rejections of the bail prayer of the appellant were without following the required mandatory provisions.-All. H.C.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note 2 Aug.2013-"Two of non-fatal injuries on deceased were simple in nature which also is clear indication that there was no unlawful assembly with common object to commit murder"   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note "It seems to us that in a murder case, the non-explanation of the injuries sustained by the accused at about the time of the occurrence or in the course of altercation is a very important circumstance from which the Court can draw the following inferences : (1) That the prosecution has suppressed the genesis and the origin of the occurrence and has thus not presented the true version. (2) that the witnesses who have denied the presence of the injuries on the person of the accused are lying on a most material point and therefore their evidence is unreliable; (3) that in case there is a defence version which explains the injuries on the person of the accused it is rendered probable so as to throw doubt on the prosecution case. The omission on the part of the prosecution to explain the injuries on the person of the accused assumes much greater importance where the evidence consists of interested or inimical witnesses or where the defence gives a version which competes in probability with that of the prosecution one."- Allahabad High Court relied upon Apex Court's judgement.-2.8.2013   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Directions issued,"whenever there is slightest suspicion the police should not hesitate in registering the crime also under section 376 IPC, and not show the crime only as a murder"-Allahbad High Court. Dated 9.7.2013   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note "Death reference rejected"-Allahabad High Court.Dated8.7.2013   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note "Cherge not framed-Effect analysed"-Allahabad High Court. Dated 3.5.2013   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Without establishing genuiness, photo can not be admitted in secondary evidence : Allahabad High Court- Dated 23/2/2012.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Police not to arrest accused persons for offences punishable upto imprisionment upto 7 years - provisions of 41(1)b,41A discussed and directions issued - Allahabad High Court - Dated 11.10.2011.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Applicability of Section 40 to 44 Evidence Act- "A Division Bench of this Court in Km. Rinki vs. State of U.P. & others, 2008 (3) JIC 267 (All.) (D.B.) and Hon'ble Single Judge in Raj Dularey Shukla v. State, 2006 (1) JIC 887 (All.) also propounded the same principle and held that if some of the accused are acquitted in a trial separately held, the other accused is not entitled to the benefit of acquittal order and his case is to be decided separately on the basis of the evidence adduced during his trial. 13. The aforesaid decisions have settled the legal position that judgments of courts of justice may be relevant under any of the provisions of sections 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act and not otherwise. In other words, if any judgment, order or decree of a court does not fulfill requirements of any of the aforesaid sections, it has no relevancy and must be held to be irrelevant. It is also well settled that every trial has to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced in the trial itself, therefore, the previous judgment of acquittal rendered in a trial, if it is not relevant under any of sections 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act has no relevancy in the subsequent trial being held against co-accused and he can not be permitted to claim any advantage of such judgment, which is merely an opinion of the judge on the basis of the evidence led in the previous trial. The only relevancy of such judgment is to decide the question of applicability of bar to the subsequent trial under section 300 of the Code as section 40 of the Evidence Act makes the previous judgment relevant only for such purposes and not otherwise. In such matters, sections 41 to 44 of the Evidence Act also have no application. In this view of the matter the proceeding of the session trial being held against the petitioners can not be quashed on the basis of the judgment of acquittal rendered in favour of co-accused persons."- Allahabad High Court - Dated 1 9/09/2011.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Interiem Bail pending final disposal of Bail u/s 389 Cr.P.C. - "Otherwise also General Rules (Criminal), applicable to lower courts and High Court Rules, applicable to high court, both provide for giving of notice of the bail application to the public prosecutor and as a well ingrained practise hearing of public prosecutor in matter of consideration of bail applications has become the rule of law. Consequently the law relating to the procedure to be followed in matters of consideration of bail applications prior to conviction holds good for post-conviction bail applications also. In this respect a full bench of our court in Smt.Amarawati's case(Supra) has held that interim bail pending consideration of final bail is permissible. It has been held therein as under- "40. We again make it clear that the learned Sessions Judge in his discretion can hear and decide the bail application under Section 439 on the same day of its filing provided notice is given to the Public Prosecutor, or he may not choose to do so. This is entirely a matter in the discretion of the learned Sessions Judge. There may also be cases where the learned Sessions Judge on the material available before him may decide to grant interim bail as he may feel that while he has sufficient material for giving interim bail he required further material for grant of final bail. In such cases also he can in his discretion, grant interim bail and he can hear the bail application finally after a few days. All these are matters which should ordinarily be left to his discretion." The aforesaid opinion by this court got it's approval by the apex court inLal kamlendra Pratap Singh versus State of Uttar Pradesh And Others: (2009) SCC 437 wherein it has been held by the apex court as under:- "Learned counsel for the appellant apprehends that the appellant will be arrested as there is no provision for anticipatory bail in the State of U.P. He placed reliance on a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Amarawati v. State of U.P. in which a seven-Judge Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that the court, if it deems fit in the facts and circumstances of the case, may grant interim bail pending final disposal of the bail application. The Full Bench also observed that arrest is not a must whenever an FIR of a cognizable offence is lodged. The Full Bench placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P. We fully agree with the view of the High Court in Amarawati case and we direct that the said decision be followed by all courts in U.P. in letter and spirit, particularly since the provision for anticipatory bail does not exist in U.P. In appropriate cases interim bail should be granted pending disposal of the final bail application, since arrest and detention of a person can cause irreparable loss to a person's reputation, as held by this Court in Joginder Kumar Case. Also, arrest is not a must in all cases of cognizable offences, and in deciding whether to arrest or not the police officer must be guided and act according to the principles laid down in Joginder Kumar Case." Thus from the above discussion the law has been crystallised that pending consideration of final bail prayer an accused can be granted interim bail and hence the answer to the mooted question is that the proviso to section 389 of the Code does put an embargo nor does it curtails power of appellate court to grant interim bail. A Proviso cannot take away right conferred by parent provision and has to be read down to harmonise it with the parent section. On this aspect support can be had from apex court decision in Dadu alias Tulsidas(Supra) wherein Apex Court has observed as under:- "Providing a right of appeal but totally disarming the Court from granting interim relief in the form of suspension of sentence would be unjust, unfair and violative of Art. 21 of the Constitution particularly when no mechanism is provided for early disposal of the appeal. The pendency of criminal litigation and the experience in dealing with pending matters indicate no possibility of early hearing of the appeal and its disposal on merits at least in many High Courts. As the present is not the occasion to dilate on the causes for such delay, we restrain ourselves from that exercise. In this view of the matter, the appellate powers of the Court cannot be denuded by Executive or judicial process".- Allahabad High Court - Dated 14/09/2011.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Non Compliance of Section 8(c),42(1)(2),50,57 N.D.P.S.Act and 100,165,313 Cr.P.C.- Its effect - Fatal to Prosecution.
Case Laws Discussed:
1.State of Rajasthan versus Shanti: AIR 2010 SC 43
2.Sarju versus State of U.P. AIR 2009 SC 3214
3.Constitution Bench of this Court in Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana [2009 (10) SCALE 255]
4.Abdul Rashid Ibrahim Mansuri v. State of Gujarat
[(2000) 2 SCC 513]
5. Sajan Abraham v. State of Kerala [(2001) 6 SCC 692]
6.Dilip versus Sate of M.P. :AIR 2007 SC 369
7.State of Punjab vs. Balbir Singh [(1994) 3 SCC 299]
8.State of West Bengal Versus Babu Chakraborty : AIR 2004 SC 4324
9.State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh, (1994) 3 SCC 299
10.State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh (1999) 6 SCC 172,Constitution Bench
11.Union Of India Versus Shah Alam and others : AIR 2010 SC 1785
12.Dilip and Another v. State of M.P. (2007) 1 SCC 450 : (2006 AIR SCW 6246)
13.State of Punjab versus Hari Singh: AIR 2010 SC 1966
14.Avtar Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab (2002 (7) SCC 419)
15.Ganesh Gogoi versus State of Assam : AIR 2009 SC 2955
16.Basavaraj R. Patil and others v. State of Karnataka and others - (2000) 8 SCC 740
17.Ranvir Yadav versus State of Bihar: AIR 2009 SC (Suppl) 1439 - Allahabad High Court.
  Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note C.B.I.directed to investigate CMO`s Murders - Allahabad High Court - Dated 29/07/2011.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Dr. Sachan`s Murder Case - Investigation ordered to be conducted by C.B.I.- Lucknow Bench, Allahabad High Court-Dated 14/07/2011.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Notification No. (S.I.2942 [E]) Dated 18.11.2009 issued by the Government of India, providing that not only the weight of Heroin found on analysis but the entire substance is to be taken into account while deciding the quantity -

