THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI will hold examination for direct recruitment against 14 vacancies to Delhi Higher Judicial Service on Sunday, the 06th April,2014-Last Date 06.02.2014 13/11/2013: While renewing the term of the appointment of the existing incumbents the State Government is required to consider their past performance and conduct in the light of the recommendations made by the District Judges and the District Magistrates. Therefore, the High Court could not have issued a Mandamus for renewal of the term of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and other similarly situated persons and thereby frustrated the provisions of LR Manual and Section 24 Cr.P.C .- SUPREME COURT. 12 Nov. 2013- Registration of FIR by police in cognizable offence is must and action must be taken against officials for not lodging a case on the complaint filed in such offences.- Supreme Court.(PTI) 09/11/2013: Supreme Court stayed Gauhati High Court order that declared CBI as unconstitutional. 06-11-2013 -"while we decline to hold and declare that the DSPE Act, 1946, is not a valid piece of legislation, we do hold that the CBI is neither an organ nor a part of the DSPE and the CBI cannot be treated as a ‘police force’ constituted under the DSPE Act, 1946"-GUWAHATI HIGH COURT
LATEST JUDGEMENTS OF VARIOUS HIGH COURTS
SEARCH JUDGEMENTS
Loading
 
Bombay High Court

Judgement Dated: 16-Oct-2009

Head note: For the purposes of deduction under Chapter VIA, the gross total income has to be computed inter alia by deducting the deductions allowable under section 30 to 43D of the Act, including depreciation allowable under section 32 of the Act, even though the assessee has computed the total income under Chapter IV by disclaiming the current depreciation : Bombay High Court