Held "This notification can not be applied retospectively and has no aplication in instant case"-
Bail Allowed.-Allahabad High Court - Dated 30/05/2011.
  Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note "Exhibits Ka 15 and 16 have been got proved and exhibited by the prosecution itself and therefore it can not now resile from it`s contents." - Documents produced by Prosecution binding on them - Alladabad High Court - Dated 25/05/2011.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Bail to Juvenile : "Merely by declaration of being a juvenile does not entitle a juvenile in conflict with law to be released on bail as a matter of right"-Section 12 analysed - Allahabad High Court - Dated 24.05.2011   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Directions to CBI to investigate any other offence-" The direction to CBI to investigate "any other offence" is wholly erroneous and cannot be sustained. Obviously, direction for investigation can be given only if an offence is, prima facie, found to have been committed or a person`s involvement is prima facie established, but a direction to CBI to investigate whether any person has committed an offence or not cannot be legally given. Such a direction would be contrary to the concept and philosophy of "LIFE" and "LIBERTY" guaranteed to a person under Article 21 of the Constitution. This direction is in complete negation of various decisions of this Court in which the concept of "LIFE" has been explained in a manner which has infused "LIFE" into the letters of Article 21"- Allahabad High Court- Dated 20/05/2011.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note False Case against Civil Judge J.D.,Nazibabad by U.P. Police in connivance with Administration - " We are constrained to observe that it is indeed a serious matter that even a judicial officer has not been spared and every effort has been made to browbeat him by the administration.":Allahabad High Court-Dated 17/05/2011.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Allahabad High Court directs Central and U.P.Govt.to amend sec. 354 I.P.C.triable by court of sessions and non-bailable:"Looking to the rampant and daily increasing prevalence of such crimes of sexual violence in the State of U.P., in Delhi and in other places we think that it is high time that the State of U.P. and even the Union of India should become sensitive to this grave issue, and consider imposing stringent laws for putting a check on such crimes of sexual violence against women and children. We therefore recommend that the State of U.P. and the Union of India consider amending the provisions of section 354 IPC and the First Schedule to the Code of Criminal Procedure by prescribing a higher sentence for the offence and for making it non-bailable and triable by a Court of Session. Copy of this order may be forwarded to the Law Commissions, of U.P and the Centre, and also to the Law( Secretary) U.P. and the Union of India within 15 days for appropriate action and recommendations." - Allahabad High Court - Dated 09/05/2011.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note If the trial of a juvenile offender has already commenced, the provisions of Section 20 of Juvenile Justice Act will have applicability.
Perusal of the record in the instant revision indicates that the trial was pending since last seven years. The trial is at the fag-end as the entire evidences of the prosecution and the accused have already been over. It is at this stage of the fag-end of the trial that the revisionist has prayed vide Paper No. 275 Kha to send his matter to the Juvenile Justice Board, which prayer has been refused by impugned order dated 8.2.2011.
It seems that only to delay the trial and lingering on the proceedings of a murder and an attempt to murder case, the said application was filed by the revisionist. When the evidences were being led and the accused were cross examining the witnesses, no grievance was raised by the revisionist for sending his matter to the Juvenile Justice Board. Much of the water has already been flown and it is too late in the day for the revisionist to rue that his matter has not been transferred to juvenile Justice Board. Opinion of the trial Judge as is recorded in the impugned order dated 8.2.2011, cannot be said to be arbitrary and illegal.
This revision being bereft of merits, is hereby dismissed:Allahabad High Court.Dated 30/03/2011.
  Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Transfer Petition -"The sessions trial is about to conclude. Most of the arguments have been heard by Mr. Ramashraya Singh, Additional Sessions Judge, therefore, at this juncture, transfer of the case would not only be improper but would also result in causing delay in the disposal of the case. It is true that the presiding officer has closed the arguments and required the accused to file written arguments but still it is open to the learned Additional Sessions Judge to permit the accused to make oral submissions also. It is expected that the learned Additional Sessions Judge will proceed accordingly if any request for oral submission is made from the accused persons or their counsel, whose arguments (oral submissions) have not been heard. ... For the reasons discussed above, the transfer application has no merit and is accordingly dismissed" : Allahabad High Court. ________________________________________   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Appeal against conviction under 307 IPC-Medical Report cooked up-Investigation not fair-313 Cr.PC not complied with-appeal allowed-conviction set aside.- Allahabad High Court.   Read Judgement

Court Delhi High Court
Head Note There was a time gap of about three hours between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were last seen together. Even otherwise the last seen evidence has to be connected with some other corroboration.
... PW14 had only seen the deceased along with the accused, merely this evidence was not sufficient to prove the circumstance of last seen.
18. Therefore, we discard the testimony of PW14 as we have found serious improbability in the version of the last seen evidence
It is settled law that in a case based on circumstantial evidence the prosecution has to prove all the incriminating circumstances beyond any shadow of reasonable doubt and the circumstances so proved should complete the chain of events linking the accused with commission of the crime. There should not be left any chinks in such a chain and no circumstance should be of such a nature which could lead to any inference of innocence of the accused. All circumstances so alleged and proved must show the involvement of the accused in the crime.
28. It is settled law that if the motive which is set out by the prosecution is not proved beyond shadow of reasonable doubt the other incriminating circumstantial evidence may lose its importance and it may lead the court to draw an inference that perhaps the appellant was not involved in this crime.
Accused given benefit of doubt and acquitted:Delhi High Court-MANMOHAN SINGH, J BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J
  Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Section 319 Criminal Procedure Code: No person can be added as accused under Section 319 Cr.P.C. after closer of the case:Allahabad High Court.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Cognizance of offence-Passing of the summoning order without obtaining relevant materials in support of the information,not proper. Summoning order quashed:Allahabad High Court.   Read Judgement

Court Chhattisgarh High Court
Head Note Hostile Witness- Binding on prosecution- CHATTISGARH HIGH COURT JUDGEMENT DATED-10 FEB 2011   Read Judgement

Court Delhi High Court
Head Note The distinction between the nature of burden that rests on an accused under Section 105, Evidence Act to establish a plea of self-defence and the one cast on the prosecution by Section 101 to prove its case is overlooked-The appellant has been able to establish a preponderance of probabilities in favour of the plea of private defence-The appeal is allowed. --DELHI HIGH COURT-JUDGEMENT DATED- 19.1.2011   Read Judgement

Court Delhi High Court
Head Note NO MOTIVE-RECOVERY NOT FREE DOUBTS-CHAIN OF CIRCUMSTANCE NOT COMPLETE-LAST SEEN DOUBTED-APPEAL ALLOWED- DELHI HIGH COURT-DATED 04.01.2011   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note 156(3)Cr.pc-Interlocutory Order-no criminal revision will lie against the orders passed by the Magistrate directing investigation under section 156(3) Cr.P.C- ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT-FULL BENCH-DATED 20 DEC 2010   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note FIR -Arrest of the petitioners stayed as a consequence of FIR - Allahabad High Court- Dated 10/12/2010   Read Judgement