Judgement:
JUDGMENT (Per J.P. Devadhar, J.) 1. This appeal filed under Section 260 A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (`Act for short) was initially heard by a Division Bench of this Court and by an order dated 19-12-2008, the said Division Bench requested the learned Chief Justice to constitute a Larger Bench to consider the following question of law: “Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, for the purposes of availing allowable special deduction under Chapter VI-A of the Income-tax Act, the gross total income is required to be computed by deducting allowable depreciation even though the assessee had disclaimed the same for the purposes of regular assessment ?” 2. On the above question of law, the Division Bench observed that there are conflicting decisions rendered by the two Division Benches of this Court in the case of Grasim Industries Limited V/s. C.I.T. reported in 245 3 I.T.R. 677 (Bom) and in the case of M/s. Scoop Industries (P) Limited V/s. Income Tax Officer reported in 289 I.T.R. 195 (Bom). The Division Bench further observed that since the above two decisions do not go hand-in-hand, and run counter to each other, the issue ought to be resolved by a Larger Bench. Accordingly, the learned Chief Justice has constituted this Full Bench for resolving the above controversy. 3. Facts relevant to the present case are that the Respondent [hereinafter referred to as `the assessee] is a Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 and is engaged in the manufacture of master batches and compounds at its units situated at Daman. 4. The assessment year [`AY for short] involved herein is AY 1997-1998. 5. In the assessment year in question, the assessee filed its return of income without claiming depreciation. For that purpose, the assessee in its return of income, added back depreciation (as per books) to the net business profit, because, the net business profit under the Profit and Loss Account (`P & L A/c. for short) was arrived at after deducting depreciation (as per books). Thus, in the return of income, the assessee computed total income (under Chapter IV) without claiming depreciation. After making deductions and additions as per claims that are allowable and disallowable under the Act, the assessee determined the gross total income, on which 100% deduction was claimed under Section 80-IA of the Act. 4 6. The above return of income was processed under Section 143 (1) of the Act and intimation of acceptance of the return of income was issued under Section 143 (1) of the Act without any adjustment. 7. Subsequently, the above assessment was reopened by the assessing officer [`A.O. for short] on the ground that 100% deduction under Section 80-IA of the Act was liable to be determined on the gross total income computed after deducting all deductions allowable under Section 30 to 43D of the Act including current depreciation allowable under Section 32 of the Act. As the assessee had computed the gross total income without deducting depreciation allowable under the Act, the assessment was sought to be reopened. The assessee in its reply, relying upon the decision of the tribunal in the case of the assessee for AY 1996-1997 contended that the assessee had the option to claim or not to claim current depreciation and in the present case, the assessee had opted not to claim current depreciation and, therefore, the current depreciation cannot be thrusted upon the assessee when not claimed. However, the AO rejected the contention of the assessee and passed a reassessment order by computing the gross total income after deducting the current depreciation allowable under Section 32 of the Act and after setting off the brought forward loss of AY 1996-1997. The gross total income so computed being loss, as per Section 80A(2), no deduction was allowable under Section 80-IA of the Act. 8. Being aggrieved by the above reassessment order, the assessee filed an appeal before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) [`CIT (A) for short], who allowed the appeal and directed the AO not to 5 deduct current depreciation in computing the gross total income. 9. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the Revenue filed an appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal [`ITAT for short] and the ITAT allowed the appeal by following the decision of this Court in the case of Scoop Industries (P) Limited (supra). The decision of this Court in the case of Scoop Industries Ltd. (supra) is based on the decision of this Court in the case of Indian Rayon Corporation Ltd. V/s. CIT reported in 261 ITR 98 (Bom) wherein it was held that Chapter VIA is a separate Code by itself and if an assessee claims relief under Chapter VIA of the Act, then it is not open to that assessee to disclaim depreciation allowance. In other words, what is held in the case of Indian Rayon Ltd. (supra) is that, one cannot exclude depreciation allowance while computing profits derived from a newly established undertaking for computing deductions under Chapter VIA. Accordingly, the Tribunal set aside the order of CIT (A) and restored the reassessment order passed by the A.O. 10. Challenging the aforesaid order of the Tribunal, the present appeal is filed by the assessee. As noted earlier, the said Appeal was initially heard by a Division Bench of this Court and the said Division Bench opined that the decision of this Court in the case of Scoop Industries (P) Limited (supra) is in conflict with the dictum laid down by another Bench of this Court in the case of Grasim Industries Limited (supra). Therefore, the appeal is placed before this Full Bench for resolving the controversy set out in the opening para of this judgment. 6 11. The above controversy between the assessee and the revenue can be easily understood by the following illustration. Suppose, the assessee in the year in question had only one source of income, namely, income from business. Suppose, the gross business profit in that year was Rs.100/-, depreciation allowable as per books as also under the Act was Rs. 80/-, brought forward loss from earlier year that could be set off was Rs.40/- and the assessee was entitled to 100% deduction under Section 80-IA of the Act. Assuming that there were no other claims that were allowable or disallowable under the Act, then, the computation of business profits / deduction under Chapter VI A, according to the assessee as well as the revenue would be as follows :- P & L A/c maintained by the assessee Gross business profit.. .. .. .. .. Rs.100/- less current depreciation allowable u/s.32 Rs. 80/- ---------------- net business profit .. .. .. .. Rs. 20/- ========= Return of income filed by the Assessee : Net business profit.. .. .. .. .. Rs. 20/- add current depreciation which is not claimed by the assessee .. .. .. .. .. Rs. 80/- ---------------- Total Income .. .. .. .. .. Rs.100/- less brought forward loss of earlier year .. Rs. 40/- Gross Total Income .. Rs. 60/- less 100% deduction under Section 80-IA Rs. 60/- ---------------- Income Chargeableto tax .. .. .. .. NIL ========= 7 Reassessment order by the A.O. Gross total income as per return of income .. Rs.100/- less current depreciation under section 32 of the Act .. .. .. .. Rs. 80/- -------------- Total income .. .. .. .. Rs. 20/- less Set off of carried forward loss of AY 1996-97 (-) Rs. 40/- --------------- Gross total income .. .. (-) Rs. 20/- ========= As the gross total income was in the negative, according to the revenue, no deduction was allowable under section 80-IA of the Act as per Section 80A(2) of the Act. 12. Thus, it is the contention of the assessee that by disclaiming the current depreciation allowable under section 32 of the Act and setting off the brought forward loss of earlier year, the assessee is entitled to deduction under section 80-IA at Rs.60/- (as per the above illustration) whereas, according to the AO, the gross total income computed after deducting the depreciation allowable under the Act (though not claimed by the assessee) results in loss and, therefore, as per Section 80A(2) no deduction was allowable under section 80-IA of the Act. 13. The basic controversy, therefore, is, whether the assessee had an option not to claim current depreciation and if so, whether the same would have any bearing in computing the deduction allowable under Section 80IA of the Act ? 8 14. Before dealing with the rival contentions on the above question, we may quote some of the provisions of the Act as they stood at the relevant time. 15. Section 2 (45) of the Act defines `total income as follows : “Definitions. 2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, - 1 to 44 --------------- 45. “total income” means the total amount of income referred to in section 5, computed in the manner laid down in this Act;” 16. Section 5 of the Act (to the extent relevant) reads as follows :- “Scope of total income. 5. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the total income of any previous year of a person who is a resident includes all income from whatever source derived which - (a) is received or is deemed to be received in India in such year by or on behalf of such person; or (b) accrues or arises or is deemed to accrue or arise to him in India during such year; or (c) accrues or arises to him outside India during such year: Provided ......... 17. Chapter IV of the Act deals with the computation of total income under various heads of income. Section 14 in Chapter IV of the Act reads as follows :- “Heads of income. 9 14. Save as otherwise provided by this Act, all income shall, for the purposes of charge of income-tax and computation of total income, be classified under the following heads of income :- A.- Salaries. B.- [*******] C.- Income from house property. D.- Profits and gains of business or profession. E.- Capital gains. F.- Income from other sources.” 18. Section 28 in Chapter IV of the Act sets out various incomes that are chargeable to income-tax under the head `Profits & gains of business or profession. Section 29 in Chapter IV of the Act provides for the computation of income from profits & gains of business or profession as follows:- “ Income from profits and gains of business or profession, how computed. 29. The income referred to in section 28 shall be computed in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 30 to 43D.” 19. Thus, computation of business income chargeable to income tax under the head `profits and gains of business or profession in Chapter IV of the Act has to be made by deducting from the business income specified in Section 28, various deductions allowable under Section 30 to 43D of the Act. Section 32(1) of the Act with which we are concerned in the present case, to the extent relevant, reads as follows : “Depreciation. 32.(1) In respect of depreciation of buildings, machinery, plant 10 or furniture owned [wholly or partly,] by the assessee and used for the purposes of the business or profession, the following deductions shall, subject to the provisions of section 34, be allowed - (i) [***] (ii) [in the case of any block of assets, such percentage on the written down value thereof as may be prescribed]: 20. Chapter VI of the Act (sections 66 to 80) provides for aggregation of income falling under different heads of income and also provision for set off or carry forward of loss. 21. Chapter VI-A of the Act provides for special deductions in cases specified in Sections 80-C to 80-U. Chapter VI-A is divided in to four sub-headings, namely A – General (Sections 80A to 80B), B – deductions in respect of certain payments (Section 80C to 80GGA), C – Deductions in respect of certain incomes (Section 80H to 80RRA) and D – Other deductions (Section 80U). 22. In the present case, the dispute relates to the special deduction allowable under Section 80-IA contained in Chapter VI-A. Relevant provisions contained in Chapter VI-A including Section 80-IA (to the extent relevant), read as follows :- “ CHAPTER VI-A DEDUCTIONS TO BE MADE IN COMPUTING TOTAL INCOME A-General Deductions to be made in computing total income. 11 80-A (1) In computing the total income of an assessee, there shall be allowed from his gross total income, in accordance with and subject to the provisions of this Chapter, the deductions specified in sections 80C to [80U]. (2) The aggregate amount of the deductions under this Chapter shall not, in any case, exceed the gross total income of the assessee. “ Deduction to be made with reference to the income included in the gross total income. 