Court Delhi High Court
Head Note FIR-to be displayed on Delhi Police website- ---Delhi High Court passes directions : (A) An accused is entitled to get a copy of the First Information Report at an earlier stage than as prescribed under Section 207 of the Cr.P.C. (B) An accused who has reasons to suspect that he has been roped in a criminal case and his name may be finding place in a First Information Report can submit an application through his representative / agent / parokar for grant of a certified copy before the concerned police officer or to the Superintendent of Police on payment of such fee which is payable for obtaining such a copy from the court. On such application being made, the copy shall be supplied within twenty-four hours. (C) Once the First Information Report is forwarded by the police station to the concerned Magistrate or any Special Judge, on an application being filed for certified copy on behalf of the accused, the same shall be given by the court concerned within two working days. The aforesaid direction has nothing to do with the statutory mandate inhered under Section 207 of the Cr.P.C. (D) The copies of the FIR, unless reasons recorded regard being had to the nature of the offence that the same is sensitive in nature, should be uploaded on the Delhi Police website within twenty-four hours of lodging of the FIR so that the accused or any person connected with the same can download the FIR and file appropriate application before the court as per law for redressal of his grievances. (E) The decision not to upload the copy of the FIR on the website of Delhi Police shall not be taken by an officer below the rank of Deputy Commissioner of Police and that too by way of a speaking order. A decision so taken by the Deputy Commissioner of Police shall also be duly communicated to the Area magistrate. (F) The word =sensitive‘ apart from the other aspects which may be thought of being sensitive by the competent authority as stated hereinbefore would also include concept of privacy regard being had to the nature of the FIR. (G) In case a copy of the FIR is not provided on the ground of sensitive nature of the case, a person grieved by the said action, after disclosing his identity, can submit a representation with the Commissioner of Police who shall constitute a committee of three high officers and the committee shall deal with the said grievance within three days from the date of receipt of the representation and communicate it to the grieved person. (H) The Commissioner of Police shall constitute the committee within eight weeks from today. (I) In cases wherein decisions have been taken not to give copies of the FIR regard being had to the sensitive nature of the case, it will be open to the accused / his authorized representative / parokar to file an application for grant of certified copy before the court to which the FIR has been sent and the same shall be provided in quite promptitude by the concerned court not beyond three days of the submission of the application. (J) The directions for uploading the FIR on the website of the Delhi Police shall be given effect from 1st February, 2011   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note First Information Report- Sec 306/504/120B IPC- FIR-Arrest of the petitioners stayed as a consequence of FIR-Order-Allahabad High Court, Dated-29-11-2010   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note A word used at different place in the Act or Rule may have different meaning according to its context--ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT-- Order Dated - 26/10/2010 at Allahabad.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad, Lucknow Bench -Justice S U Khan, Justice Sudhir Agarwal,Justice D V Sharma .J,J,J
Head Note AYODHYA RAM JANM BHOOMI-BABRI MASZID TITLE CASE--held--Ram Lala Idol not to be removed- Sunni Wakf Board suit dismissed.-- 1. Whether the disputed site is the birth place of Bhagwan Ram? The disputed site is the birth place of Lord Ram. Place of birth is a juristic person and is a deity. It is personified as the spirit of divine worshipped as birth place of Lord Rama as a child. Spirit of divine ever remains present every where at all times for any one to invoke at any shape or form in accordance with his own aspirations and it can be shapeless and formless also. 2. Whether the disputed building was a mosque? When was it built? By whom? The disputed building was constructed by Babar, the year is not certain but it was built against the tenets of Islam. Thus, it cannot have the character of a mosque. 3. Whether the mosque was built after demolishing a Hindu temple? The disputed structure was constructed on the site of old structure after demolition of the same. The Archaeological Survey of India has proved that the structure was a massive Hindu religious structure. 4. Whether the idols were placed in the building on the night of December 22/23rd, 1949? The idols were placed in the middle dome of the disputed structure in the intervening night of 22/23.12.1949. 2 5. Whether any of the claims for title is time barred? O.O.S. No. 4 of 1989, the Sunni Central Board of Waqfs U.P., Lucknow and others Vs. Gopal Singh Visharad and others and O.O.S. No.3 of 1989, Nirmohi Akhara and Another Vs. Sri Jamuna Prasad Singh and others are barred by time. 6. What will be the status of the disputed site e.g. inner and outer courtyard? It is established that the property in suit is the site of Janm Bhumi of Ram Chandra Ji and Hindus in general had the right to worship Charan, Sita Rasoi, other idols and other object of worship existed upon the property in suit. It is also established that Hindus have been worshipping the place in dispute as Janm Sthan i.e. a birth place as deity and visiting it as a sacred place of pilgrimage as of right since time immemorial. After the construction of the disputed structure it is proved the deities were installed inside the disputed structure on 22/23.12.1949. It is also proved that the outer courtyard was in exclusive possession of Hindus and they were worshipping throughout and in the inner courtyard (in the disputed structure) they were also worshipping. It is also established that the disputed structure cannot be treated as a mosque as it came into existence against the tenets of Islam.......Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench   Read Judgement