80AB. Where any deduction is required to be made or allowed under any section [(except section 80M)] included in this Chapter under the heading “C – Deductions in respect of certain incomes” in respect of any income of the nature specified in that section which is included in the gross total come of the assessee, then, notwithstanding anything contained in that section, for the purpose ofcomputing the deduction under that section, the amount of income of that nature as computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act (before making any deduction under this Chapter) shall alone be deemed to be the amount of income of that nature which is derived or received by the assessee and which is included in his gross total income. “ Definitions. 80B. In this Chapter- (1) ****** (2) ****** (3) ****** (4) ****** (5) “gross total income” means the total income computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act, before making any deduction under this Chapter. “C. - Deductions in respect of certain incomes ..................... ..................... ................... ..................... ............ .............. .............. ................ .................... ................... .......... Deductions in respect of profits and gains from industrial undertakings, etc., in certain cases: 12 80-IA (1) Where the gross total income of an assessee includes any profits and gains derived from any business of an industrial undertaking or a hotel or operation of a shop or developing, maintaining and operating any infrastructure facility or scientific and industrial research and development or providing telecommunication services whether basic or cellular or operating an industrial park or commercial production of mineral oil in the North Eastern Region (such business being hereinafter referred to as the eligible business), to which this section applies, there shall, in accordance with and subject to the provisions of this section, be allowed, in computing the total income of the assessee, a deduction from such profits and gains of an amount equal to the percentage specified in sub-section (5) and for such number of assessment years as is specified in sub-section (6). (2) to (6) ........... (7) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act, the profits and gains of an eligible business to which the provisions of sub-section (1) apply shall, for the purposes of determining the quantum of deduction under sub-section (5) for the assessment year immediately succeeding the initial assessment year or any subsequent assessment year, be computed as if such eligible business were the only source of income of the assessee during the previous year relevant to the initial assessment year and to every subsequent assessment year upto and including the assessment year for which the determination is to be made. “ (emphasis supplied) 23. Thus, Chapter II of the Act contains provisions relating to the basic charge of income tax. Chapter IV contains provisions relating to the computation of total income under various heads of income as also the deductions that are allowable under each head. Chapter VI contains provisions relating to the aggregation of income and set off or carry forward of loss and Chapter VI-A of the Act provides for special deductions that are allowed at such rates that are specified in the respective provisions on the gross total income of the assessee. 13 24. The basic argument of Mr. Dastur, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the assessee is that, in the assessment year in question (AY 1997-1998) the assessee had an option to claim or not to claim current depreciation allowable under Section 32 of the Act and the assessee had chosen not to claim current depreciation. In such a case, it is contended that income chargeable to tax had to be computed without allowing current depreciation and, therefore, the AO was not justified in thrusting current depreciation upon the assessee while computing the income chargeable to tax. 25. In support of the above argument, Mr.Dastur strongly relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of C.I.T. V/s. Mahendra Mills reported in 243 ITR 56 (S.C.), wherein the Apex Court on interpretation of Section 32 and 34 of the Act (as they were applicable to AY 1974-75) and considering the Board Circular dated 31-8-1965 held that the current depreciation can be allowed only if, firstly, it is claimed by the assessee and secondly, the required particulars have been furnished by the assessee. It is contended by the counsel for the assessee that unless the above two conditions (which are mutually exclusive) are satisfied current depreciation cannot be allowed. In the present case, it is contended that the current depreciation is not claimed by the assessee and, therefore, thrusting current depreciation upon the assessee in computing the taxable income is contrary to the law laid down by the Apex Court. 26. Mr. Dastur further contended that in view of the deletion of 14 Section 34(1) and (2) of the Act with effect from 1-4-1988, no doubt, the second condition would not survive, however, the first condition would still survive. Therefore, as per the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mahendra Mills (Supra) unless the first condition is satisfied, that is, unless the assessee has claimed current depreciation, the same cannot be allowed or thrust upon the assessee. In the present case, admittedly the assessee has not claimed current depreciation and, therefore, irrespective of the deletion of Section 34(1) and (2), the current depreciation could not be thrust upon the assessee when not claimed by the assessee. 27. Mr.Dastur referred to Explanation 5 to Section 32 (1) inserted by Finance Act 2001 with effect from 1-4-2002, which reads thus :- “Explanation 5. - For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the provisions of this subsection shall apply whether or not the assessee has claimed the deduction in respect of depreciation in computing his total income; Mr. Dastur submitted that since Explanation 5 to Section 32(1) has been expressly made operative with effect from 1-4-2002, it is clear that the said Explanation applies prospectively and not retrospectively and, therefore, in view of the clear legislative intent, current depreciation cannot be thrust upon the assessee till 1-4-2002 if not claimed by the assessee. The submission is that, when the legislature has expressly made it clear that the current depreciation has to be mandatorily allowed (even if not claimed by the assessee) with effect from 1-4-2002, the AO was not justified in thrusting current depreciation upon the assessee in the assessment year in 15 question (AY 1997-98) even though the assessee had opted not to claim current depreciation. 28. In support of the above argument, Mr. Dastur relied upon a decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of C.I.T. V/s. Kerala Electric Lamp Works Limited reported in 261 ITR 721 (Ker), decision of the Madras High Court in the case of C.I.T. V/s. Sree Senhavalli Textiles P. Limited reported in 259 ITR 77 (Mad), decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Ram Nath Jindal V/s. C.I.T. reported in 252 I.T.R. 590 (P & H) wherein it is held that the Explanation 5 to section 32(1) is prospective in nature and even after deletion of section 34(1) & (2) of the Act if the assessee does not wish to claim depreciation, the same cannot be thrusted upon the assessee. He has also relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of DCIT V/s. Core Health Care Limited reported in 298 ITR 194 (SC), where it is held that the proviso inserted to Section 36(1)(iii) by Finance Act, 2003 with effect from 1-4-2004 has to be read prospectively with effect from 1-4-2004. Accordingly, Mr.Dastur submitted that notwithstanding the deletion of Section 34(1) and (2) with effect from 1-4-1988 and notwithstanding the insertion of Explanation 5 to Section 32(1) with effect from 1-4-2002, in the assessment year in question (AY 1997-98) the assessee in the light of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mahendra Mills (supra) had the option to claim or not to claim current depreciation and since the assessee in the present case had opted not to claim current depreciation, the same could not be thrusted upon the assessee, either in determining the total income under Chapter IV or in determining the gross total income for the purpose of computing deduction 16 under section 80-IA of the Act. 29. Mr.Dastur further submitted that the deduction under Section 80-IA of the Act is at a percentage of the profits of the assessees industrial undertaking. As per section 80AB, the profits of an industrial undertaking to which the percentage is to be applied has to be computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act before making any deduction under Chapter VIA. Profits of an industrial undertaking as per section 29 of the Act is to be computed in accordance with the provisions contained in sections 30 to 43D of the Act. Therefore, the expression “income.... computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act” in section 80AB must mean business profits computed as per the provisions contained in sections 30 to 43D of the Act and if in computing the business profits under Section 30 to 43D of the Act, the claim for depreciation as per the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mahendra Mills (supra) is optional, then, it would also be so for the purposes of section 80AB of the Act. The submission is that once the total income under Chapter IV is computed in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 30 to 43D of the Act without deducting the allowable current depreciation (on account of the assessee not claiming it), then the gross total income for the purpose of deduction under Chapter VI-A would also have to be computed without deducting current depreciation. In other words, the submission is that, where the assessee chooses not to claim current depreciation, then the total income under Chapter IV as well as the gross total income under Chapter VI-A have to be computed without deducting from the business profits the current depreciation allowable under the Act. 17 30. We see no merit in the above contentions. As rightly contended by Mr. Srivastav, learned counsel for the revenue, the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mahendra Mills (supra) has to be understood in the context in which the said decision was rendered. In that case, the Apex Court on interpretation of Section 32 and Section 34(1) and (2) of the Act (as they stood at the relevant time) held that the current depreciation can be allowed only when, firstly, the assessee has claimed current depreciation under section 32 and secondly, the assessee has furnished requisite particulars under section 34. The Apex Court in the Mahendra Mills (supra) has further held that the deduction by way of current depreciation is a benefit conferred upon the assessee and if the assessee does not wish to avail that benefit for some reason, then the current depreciation cannot be forced upon the assessee. 31. However, it is pertinent to note that firstly, the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mahendra Mills (supra) was rendered in the context of determining total income of an industrial undertaking under Chapter IV of the Act and not in the context of determining the deduction under Chapter VIA of the Act. Secondly, what is held by the Apex Court in the case of Mahendra Mills (supra) is that, when there are two provisions under which an assessee can claim some benefit, it is for the assessee to choose one and that the consequence of the assessee not claiming deprecation in the current year would be that the written down value would remain the same for the following year (see 243 ITR 56 at Page 62). Thirdly, the Apex Court in the case of Mahendra Mills (supra) has not laid down any 18 proposition of law that by disclaiming depreciation, the assessee can claim enhanced deduction allowable under any other provision in the Act. 32. The choice or the option available to an assessee to claim or not to claim current depreciation as per the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mahendra Mills (supra) can be elucidated by an illustration. Suppose an assessee is carrying business in scientific research. That assessee would be entitled to deduction under section 32 (current depreciation on the plant and machinery used for that business) as well as deduction under Section 35(1)(iv) (capital expenditure on the scientific research business). In such a case, it cannot be said that the legislature intended to give double deduction in respect of the same business outgoing and the assessee would have to choose one out of the above two deductions and cannot claim both the deductions. In these circumstances, the Apex Court in the case of Mahendra Mills (supra) has observed that the assessee has an option to disclaim depreciation and that the consequence of disclaiming depreciation would be that the written down value of the asset would remain the same for the following year. Thus, even according to the Apex Court, disclaiming of depreciation cannot result in enhancement in the quantum of deduction that is allowable under any other provision in the Act. 33. Although it is contended on behalf of the revenue that the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mahendra Mills (supra) is rendered ineffective by the subsequent amendments, we do not consider it necessary to deal with that argument, because, in our opinion, even assuming that in the year in question the assessee had an option to disclaim current 19 depreciation in computing the total income under Chapter IV of the Act, the question is, whether the quantum of deduction allowable under section 80- IA of the Act is dependent upon the assessee claiming or not claiming current depreciation allowable under the Act ? To illustrate, suppose in the assessment year in question, the only source of income of the assessee was the business income. Suppose the gross business profit of the assessee in that year was Rs.100/-, and the assessee was entitled to current depreciation under Section 32 at Rs.80/- and 100% deduction under Section 80-IA. Assuming that there were no other claims that were to be allowed to disallowed, then the computation of income, as per the Assessee Gross business profit.. .. .. .. Rs.100/- less depreciation allowable under the .. Act (not claimed).. .. .. .. .. ---- ----------- Gross Total Income.. .. Rs.100/- less 100% deduction under Section 80-IA.. .. Rs.100/- ----------- Taxable Income.. .. NIL ====== as per the AO Gross business profit.. .. .. .. Rs.100/- less depreciation allowable under the Act.. .. Rs. 80/- ------------ Gross Total Income.. .. Rs. 20/- less 100% deduction under Section 80-IA.. .. Rs. 20/- ----------- Taxable Income.. .. NIL ====== 20 Thus, as per the above illustration, where the depreciation is disclaimed by the assessee, the quantum of deduction under Section 80IA comes to Rs.100/- and where depreciation is claimed by the assessee, the deduction under Section 80-IA (as per the above illustration) comes to Rs. 20/-. The question, therefore, to be considered is, whether the quantum of deduction under Section 80IA is dependent upon the assessee claiming or not claiming depreciation ? 34. As noted earlier, the Apex Court in the case of Mahendra Mills (supra) has neither considered the scope of deduction under Chapter VI-A nor the said decision can be read to mean that by disclaiming current depreciation the assessee can claim enhanced deduction under any other provision in the Act. Therefore, reliance placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mahendra Mills (supra) in computing the quantum of deduction under section 80-IA of the Act is wholly misplaced. 35. The question then to be considered is, whether on a plain reading of Section 80IA read with other relevant provisions in Chapter VI-A, can it be said that the quantum of deduction allowable under Section 80IA depends upon the assessee claiming or not claiming current depreciation ? To be specific, the question is, whether the choice, if any, vested in the assessee in claiming or not claiming current depreciation has any bearing in determining the quantum of deduction allowable under Section 80IA of the Act ? 36. In our opinion, the above question is no longer res-integra. 21 The Apex Court in the case of M/s.Liberty India V/s. Commissioner of Income Tax reported in 2009 (12) SCALE 61, held as under : “13. Before analyzing Section 80-IB, as a prefatory note, it needs to be mentioned that the 1961 Act broadly provides for two types of tax incentives, namely, investment linked incentives and profit linked incentives. Chapter VI-A which provides for incentives in the form of tax deductions essentially belong to the category of “profit linked incentives”. Therefore, when Section 80-IA / 80-IB refers to profits derived from eligible business, it is not the ownership of that business which attracts the incentives. What attracts the incentives under Section 80-IA / 80-IB is the generation of profits (operational profits). For example, an assessee company located in Mumbai may have a business of building housing projects or a ship in Nava Sheva. Ownership of a ship per se will not attract Section 80-IB (6). It is the profits arising from the business of a ship which attracts sub-section (6). In other words, deduction under sub-section (6) at the specified rate has linkage to the profits derived from the shipping operations. This what we mean in drawing the distinction between profit linked tax incentives and investment linked tax incentives. It is for this reason that Parliament has confined deduction to profits derived from eligible businesses mentioned in sub-sections (3) to (11A) [as they stood at the relevant time]. One more aspect needs to be highlighted. Each of the eligible business in subsections (3) to (11A) constitutes a stand-alone item in the matter of computation of profits. That is the reason why the concent of “Segment Reporting” stands introduced in the Indian Accounting Standards (IAS) by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI). 14. Analysing Chapter VI-A, we find that Sections 80-IB / 80-IA are the Code by themselves as they contain both substantive as well as procedural provisions. Therefore, we need to examine what these provisions prescribe for “computation of profits of the eligible business”. It is evident that Section 80- IB provides for allowing of deduction in respect of profits and gains derived from the eligible business. The words “derived from” in narrower in connotation as compared to the words “attributable to”. In other words, by using the expression “derived from”, 22 Parliament intended to cover sources not beyond the first degree. In the present batch of cases, the controversy which arises for determination is: whether the DEPB credit / Duty drawback receipt comes within the first degree sources ? According to the assessee(s), DEPB credit / duty drawback receipt reduces the value of purchases (cost neutralization), hence, it comes within first degree source as it increases the net profit proportionately. On the other hand, according to the Department, DEPB credit, duty drawback receipt do not come within first degree source as the said incentives flow from Incentive Schemes enacted by the Government of India or from Section 75 of the Customs Act, 1962. Hence, according to the Department, in the present cases, the first degree source is the incentive scheme / provisions of the Customs Act. In this connection, Department places heavy reliance on the judgment of this Court in Sterling Food (supra). Therefore, in the present cases, in which we are required to examine the eligible business of an industrial undertaking, we need to trace the source of the profits to manufacture (see CIT v. Kirloskar Oil Engines Ltd., reported in [1986] 157 ITR 762) 15. Continuing our analysis of Sections 80- IA / 80-IB it may be mentioned that sub-section (13) of Section 80-IB provides for applicability of the provisions of sub-section (5) and sub-sections (7) to (12) to Section 80-IA, so far as may be, applicable to the eligible business under Section 80-IB. Therefore, at the outset, we stated that one needs to read Sections 80I, 80-IA and 80-IB as having a common Scheme. On perusal of sub-section (5) of Section 80- IA, it is noticed that it provides for manner of computation of profits of an eligible business. Accordingly, such profits are to be computed as if such eligible business is the only source of income of the assessee. Therefore, the devices adopted to reduce or inflate the profits of eligible business has got to be rejected in view of the overriding provisions of sub-section (5) of Section 80-IA, which are also required to be read into Section 80-IB. [see Section 80-IB(13)]. We may reiterate that Sections 80I, 80-IA and 80-IB have a common scheme and if so read it is clear that the said sections provide for incentives in the form of deduction(s) which are linked to profits and not to investment. On analysis of Sections 80-IA and 80-IB it becomes clear that any industrial undertaking, which becomes eligible on satisfying sub-section (2), would be entitled to deduction under sub-section (1) 23 only to the extent of profits derived from such industrial undertaking after specified date(s). Hence, apart from eligibility, sub-section (1) purports to restrict the quantum of deduction to a specified percentage of profits. This is the importance of the words “derived from industrial undertaking” as against “profits attributable to industrial undertaking”.” (emphasis supplied) 37. In the case of CIT V/s. Williamson Financial Services & Ors. reported in [2008] 297 ITR 17 (SC), the Apex Court inter alia held thus:- " In this connection, it is also important to note that section 80A which falls in Chapter VI-A, deductions are allowed only from gross total income". The object for making such provision is to limit the amount of the amount of the section 80HHC deduction. It is true that section 80HHC provides for deduction of a percentage of the export profits. The percentage is calculated with reference to the export profits, but the deduction is only from "gross total income" as defined under section under section 80B(5) of the 1961 Act. Therefore, the very scheme of the 1961 Act is to treat the deductions under Chapter VI-A as deductions only from "gross total income" in order to arrive at the "total income". In other cases falling under section 28 where computation of income falls under the head "Business", allowances are deductible from the income but not from "gross total income". It is, therefore, not possible to accept the contention that section 80HHC is part of the provisions for computation of business income. Section 80 HHC does not have any direct impact on the computation of business income in the manner in which, for example, section 72 affects the computation of business income. " 38. In the case of CIT V/s. Doom Dooma India Ltd. reported in/ (2009) 310 ITR 392 (SC), the Apex Court has held as follows:- "Chapter VI-A refers to special deductions. It is a separate code by itself. There is a distinction between "deductions / allowances in Section 30 to 43-D and "deductions admissible under Chapter VI-A". Deductions / allowances provided in Sections 30 to 43-D are allowed in determining gross total income and are not chargeable to tax because the same constitute charge on profit, 24 whereas, deductions under Chapter VI-A are allowed from gross total income chargeable to tax. Therefore, the judgments rendered in the context of Section 80-HHC of the 1961 Act, both by this Court and by the Kerala High Court stand on different footing. " (emphasis supplied) 39. In the light of the aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court, it is clear that Section 80IA is a Code by itself and the deduction allowable under Section 80IA is a special deduction which is linked to profits, unlike deductions contained in Chapter IV of the Act which are linked to investments. The deduction under Section 80IA is allowed at a percentage of the business profits computed in the manner specified in that Section and other provisions contained in Chapter VIA. The Apex Court has held that section 80-IA contains both substantive and procedural provisions for computation of the special deduction and any device adopted to reduce or inflate the profits, of eligible business has to be rejected. In the present case, the assessee by not claiming current depreciation seeks to inflate the profit linked incentives provided under Section 80-IA of the Act which is not permissible as per the law laid down by the Apex Court. 40. Strong reliance was placed by the counsel for the assessee on the Constitution Bench decision of the Apex Court in the case of Distributors (Baroda) P. Ltd. V/s. Union of India reported in 155 ITR 120 (S.C.) in support of his contention that where the business income of the assessee is computed under Chapter IV by disclaiming current depreciation, then, deduction under Chapter VIA has also got to be computed by disregarding the current depreciation. It is contended that the deduction 25 under Chapter VIA has to be computed by determining the gross total income and according to the Apex Court what is included in the gross total income is not only the category of income [income of the industrial undertaking under section 80-IA(2) (iv)(b)] but also the quantum of income [profits and gains as computed under section 30 to 40D]. The argument is that as per the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Distributors Baroda P. Limited (supra), for computing deduction under Chapter VI-A, what is relevant is that, there must be business income (category of income) and total income from business (quantum of income) must be computed in accordance with the provisions contained in sections 30 to 43D of the Act (which includes section 32). As per the Apex Court in the case of Mahindra Mills (supra) the assessee has a choice to claim or not to claim current depreciation allowable under section 32 of the Act. Accordingly, it is contended that where the total income under Chapter IV is computed by disclaiming current depreciation, then, as per the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Distributors Baroda (supra) the category of income and the quantum of income computed under Chapter IV would alone be the basis for determining the quantum of deduction under Chapter VIA of the Act (in the present case section 80-IA). In this connection, reliance is placed on the decisions of this Court in the case of Grasim Industries Ltd. (supra), CIT V/s. Asian Cable Corporation Ltd. reported in 262 ITR 537 (Bom) and CIT V/s. Albright Morarji & Pandit Ltd. reported in 236 ITR 914 (Bom). 