Court Punjab and Haryana High Court
Head Note BAIL ALLOWED-Appeal is not likely to be heard in near future- PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT-DATED 23rd SEPTEMBER 2010   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note No opportunity is required to be given if selection is made on the basis of a forged marksheet--ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT--Judgment/Order Dated - 25/8/2010 at Allahabad.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Witness Protection : Witness protection programme is an important aspect of criminal justice system: without it, no reforms are possible. If witnesses are afraid to come forward then irrespective of any measures justice cannot be administered. This case is a pointer - Allahabad High Court.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note There was no pre-meditation or pre-plan on the part of the appellant to cause death of the deceased, and the occurrence had taken place when the deceased, with another had entered the field of the appellant and engaged himself in an altercation with the appellant when the appellant had refused to part with bitterguard. Having regard to the attending circumstances in which the incident had taken place, this Court is of the opinion that the interest of justice would be served if the appellant is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for five years for commission of offence punishable under Section 304, Part II, IPC."   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Dying declaration before police is admissible u/s 162 (2) CrPC.--ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT--Judgment/Order - Judgment/Order Dated - 16/4/2010 at Allahabad.   Read Judgement

Court Delhi High Court
Head Note Intention to Cause Death : He who inflicts 13 stab wounds on the vital part of the body of a human being using a dagger having a blade of 21 cms length would certainly be attributed with the intention to cause the death of the victim : Delhi High Court.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Circumstantial Evidence - Recovery of body and cycle of deceased from the appellant-witnesses reliable-Conviction Maintained : Allahabad High Court.   Read Judgement

Court Delhi High Court
Head Note Period of Limitation : The period of limitation would start only from the date when ultimately, it was held by the competent Court that the criminal prosecution was a false prosecution. It is well-know maxim of law that an appeal/ revision is continuity of the criminal trial and criminal trial finally comes to an end when the last Court i.e. the Supreme Court, give its verdict: Delhi High Court.   Read Judgement

Court Delhi High Court
Head Note Culpable Homicide not amounting to Murder : Accused causing death by his lisence weapon in marriage ceremony-convicted u/s 304II IPC for imprisionment of eight months already undergone and pay 3.5 lacs to dependant-2005 (116) DLT 634 Nehru Jain Vs. State NCT of Delhi Followed : Delhi High Court.   Read Judgement

Court Delhi High Court
Head Note Anticipatory Bail : Anticipatory Bail can not be denied merely on the ground that charge-sheet has been filed or the court has taken the cognizance- bail allowed- Supreme Court Followed : Delhi High Court- 26/02/2010.   Read Judgement

Court Delhi High Court
Head Note Circumstantial Evidence : : Delhi High Court.   Read Judgement

Court Calcutta High Court
Head Note Delay in lodging FIR in Rape case : i) When there was considerable delay and the delay was not properly explained benefit must go to the defence. ii) A rape victim may think seriously before lodging complaint to the police as the onslaught of a social stigma may haunt her for life. Hence, delay might be possible in the case of a like nature. iii) If the complainant was victim and was injured in the incident delay in lodging the complaint would not be fatal : Calcutta High Court.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Case of circumstantial evidence : Whether the circumstances against the appellant are established and lead only to his guilt or not- all circumstances must be proved : Allahabad High Court.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Cancellation of Bail : In Mubarak Dawood Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra: 2004 (2) SCC 362, State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi:2005 (8) SCC 21, and Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan: 2004(7) SCC 528 it was observed that even when there is a prima facie apprehension of the likelihood of an attempt to derail the course of justice by tampering with the witnesses, the Court would be fully justified in cancelling the bail. Here as we have seen the eye witness, had actually turned hostile, and it was not only a case of an apprehension that an attempt would be made to tamper with the witnesses.Followed: Allahabad High Court.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Out of 17 general posts, 12 posts have been filled-up from the candidates belonging to the reserved category-on merit:Allahabad High Court.   Read Judgement

Court Punjab and Haryana High Court
Head Note ANTICIPATORY BAIL-Section 438 CR.P.C-Inconsistency in medical report-Bail Allowed- PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT-DATED-2OTH NOV 2009   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Recovery Of Heroine:The recovery was made from the basement of building belonging to Mohd.Mobin Khan. It is also very strange that why would the applicant plant the recovered heroine and then would make a cool statement before officials that he himself had planted the heroinea:Allahabad High Court-Bail Granted   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Recovery of 20 Kg. Charas- Bail Refused-Dilip and another Vs. State of M.P. (2007) 1 Supreme Court Cases 450 , Ritesh Chakarvarti Vs. State of M.P. reported in (2006) 12 Supreme Court Cases 321,State of H.P. v. Pawan Kumar (2005) 4 SCC 350: 2005 (1) EFR 2008 Discussed : Allahabad High Court   Read Judgement

Court Bombay High Court
Head Note For the purposes of deduction under Chapter VIA, the gross total income has to be computed inter alia by deducting the deductions allowable under section 30 to 43D of the Act, including depreciation allowable under section 32 of the Act, even though the assessee has computed the total income under Chapter IV by disclaiming the current depreciation : Bombay High Court   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note chargesheet for the offence under section 3(1)(X) SC/ST Act submitted by the Circle Officer concerned on the basis of the investigation carried out by the Sub-Inspector not valid   Read Judgement