41. We see no merit in the above contention. The question before the Apex Court in the case of Distributors Baroda (P) Ltd. (supra) was, where the gross total income of an assessee includes any income by way of 26 dividends received from a domestic company, whether deduction under section 80M contained in Chapter VIA of the Act has to be computed after deducting the interest payable on monies borrowed for earning such dividend income ? The Apex Court after reviewing the entire case law and after reversing its own judgment in the case of Cloth Traders (P) Ltd. V/s. ACIT reported in 118 ITR 243 (S.C.) held (see 155 ITR 120 at page 134) as follows:- “...... Now when an amount by way of dividend is received by the assessee from the paying company, the full amount of such dividend would have suffered tax in the assessment of the paying company and it is obvious, that, in order to encourage inter-company investments, the Legislature intended that this amount should not bear tax once again in the hands of the assessee either in its entirety or to a specified extend. But the amount by way of dividend which would otherwise suffer tax in the hands of the assessee would be the amount computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and not the full amount received from paying company. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that in enacting S.80M, the Legislature intended to grant relief with reference to the amount of dividend computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and not with reference to the full amount of dividend received from the paying company. It is difficult to imagine any reason why the Legislature should have intended to give relief with reference to the full amount of dividend received from the paying company when that is not the amount which is liable to suffer tax once again in the hands of the assessee. The Legislature could certainly be attributed with the intention to prevent double taxation but not to provide an additional benefit which would go beyond what is required for saving the amount of dividend from taxation once again in the hands of the assessee..... ..... Income by way of dividends from a domestic company included in the gross total income would, therefore, obviously be income computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act, that is, after deducting interest on monies borrowed for 27 earning such income. If income by way of dividends from a domestic company computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act is included in the gross total income, or, in other words, forms part of the gross total income, the condition specified in the opening part of sub-s.(1) of S. 80M would be fulfilled and the provision enacted in that sub-section would be attracted.” (emphasis supplied) 42. Thus, in the case of Distributors (Baroda) P. Ltd. (supra) the Apex Court has held that the deduction under section 80M relating to certain inter-corporate dividends has to be allowed after deducting the interest payable on monies borrowed for earning such dividend income. The Apex Court has also held that section 80M cannot be interpreted in a manner so as to confer additional benefit which would go beyond what is required for saving the amount of dividend from taxation once again in the hands of the assessee. Therefore, even in the case of Distributors Baroda (P) Ltd. (supra) the Apex Court has held that the computation of deduction under VIA cannot be done in a manner which gives additional benefit to the assessee than what is contemplated under Chapter VIA of the Act. Similar view has been taken by the Apex Court in the case of Liberty India (supra) wherein it is held that any device adopted to reduce or inflate the profits of eligible business has got to be rejected in view of the overriding provisions of subsection 5 of section 80-IB [similar to section 80IA(7)]. Therefore, in the light of the aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court, it is clear that the quantum of deduction under section 80-IA would not be dependent upon the assessee claiming or not claiming current depreciation, because, the quantum deduction under section 80-IA has to be computed on the profits determined after deducting all deductions allowable under the Act. 28 43. The Apex Court in the case of Distributors Baroda (P) Ltd. (supra) has quoted with approval the following passage from the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Cambay Electric Supply Industrial Co. Ltd. V/s. CIT reported in 113 ITR 84 (SC):- “ On reading sub-section (1), it will become clear that three important steps are required to be taken before the special deduction permissible thereunder is allowed and the net total income exigible to tax is determined. First, compute the total income of the concerned assessee in accordance with the other provisions of the Act i.e. in accordance with all the provisions except section 80E; secondly, ascertain what part of the total income so computed represents the profits and gains attributable to the business of the specified industry (here generation and distribution of electricity); and, thirdly, if there be profits and gains so attributable, deduct 8% thereof from such profits and gains and then arrive at the net total income exigible to tax. “ [see 155 ITR 120 139] Thus, in all the aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court the consistent view taken is that, the deduction under Chapter VIA is a special deduction and the quantum of deduction thereunder has to be computed by ascertaining that part of the total income which represents the profits and gains derived by an undertaking after deducting all the deductions allowable under section 30 to 43D of the Act. Therefore, assuming that in the assessment year in question the assessee has an option to disclaim depreciation, the same would not have any bearing on the computation of quantum deduction under section 80-IA of the Act. 29 44. To summarise, firstly, the Apex Court decision in the case of Mahendra Mills (supra) cannot be construed to mean that by disclaiming depreciation, the assessee can claim enhanced quantum of deduction under Section 80IA. Secondly, the Apex Court in the case of Distributors (Baroda) P. Ltd. (supra) and in the case of Liberty India (supra) has clearly held that the special deduction under Chapter VIA has to be computed on the gross total income determined after deducting all deductions allowable under section 30 to 43D of the Act and any device adopted to reduce or inflate the profits of eligible business has got to be rejected. Thirdly, this Court in the case of Albright Morarji & Pandit Ltd. (supra), Grasim Industries Ltd. (supra) and Asian Cable Corporation Ltd. (supra) has only followed the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Distributors Baroda (supra). Thus, on analysis of all the decisions referred hereinabove, it is seen that the quantum of deduction allowable under section 80-IA of the Act has to be determined by computing the gross total income from business, after taking into consideration all the deductions allowable under section 30 to 43D of the Act. Therefore, whether the assessee has claimed the deductions allowable under Sections 30 to 43D of the Act or not, the quantum of deduction under Section 80IA has to be determined on the total income computed after deducting all deductions allowable under Sections 30 to 43D of the Act. 45. Apart from the above, in the present case, as fairly stated by Mr. Dastur, the assessee is disclaiming depreciation neither with a view to be charitable nor with a view to pay more tax than what is legally payable. In the present case, the assessee by disclaiming depreciation, seeks deduction under section 80-IA at Rs.100/- instead of Rs.20/- which is legally 30 permissible as per the illustration at para 33 above. Once it is held that the quantum of deduction allowable under section 80-IA after deducting all deductions allowable under Sections 30 to 43D is Rs.20/- only (as per the illustration at para 33), then, by disclaiming current depreciation, the assessee would be worse off, because by disclaiming depreciation the assessee would have to pay tax on Rs.80/- and if depreciation is allowed, then there would be no tax liability. In these circumstances, disclaiming depreciation being not in the interest of the assessee, the A.O. was justified in allowing depreciation to the assessee, so that no tax liability is fastened upon the assessee by disclaiming depreciation. 46. Now, let us consider the argument as to whether the observations made by this Court in the case of Indian Rayon (supra) which is followed in the case of Scoop Industries Ltd. (supra) are contrary to the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Mahendra Mills (supra) and Distributors Baroda (P) Ltd. (supra). It is true that in the case of Indian Rayon (supra) the assessee therein had claimed depreciation and the observations of this Court relating to cases where the assessee has not claimed depreciations were only general observations. Considerable argument was advanced by the Counsel for the assessee on the binding nature of such general observations. However, we do not consider it necessary to deal with those arguments, because in our opinion, those general observations are in consonance with the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Distributors Baroda (P) Ltd. (supra) and reiterated again in the case of Liberty India (supra). Even in the case of Grasim Industries Ltd. (supra), this Court has held that deduction under section 80HH in 31 Chapter VI-A has to be computed after deducting development rebate allowable under section 33 of the Act. Thus, in our opinion, there is no conflict whatsoever in the decisions of this Court in the case of Grasim Industries Ltd. (supra) and Indian Rayon Ltd. (supra) and the ratio laid down in both the above cases are in consonance with the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Distributors Baroda (P) Ltd. (supra) and other cases referred to herein above. 47. Thus, the common thread passing through the above decisions of the Apex Court as well as the decisions of this Court including the decision in the case of Indian Rayon (supra) is that the deductions under Chapter VI-A are linked to profits and the profits for the purposes of deduction under Chapter VI-A have to be determined after considering all deductions allowable under the Act (except deductions allowable under Chapter VI-A). Therefore, whether the assessee has claimed current depreciation or not has no bearing in determining the quantum of deduction allowable under Section 80IA of the Act and once it is found that disclaiming depreciation is not in the interest of the assessee, the AO was justified in allowing current depreciation to the assessee. 48. For all the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the quantum of deduction under Section 80IA is not dependent upon the assessee claiming or not claiming depreciation, because, under Section 80IA the quantum of deduction has to be determined by computing total income from business after deducting all deductions allowable under Section 30 to 43D of the Act. 32 49. In the result, we answer the question referred to us set out at para 1 above in the affirmative, that is, for the purposes of deduction under Chapter VIA, the gross total income has to be computed inter alia by deducting the deductions allowable under section 30 to 43D of the Act, including depreciation allowable under section 32 of the Act, even though the assessee has computed the total income under Chapter IV by disclaiming the current depreciation. 50. The reference is accordingly disposed of with no order as to costs. (SMT. RANJANA DESAI, J.) (J.P. DEVADHAR, J.) (R.V. MORE, J.)
                   