Court Delhi High Court
Head Note The proximity of place of last seen vis-à-vis the place of murder having snapped in the instant case, we are of the opinion that in the facts of this case, it would be unsafe to conclude against the guilt of the appellant on the solitary circumstance of his seen in the company of the deceased in the house of the father of the deceased which house is at a distance of about 2 km from the place where the deceased: Delhi High Court   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Application of judicial mind:Judicial Magistrate II, Court No. 14 Saharanpur, has passed the impugned order ignoring all judicial discipline. She has not at all applied her judicial mind and had only referred some of the judgements of this court, which are contrary to the opinion of the apex court, rendered in many decisions. Judicial order should be passed by applying judicial mind. By this judgement, I severely criticise the conduct of Judicial Magistrate, II, Saharanpur and record my serious displeasure against her order for passing such type of illegal orders. Judicial Magistrate II Court No. 14, Saharanpur is warned for future and is cautioned to be careful in passing judicial orders. She should have thought of that rape not only causes physical injury to the victim, but it leave scare on mind for life long and implant the victim with such ignominy, which is worst than her death and I say no more. Though, I was inclined to refer this matter to Administrative Committee for taking action against Judicial Magistrate II, Court No. 14 Saharanpur, but only for the reason that she is a young officer and have long career ahead, I refrain from such a stringent action:Allahabad High Court   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note On granting bail by one judge to any accused, another judge is not under obligation to grant bail to similarly placed accused on the basis of parity :Allahabad High Court   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Murder-single blow-intention to murder absent-partly allowed-convicted u/s 304 part 1-sentence of 7 years R.I. implanted: Allahabad High Court   Read Judgement

Court Punjab and Haryana High Court
Head Note Pre-arrest bail prayer refused:Punjab & Haryana High Court   Read Judgement

Court Delhi High Court
Head Note Limitation- Complaint barred by-calculation of mandatory 15 days period for notice under Negotiable Instrument Act: Delhi High Court   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note 302 IPC- FIR anti-timed-informant presence doubtful-investigation tainted-conviction set aside 302 IPC:Allahabad High Court   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note 304-B-Sentence of life imprisionment-Cause of death not known-Sentence reduced to 10 years R.I. and fine of Rs. 2,00,000/-: Allahabad High Court   Read Judgement

Court Punjab and Haryana High Court
Head Note Anticipatory Bail of Unit Manager of ICICI Company Deepak Kapila rejected : Punjab & Haryana High Court   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Transfer Matters:In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Mrs. Shilpi Bose v. State of Bihar and others [AIR 1991 SC 531], Article 226 of the Constitution of India not to be invoked:Allahabad High Court   Read Judgement

Court Delhi High Court
Head Note The degree of proof required in departmental enquiries is that of a preponderance of probabilities and not proof beyond a reasonable doubt, is now well settled through a series of decisions by Apex Court: Delhi High Court.   Read Judgement

Court Punjab and Haryana High Court
Head Note Protection of life and liberty-petitioners are major and have married against the wishes of their parents.Proof of age and marriage certificated produced. Directions to SSP to look representation and take action: Punjab & Haryana High Court.   Read Judgement

Court Punjab and Haryana High Court
Head Note Apprehending - arrest and also harassment by the police and family members of petitioner- both major and married-Directions to SSP for proctection of life and liberty: Punjab & Haryana High Court   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Adult woman entitle to live independely and not to be detained in Nari Niketan because matter communally sensitive or parents unwilling to take her: Allahabad High Court [D.B.]   Read Judgement

Court Bombay High Court
Head Note The exercise of monitoring the investigation and the power vested in the High Court to issue a writ of continuing mandamus would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where the investigation is so very unjust and unfair and is in unlawful exercise of statutory discretion, the court could interfere and monitor the investigation even after a report under section 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 has been filed before the Court of competent jurisdiction: Bombay High Court   Read Judgement

Court Punjab and Haryana High Court
Head Note All the prosecution witnesses have been examined U/S 498-A,406,304-B,34 IPC, no ground for grant of bail made out.Bail refused:Punjab & Haryana High Court.   Read Judgement

Court Bombay High Court
Head Note Dowery Death:The antemortem injuries establish that soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty. There was a demand for Rs.40,000/- which the deceased’s father could not fulfill. Circumstances establish that the harassment was in connection with dowry demand. Presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act must, therefore, arise. The appellant’s failure to explain how the deceased received ante-mortem injuries provide an important link in the chain of circumstances. Conviction affirmed: Bombay High Court.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Recovery could not be initiated against the petitioner under the statutory provisions of assessment on the ground of theft of electricity, until petitioner s objection is decided, as per Cl.8.1 Electricity Supply Code ,2005 : ALL.H.C.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Only after the declaration of the result the petitioner has now started claiming that her candidature should be treated as Scheduled Caste candidates. This change cannot be permitted at such a belated stage.Petition dismissed: All. H.C.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Small or commercial quantity of Narcotic Drug is to be determined on the basis of actual contents in such drug - percentage of heroin in the recovered contraband was found 31.25%, meaning thereby that actual weight of heroin in the recovered contraband comes 93.75 gm, which is below commercial quantity as per entry 56 of Notification dated 19.10.2001 issued by Central Government -Bail granted: All. H.C.   Read Judgement

Court Delhi High Court
Head Note Section 377 IPC, insofar it criminalises consensual sexual acts of adults in private, is violative of Articles 21, 14 and 15 of the Constitution The provisions of Section 377 IPC will continue to govern non-consensual penile non-vaginal sex ....Delhi High Court   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Second bail application on the same grounds is not maintainable : Allahabad High Court.-• Satya Pal Vs. State of U.P. 1998(37) ACC 287, Gama and another v. State of U.P. 1986 (23) ACC 339, • State of Maharashtra Vs. Buddhikota Subha Rao 1989(26) ACC 503(SC), • Babu Singh Vs. State of U.P. 1978 Cr. L. J. 651 (SC), • Shahzad Hasan Khan V. Ishtiaq Hasan Khan 1987(24) ACC 425(SC) , • Kalyan Chandra Sarkar etc. Vs. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav and another 2005(51) ACC 727 (SC). , • Pramod Kumar Saxena vs. Union of India and others 2008 (63) ACC 115[SC]- Discussed.   Read Judgement

Court Bombay High Court
Head Note State Government shall immediately take steps to train its all Executive Magistrates so that they understand as to how the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Criminal Procedure Code have to be applied : Bombay HIgh Court   Read Judgement

Court Punjab and Haryana High Court
Head Note In Petition to protect the life and liberty of the petitioners Superintendent of Police, Yamuna Nagar ordered to take an appropriate action on the petition: Punjab & Haryana High Court   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Whether the principle of parity can be the sole ground for granting Bail ? No :Allahabad High Court   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Revision against summoning order maintainable and not barred under sub section (2) of section 397 Cr.P.C.;Hon. Vijay Kumar Verma,J.: Allahabad High Court   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Long incaricuration in jail during trail is not perse illegal and would not be voilative of article 21 of constitution of India.   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Notice to the prospective accused is not required to be issued prior to passing the order under section 319 Cr.P.C.:Allahabad High Court   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Merely ownership of the weapon did not makes out a case under Section 307 IPC and in any event Section 27 has no application.   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Jail Detention during trial not perse illegal and not be violative of article 21 of Constitution...: ALL. H.C. Pramod Kumar Saxena vs. Union of India and others 2008 (6 ACC 115, in which the Hon. Apex Court has held that mere long period of incarceration in jail would not be per-se illegal-Followed   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Jail Detention during trial not perse illegal and not be violative of article 21 of Constitution...: ALL. H.C. Pramod Kumar Saxena vs. Union of India and others 2008 (6 ACC 115, in which the Hon. Apex Court has held that mere long period of incarceration in jail would not be per-se illegal-Followed   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Transfer Aplication- Supereme Court transfered the case to faimily court Banglore, where husband and wife last resided-Divorce petiton.   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Death sentence in case of rape and murder of 10 years girl reduced to life inprisionment, case does not fall rare of rarest. Bachan Singh case followed.: SUPEREME COURT   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Evidence did not attribute any overt act to the appellant. The mere fact that he was in the company of the accused who were armed would not be sufficient to attract aplicability of section 34 IPC, accused acquitted : supreme court   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note The mere fact that one of the members of the Board or the District Magistrate or the Superintendent of Police or the Panchayat has recommended release of the convict from jail, is by itself of no consequence. The recommendation is of the Board and not........:SUPREME COURT   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note SUB-BROKER CARRYING BUISNESS WITHOUT SEBI REGISTRATION EFFECT:POWERS OF TRIBUNAL IMPOSITION OF PENALTY -SCOPE OF: SUPREME COURT   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Finding of trial judge regarding time of incident on the basis of stomach contents of deceased rejected,and high court view approved, conviction maintained: SUPREME COURT   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Section 302 read with 149 IPC:The role attributed was throwing bricks towards house of Aurangjeb, death was caused by gun shot,although accused did not caused fatal blow to deceased,but conviction maintained with help of 149 IPC.As,the acquitted accused were not mere onlookers, but they were members of unlawful assembly and they also had taken active part in the incident by throwing bricks thereby causing injuries to the injured Aurangzeb and Smt. Akbari.   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Absence of direct evidence of complicity of accused-319 cr.p.c. not be invoked.   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note An apprentice is not an employee : Supereme Court   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Vicarious Liability u/s 34 IPC -Bail can not be refused :Allahabad High Court,Hon. Shiv Charan,J. Hon. Vijay Kumar Verma,J.   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Banks Recovery of loans or seizure of vehicles can only be done through legal means- Banks not to resort to use of muscle power for recovery of loans and persistently bothering borrower at odd hours   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Dyeing recorded by SHO in presence of doctor of hospital accepted by Supreme Court to base conviction- rules regarding recording of dyeing declaration by magistrate held merely procedural.   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Division Bench referance answered in Neera Yadev case.----Section 19 Prevention of Corruption Act and 197 Criminal Procedure Code,120-B IPC   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Delay in FIR, Lack of names of witnesses at first instance, Statement to CRPF withheld by prosecution- all these stereo type arguments discarded, in the circumstances of the case.   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note In appropriate cases, interim bail may be granted by subordinate courts pending disposal of bail applications.   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Aggressor has no right of private defence. Active participation is not essential FOR applicability of section 149 IPC.   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Mentioning the names of accused and witensses is not the requirement of law. In case of direct evidence, absence of motive looses significance.   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Section 3(2)(v) SC/ST not be attracted in cases where the offence committed under IPC is punishable less than ten years imprisonment.   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Interest is payable even if possession is taken prior to notification u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition Act.   Read Judgement