                     

                     

Court Delhi High Court
Head Note 2.4.2014- Judgement-- Nitish Katara Murder Case- After hearing Mr. Ram Jethmalani Senior Counsel for Vishal Yadav, Mr. U.R Lalit Senior Counsel for Vikas Yadav and Mr. Ravindra Kumar Kapoor learned counsel for Sukhdev Appellant the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi Dismissed all the appeals.   Read Judgement

Court Guwahati High Court
Head Note 06 Nov-2013-"while we decline to hold and declare that the DSPE Act, 1946, is not a valid piece of legislation, we do hold that the CBI is neither an organ nor a part of the DSPE and the CBI cannot be treated as a ‘police force’ constituted under the DSPE Act, 1946."--GUWAHATI HIGH COURT   Read Judgement

Court Delhi High Court
Head Note Conclusion: "We have held that the Delhi Legislative Assembly did not have the legislative competence to amend the Court Fees Act,1870. We have also held that the Court Fees (Delhi Amendment) Act, 2012 adversely impacts the Part-III rights and results in violation of Article 38 and 39A of the Constitution of India….   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note 13 sept.2013-"The impugned judgment of the trial Court has failed to notice and take into account the probabilities, material contradictions and the embellishments.."   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note 13/9/2013: Held,"The impugned judgment of the trial Court has failed to notice and take into account the probabilities, material contradictions and the embellishments that have been highlighted above and therefore, in our opinion, the impugned order of conviction and sentence cannot be sustained and is liable to be reversed." - Allahabad High Court.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note 3/9/2013: Hostility of witnesses - Hon'ble Court took serious note-Allahabad High Court.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note 2 Sept.2013- The earlier rejections of the bail prayer of the appellant were without following the required mandatory provisions.-All. H.C.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note 2 Aug.2013-"Two of non-fatal injuries on deceased were simple in nature which also is clear indication that there was no unlawful assembly with common object to commit murder"   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note "It seems to us that in a murder case, the non-explanation of the injuries sustained by the accused at about the time of the occurrence or in the course of altercation is a very important circumstance from which the Court can draw the following inferences : (1) That the prosecution has suppressed the genesis and the origin of the occurrence and has thus not presented the true version. (2) that the witnesses who have denied the presence of the injuries on the person of the accused are lying on a most material point and therefore their evidence is unreliable; (3) that in case there is a defence version which explains the injuries on the person of the accused it is rendered probable so as to throw doubt on the prosecution case. The omission on the part of the prosecution to explain the injuries on the person of the accused assumes much greater importance where the evidence consists of interested or inimical witnesses or where the defence gives a version which competes in probability with that of the prosecution one."- Allahabad High Court relied upon Apex Court's judgement.-2.8.2013   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Directions issued,"whenever there is slightest suspicion the police should not hesitate in registering the crime also under section 376 IPC, and not show the crime only as a murder"-Allahbad High Court. Dated 9.7.2013   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note "Death reference rejected"-Allahabad High Court.Dated8.7.2013   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note "Cherge not framed-Effect analysed"-Allahabad High Court. Dated 3.5.2013   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Without establishing genuiness, photo can not be admitted in secondary evidence : Allahabad High Court- Dated 23/2/2012.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Police not to arrest accused persons for offences punishable upto imprisionment upto 7 years - provisions of 41(1)b,41A discussed and directions issued - Allahabad High Court - Dated 11.10.2011.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Applicability of Section 40 to 44 Evidence Act- "A Division Bench of this Court in Km. Rinki vs. State of U.P. & others, 2008 (3) JIC 267 (All.) (D.B.) and Hon'ble Single Judge in Raj Dularey Shukla v. State, 2006 (1) JIC 887 (All.) also propounded the same principle and held that if some of the accused are acquitted in a trial separately held, the other accused is not entitled to the benefit of acquittal order and his case is to be decided separately on the basis of the evidence adduced during his trial. 13. The aforesaid decisions have settled the legal position that judgments of courts of justice may be relevant under any of the provisions of sections 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act and not otherwise. In other words, if any judgment, order or decree of a court does not fulfill requirements of any of the aforesaid sections, it has no relevancy and must be held to be irrelevant. It is also well settled that every trial has to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced in the trial itself, therefore, the previous judgment of acquittal rendered in a trial, if it is not relevant under any of sections 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act has no relevancy in the subsequent trial being held against co-accused and he can not be permitted to claim any advantage of such judgment, which is merely an opinion of the judge on the basis of the evidence led in the previous trial. The only relevancy of such judgment is to decide the question of applicability of bar to the subsequent trial under section 300 of the Code as section 40 of the Evidence Act makes the previous judgment relevant only for such purposes and not otherwise. In such matters, sections 41 to 44 of the Evidence Act also have no application. In this view of the matter the proceeding of the session trial being held against the petitioners can not be quashed on the basis of the judgment of acquittal rendered in favour of co-accused persons."- Allahabad High Court - Dated 1 9/09/2011.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Interiem Bail pending final disposal of Bail u/s 389 Cr.P.C. - "Otherwise also General Rules (Criminal), applicable to lower courts and High Court Rules, applicable to high court, both provide for giving of notice of the bail application to the public prosecutor and as a well ingrained practise hearing of public prosecutor in matter of consideration of bail applications has become the rule of law. Consequently the law relating to the procedure to be followed in matters of consideration of bail applications prior to conviction holds good for post-conviction bail applications also. In this respect a full bench of our court in Smt.Amarawati's case(Supra) has held that interim bail pending consideration of final bail is permissible. It has been held therein as under- "40. We again make it clear that the learned Sessions Judge in his discretion can hear and decide the bail application under Section 439 on the same day of its filing provided notice is given to the Public Prosecutor, or he may not choose to do so. This is entirely a matter in the discretion of the learned Sessions Judge. There may also be cases where the learned Sessions Judge on the material available before him may decide to grant interim bail as he may feel that while he has sufficient material for giving interim bail he required further material for grant of final bail. In such cases also he can in his discretion, grant interim bail and he can hear the bail application finally after a few days. All these are matters which should ordinarily be left to his discretion." The aforesaid opinion by this court got it's approval by the apex court inLal kamlendra Pratap Singh versus State of Uttar Pradesh And Others: (2009) SCC 437 wherein it has been held by the apex court as under:- "Learned counsel for the appellant apprehends that the appellant will be arrested as there is no provision for anticipatory bail in the State of U.P. He placed reliance on a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Amarawati v. State of U.P. in which a seven-Judge Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that the court, if it deems fit in the facts and circumstances of the case, may grant interim bail pending final disposal of the bail application. The Full Bench also observed that arrest is not a must whenever an FIR of a cognizable offence is lodged. The Full Bench placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P. We fully agree with the view of the High Court in Amarawati case and we direct that the said decision be followed by all courts in U.P. in letter and spirit, particularly since the provision for anticipatory bail does not exist in U.P. In appropriate cases interim bail should be granted pending disposal of the final bail application, since arrest and detention of a person can cause irreparable loss to a person's reputation, as held by this Court in Joginder Kumar Case. Also, arrest is not a must in all cases of cognizable offences, and in deciding whether to arrest or not the police officer must be guided and act according to the principles laid down in Joginder Kumar Case." Thus from the above discussion the law has been crystallised that pending consideration of final bail prayer an accused can be granted interim bail and hence the answer to the mooted question is that the proviso to section 389 of the Code does put an embargo nor does it curtails power of appellate court to grant interim bail. A Proviso cannot take away right conferred by parent provision and has to be read down to harmonise it with the parent section. On this aspect support can be had from apex court decision in Dadu alias Tulsidas(Supra) wherein Apex Court has observed as under:- "Providing a right of appeal but totally disarming the Court from granting interim relief in the form of suspension of sentence would be unjust, unfair and violative of Art. 21 of the Constitution particularly when no mechanism is provided for early disposal of the appeal. The pendency of criminal litigation and the experience in dealing with pending matters indicate no possibility of early hearing of the appeal and its disposal on merits at least in many High Courts. As the present is not the occasion to dilate on the causes for such delay, we restrain ourselves from that exercise. In this view of the matter, the appellate powers of the Court cannot be denuded by Executive or judicial process".- Allahabad High Court - Dated 14/09/2011.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Non Compliance of Section 8(c),42(1)(2),50,57 N.D.P.S.Act and 100,165,313 Cr.P.C.- Its effect - Fatal to Prosecution.
Case Laws Discussed:
1.State of Rajasthan versus Shanti: AIR 2010 SC 43
2.Sarju versus State of U.P. AIR 2009 SC 3214
3.Constitution Bench of this Court in Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana [2009 (10) SCALE 255]
4.Abdul Rashid Ibrahim Mansuri v. State of Gujarat
[(2000) 2 SCC 513]
5. Sajan Abraham v. State of Kerala [(2001) 6 SCC 692]
6.Dilip versus Sate of M.P. :AIR 2007 SC 369
7.State of Punjab vs. Balbir Singh [(1994) 3 SCC 299]
8.State of West Bengal Versus Babu Chakraborty : AIR 2004 SC 4324
9.State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh, (1994) 3 SCC 299
10.State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh (1999) 6 SCC 172,Constitution Bench
11.Union Of India Versus Shah Alam and others : AIR 2010 SC 1785
12.Dilip and Another v. State of M.P. (2007) 1 SCC 450 : (2006 AIR SCW 6246)
13.State of Punjab versus Hari Singh: AIR 2010 SC 1966
14.Avtar Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab (2002 (7) SCC 419)
15.Ganesh Gogoi versus State of Assam : AIR 2009 SC 2955
16.Basavaraj R. Patil and others v. State of Karnataka and others - (2000) 8 SCC 740
17.Ranvir Yadav versus State of Bihar: AIR 2009 SC (Suppl) 1439 - Allahabad High Court.
  Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note C.B.I.directed to investigate CMO`s Murders - Allahabad High Court - Dated 29/07/2011.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Dr. Sachan`s Murder Case - Investigation ordered to be conducted by C.B.I.- Lucknow Bench, Allahabad High Court-Dated 14/07/2011.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Notification No. (S.I.2942 [E]) Dated 18.11.2009 issued by the Government of India, providing that not only the weight of Heroin found on analysis but the entire substance is to be taken into account while deciding the quantity -