Court Bombay High Court
Head Note Law laid down in Anant Vasantlal Sambre and Manohar Martandrao Kulkarni’s cases no more a good law to that extent.It is not a requirement under section 3 of the Atrocities Act that the complainant should disclose the caste of the accused in the complaint: Bombay High Court-Full Bench   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Medical evidence inconsistent to oral eye witness account,Held"conviction u/s 302 IPC can not be maintained and altered to 326 IPC   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note ALL. H.C.: Existence of an arbitration agreement is a sine quo non for invoking the jurisdiction of the court u/s 9 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note S.C.:Question of law not framed by high court, so case remmitted back.   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Separate conviction and sentence under section 3(2)(5) SC/ST Act simplicitor is illegal--Allahabad High Court   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note All.H.C.;Magistrate having no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence can not pass the order for investigation under section 156(3) Cr.P.C.   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note All. H.C.:The Magistrate can pass order for further investigation on the final report.   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note All.H,C.:Carrying the cow, bull or bullock within the State for slaughtering is no offence under Cow Slaughter Act   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note All. H.C.:Second or subsequent bail application can be considered on new ground or change of law.   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note All.H.C.:Participation of all the accused in criminal act by doing some overt act is not necessary to attract Section 34 of I.P.C.   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note All.H.C.:There is no parity in rejection of bail.   Read Judgement

Court Punjab and Haryana High Court
Head Note Murder Reference No.1 of 2007 accepted and confirmed the death sentence awarded by the trial Court. Resultantly, Crl.Appeal No.105-DB of 2007 (Vikram Singh @ Vicky Walia and others versus State of Punjab) dismissed:Punjab & Haryana High Court   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Held"(1) The respondents shall not consider the applications submitted in pursuance of the advertisement dated 22nd October, 2003 (Annexure-2) for the time being and keep the process of appointment in abeyance so far as the petitioners are concerned;
(2) Applications of the petitioners for renewal shall be considered first, as required under Para 7.08 of the L.R. Manual and to be disposed of by a speaking and reasoned order;
(3) While considering the applications for renewal, the findings of fact shall be recorded by the authority concerned as to whether initial appointment of the petitioners had been made in accordance with law and in case, answer is negative, the applications for renewal shall be rejected forthwith.
(4) In case, the applications of the petitioners or any of them is rejected and renewal is not made, the said vacancies shall be filled up by the respondents in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Paras 7.03 and 7.06 of the L.R. Manual.
(5) The process shall be completed expeditiously, preferably within a period of 8 weeks from today" : Allahabad High Court. Dated 14/11/2003.
  Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Held,"In State of U.P. v. U.P. State Law Officers Association (supra), it was observed by the Supreme Court that the Government or a public body represent public interests, and hence, there is an obligation on them to engage the most competent lawyers.
Time, has, therefore, come when this practice must stop so that highly competent lawyers of integrity and sound knowledge of law are appointed as Government Counsels and for this purpose we recommend to the State Government to consult Hon'ble the Chief Justice of the High Court and suitably amend the L.R. Manual accordingly. Till that is done, ordinarily the recommendation of the District Judge, in the matter of appointment/renewal of the Government Counsels in the District Court in the State must ordinarily be accepted.": Allahabad High Court (DB)-Dated 1
  Read Judgement

Court Gujarat High Court
Head Note SECTION 18-EVIDENCE ACT- EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF SUGGESTION PUT IN CROSS EXAMINATION TO PROSECUTION WITNESS BY DEFENCE COUNSEL- NOT AN EVIDENCE--GUJARAT HIGH COURT   Read Judgement

Court CAT
Head Note Candidate is Called for Interview but not Selected.   Read Judgement

Court CAT
Head Note the applicant claiming that she was not called for interview despite possessing the qualifications prescribed in the advertisement published by the Commission and that the Commission can not shortlist the candidates on the basis of higher qualification and experience than those prescribed.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court - Vinod Prasad J.
Head Note Sentence and Compensation : Looking to the activity indulged into by the petitioner, it cannot be said that he does not deserve incarceration. How ever sentence has to be commensurate with the guilt of the accused. Judging from that angle it is detected that the illegal activity was carried out by the revisionist for a period of eighteen days. The maximum sentence, which has been provided under the Statute for offence under Section 294 IPC can extend to three months of imprisonment or with fine or with both. Looking to the entire facts and circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that the substantive sentence of the petitioner for two months R.I. is excessive and should be reduced and instead he should be implanted with heavy fine of Rs.30,000/- out of which compensation should be awarded to the the children for the agony suffered by them:Allahabad High Court - Dated 01/04/2011.   Read Judgement