Held "This notification can not be applied retospectively and has no aplication in instant case"-
Bail Allowed.-Allahabad High Court - Dated 30/05/2011.
  Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note "Exhibits Ka 15 and 16 have been got proved and exhibited by the prosecution itself and therefore it can not now resile from it`s contents." - Documents produced by Prosecution binding on them - Alladabad High Court - Dated 25/05/2011.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Bail to Juvenile : "Merely by declaration of being a juvenile does not entitle a juvenile in conflict with law to be released on bail as a matter of right"-Section 12 analysed - Allahabad High Court - Dated 24.05.2011   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Directions to CBI to investigate any other offence-" The direction to CBI to investigate "any other offence" is wholly erroneous and cannot be sustained. Obviously, direction for investigation can be given only if an offence is, prima facie, found to have been committed or a person`s involvement is prima facie established, but a direction to CBI to investigate whether any person has committed an offence or not cannot be legally given. Such a direction would be contrary to the concept and philosophy of "LIFE" and "LIBERTY" guaranteed to a person under Article 21 of the Constitution. This direction is in complete negation of various decisions of this Court in which the concept of "LIFE" has been explained in a manner which has infused "LIFE" into the letters of Article 21"- Allahabad High Court- Dated 20/05/2011.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note False Case against Civil Judge J.D.,Nazibabad by U.P. Police in connivance with Administration - " We are constrained to observe that it is indeed a serious matter that even a judicial officer has not been spared and every effort has been made to browbeat him by the administration.":Allahabad High Court-Dated 17/05/2011.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Allahabad High Court directs Central and U.P.Govt.to amend sec. 354 I.P.C.triable by court of sessions and non-bailable:"Looking to the rampant and daily increasing prevalence of such crimes of sexual violence in the State of U.P., in Delhi and in other places we think that it is high time that the State of U.P. and even the Union of India should become sensitive to this grave issue, and consider imposing stringent laws for putting a check on such crimes of sexual violence against women and children. We therefore recommend that the State of U.P. and the Union of India consider amending the provisions of section 354 IPC and the First Schedule to the Code of Criminal Procedure by prescribing a higher sentence for the offence and for making it non-bailable and triable by a Court of Session. Copy of this order may be forwarded to the Law Commissions, of U.P and the Centre, and also to the Law( Secretary) U.P. and the Union of India within 15 days for appropriate action and recommendations." - Allahabad High Court - Dated 09/05/2011.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note If the trial of a juvenile offender has already commenced, the provisions of Section 20 of Juvenile Justice Act will have applicability.
Perusal of the record in the instant revision indicates that the trial was pending since last seven years. The trial is at the fag-end as the entire evidences of the prosecution and the accused have already been over. It is at this stage of the fag-end of the trial that the revisionist has prayed vide Paper No. 275 Kha to send his matter to the Juvenile Justice Board, which prayer has been refused by impugned order dated 8.2.2011.
It seems that only to delay the trial and lingering on the proceedings of a murder and an attempt to murder case, the said application was filed by the revisionist. When the evidences were being led and the accused were cross examining the witnesses, no grievance was raised by the revisionist for sending his matter to the Juvenile Justice Board. Much of the water has already been flown and it is too late in the day for the revisionist to rue that his matter has not been transferred to juvenile Justice Board. Opinion of the trial Judge as is recorded in the impugned order dated 8.2.2011, cannot be said to be arbitrary and illegal.
This revision being bereft of merits, is hereby dismissed:Allahabad High Court.Dated 30/03/2011.
  Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Transfer Petition -"The sessions trial is about to conclude. Most of the arguments have been heard by Mr. Ramashraya Singh, Additional Sessions Judge, therefore, at this juncture, transfer of the case would not only be improper but would also result in causing delay in the disposal of the case. It is true that the presiding officer has closed the arguments and required the accused to file written arguments but still it is open to the learned Additional Sessions Judge to permit the accused to make oral submissions also. It is expected that the learned Additional Sessions Judge will proceed accordingly if any request for oral submission is made from the accused persons or their counsel, whose arguments (oral submissions) have not been heard. ... For the reasons discussed above, the transfer application has no merit and is accordingly dismissed" : Allahabad High Court. ________________________________________   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Appeal against conviction under 307 IPC-Medical Report cooked up-Investigation not fair-313 Cr.PC not complied with-appeal allowed-conviction set aside.- Allahabad High Court.   Read Judgement

Court Delhi High Court
Head Note There was a time gap of about three hours between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were last seen together. Even otherwise the last seen evidence has to be connected with some other corroboration.
... PW14 had only seen the deceased along with the accused, merely this evidence was not sufficient to prove the circumstance of last seen.
18. Therefore, we discard the testimony of PW14 as we have found serious improbability in the version of the last seen evidence
It is settled law that in a case based on circumstantial evidence the prosecution has to prove all the incriminating circumstances beyond any shadow of reasonable doubt and the circumstances so proved should complete the chain of events linking the accused with commission of the crime. There should not be left any chinks in such a chain and no circumstance should be of such a nature which could lead to any inference of innocence of the accused. All circumstances so alleged and proved must show the involvement of the accused in the crime.
28. It is settled law that if the motive which is set out by the prosecution is not proved beyond shadow of reasonable doubt the other incriminating circumstantial evidence may lose its importance and it may lead the court to draw an inference that perhaps the appellant was not involved in this crime.
Accused given benefit of doubt and acquitted:Delhi High Court-MANMOHAN SINGH, J BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J
  Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Section 319 Criminal Procedure Code: No person can be added as accused under Section 319 Cr.P.C. after closer of the case:Allahabad High Court.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Cognizance of offence-Passing of the summoning order without obtaining relevant materials in support of the information,not proper. Summoning order quashed:Allahabad High Court.   Read Judgement

Court Chhattisgarh High Court
Head Note Hostile Witness- Binding on prosecution- CHATTISGARH HIGH COURT JUDGEMENT DATED-10 FEB 2011   Read Judgement

Court Delhi High Court
Head Note The distinction between the nature of burden that rests on an accused under Section 105, Evidence Act to establish a plea of self-defence and the one cast on the prosecution by Section 101 to prove its case is overlooked-The appellant has been able to establish a preponderance of probabilities in favour of the plea of private defence-The appeal is allowed. --DELHI HIGH COURT-JUDGEMENT DATED- 19.1.2011   Read Judgement

Court Delhi High Court
Head Note NO MOTIVE-RECOVERY NOT FREE DOUBTS-CHAIN OF CIRCUMSTANCE NOT COMPLETE-LAST SEEN DOUBTED-APPEAL ALLOWED- DELHI HIGH COURT-DATED 04.01.2011   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note 156(3)Cr.pc-Interlocutory Order-no criminal revision will lie against the orders passed by the Magistrate directing investigation under section 156(3) Cr.P.C- ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT-FULL BENCH-DATED 20 DEC 2010   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note FIR -Arrest of the petitioners stayed as a consequence of FIR - Allahabad High Court- Dated 10/12/2010   Read Judgement

Court Delhi High Court
Head Note FIR-to be displayed on Delhi Police website- ---Delhi High Court passes directions : (A) An accused is entitled to get a copy of the First Information Report at an earlier stage than as prescribed under Section 207 of the Cr.P.C. (B) An accused who has reasons to suspect that he has been roped in a criminal case and his name may be finding place in a First Information Report can submit an application through his representative / agent / parokar for grant of a certified copy before the concerned police officer or to the Superintendent of Police on payment of such fee which is payable for obtaining such a copy from the court. On such application being made, the copy shall be supplied within twenty-four hours. (C) Once the First Information Report is forwarded by the police station to the concerned Magistrate or any Special Judge, on an application being filed for certified copy on behalf of the accused, the same shall be given by the court concerned within two working days. The aforesaid direction has nothing to do with the statutory mandate inhered under Section 207 of the Cr.P.C. (D) The copies of the FIR, unless reasons recorded regard being had to the nature of the offence that the same is sensitive in nature, should be uploaded on the Delhi Police website within twenty-four hours of lodging of the FIR so that the accused or any person connected with the same can download the FIR and file appropriate application before the court as per law for redressal of his grievances. (E) The decision not to upload the copy of the FIR on the website of Delhi Police shall not be taken by an officer below the rank of Deputy Commissioner of Police and that too by way of a speaking order. A decision so taken by the Deputy Commissioner of Police shall also be duly communicated to the Area magistrate. (F) The word =sensitive‘ apart from the other aspects which may be thought of being sensitive by the competent authority as stated hereinbefore would also include concept of privacy regard being had to the nature of the FIR. (G) In case a copy of the FIR is not provided on the ground of sensitive nature of the case, a person grieved by the said action, after disclosing his identity, can submit a representation with the Commissioner of Police who shall constitute a committee of three high officers and the committee shall deal with the said grievance within three days from the date of receipt of the representation and communicate it to the grieved person. (H) The Commissioner of Police shall constitute the committee within eight weeks from today. (I) In cases wherein decisions have been taken not to give copies of the FIR regard being had to the sensitive nature of the case, it will be open to the accused / his authorized representative / parokar to file an application for grant of certified copy before the court to which the FIR has been sent and the same shall be provided in quite promptitude by the concerned court not beyond three days of the submission of the application. (J) The directions for uploading the FIR on the website of the Delhi Police shall be given effect from 1st February, 2011   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note First Information Report- Sec 306/504/120B IPC- FIR-Arrest of the petitioners stayed as a consequence of FIR-Order-Allahabad High Court, Dated-29-11-2010   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note A word used at different place in the Act or Rule may have different meaning according to its context--ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT-- Order Dated - 26/10/2010 at Allahabad.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad, Lucknow Bench -Justice S U Khan, Justice Sudhir Agarwal,Justice D V Sharma .J,J,J
Head Note AYODHYA RAM JANM BHOOMI-BABRI MASZID TITLE CASE--held--Ram Lala Idol not to be removed- Sunni Wakf Board suit dismissed.-- 1. Whether the disputed site is the birth place of Bhagwan Ram? The disputed site is the birth place of Lord Ram. Place of birth is a juristic person and is a deity. It is personified as the spirit of divine worshipped as birth place of Lord Rama as a child. Spirit of divine ever remains present every where at all times for any one to invoke at any shape or form in accordance with his own aspirations and it can be shapeless and formless also. 2. Whether the disputed building was a mosque? When was it built? By whom? The disputed building was constructed by Babar, the year is not certain but it was built against the tenets of Islam. Thus, it cannot have the character of a mosque. 3. Whether the mosque was built after demolishing a Hindu temple? The disputed structure was constructed on the site of old structure after demolition of the same. The Archaeological Survey of India has proved that the structure was a massive Hindu religious structure. 4. Whether the idols were placed in the building on the night of December 22/23rd, 1949? The idols were placed in the middle dome of the disputed structure in the intervening night of 22/23.12.1949. 2 5. Whether any of the claims for title is time barred? O.O.S. No. 4 of 1989, the Sunni Central Board of Waqfs U.P., Lucknow and others Vs. Gopal Singh Visharad and others and O.O.S. No.3 of 1989, Nirmohi Akhara and Another Vs. Sri Jamuna Prasad Singh and others are barred by time. 6. What will be the status of the disputed site e.g. inner and outer courtyard? It is established that the property in suit is the site of Janm Bhumi of Ram Chandra Ji and Hindus in general had the right to worship Charan, Sita Rasoi, other idols and other object of worship existed upon the property in suit. It is also established that Hindus have been worshipping the place in dispute as Janm Sthan i.e. a birth place as deity and visiting it as a sacred place of pilgrimage as of right since time immemorial. After the construction of the disputed structure it is proved the deities were installed inside the disputed structure on 22/23.12.1949. It is also proved that the outer courtyard was in exclusive possession of Hindus and they were worshipping throughout and in the inner courtyard (in the disputed structure) they were also worshipping. It is also established that the disputed structure cannot be treated as a mosque as it came into existence against the tenets of Islam.......Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench   Read Judgement

Court Punjab and Haryana High Court
Head Note BAIL ALLOWED-Appeal is not likely to be heard in near future- PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT-DATED 23rd SEPTEMBER 2010   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note No opportunity is required to be given if selection is made on the basis of a forged marksheet--ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT--Judgment/Order Dated - 25/8/2010 at Allahabad.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Witness Protection : Witness protection programme is an important aspect of criminal justice system: without it, no reforms are possible. If witnesses are afraid to come forward then irrespective of any measures justice cannot be administered. This case is a pointer - Allahabad High Court.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note There was no pre-meditation or pre-plan on the part of the appellant to cause death of the deceased, and the occurrence had taken place when the deceased, with another had entered the field of the appellant and engaged himself in an altercation with the appellant when the appellant had refused to part with bitterguard. Having regard to the attending circumstances in which the incident had taken place, this Court is of the opinion that the interest of justice would be served if the appellant is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for five years for commission of offence punishable under Section 304, Part II, IPC."   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Dying declaration before police is admissible u/s 162 (2) CrPC.--ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT--Judgment/Order - Judgment/Order Dated - 16/4/2010 at Allahabad.   Read Judgement

Court Delhi High Court
Head Note Intention to Cause Death : He who inflicts 13 stab wounds on the vital part of the body of a human being using a dagger having a blade of 21 cms length would certainly be attributed with the intention to cause the death of the victim : Delhi High Court.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Circumstantial Evidence - Recovery of body and cycle of deceased from the appellant-witnesses reliable-Conviction Maintained : Allahabad High Court.   Read Judgement

Court Delhi High Court
Head Note Period of Limitation : The period of limitation would start only from the date when ultimately, it was held by the competent Court that the criminal prosecution was a false prosecution. It is well-know maxim of law that an appeal/ revision is continuity of the criminal trial and criminal trial finally comes to an end when the last Court i.e. the Supreme Court, give its verdict: Delhi High Court.   Read Judgement

Court Delhi High Court
Head Note Culpable Homicide not amounting to Murder : Accused causing death by his lisence weapon in marriage ceremony-convicted u/s 304II IPC for imprisionment of eight months already undergone and pay 3.5 lacs to dependant-2005 (116) DLT 634 Nehru Jain Vs. State NCT of Delhi Followed : Delhi High Court.   Read Judgement

Court Delhi High Court
Head Note Anticipatory Bail : Anticipatory Bail can not be denied merely on the ground that charge-sheet has been filed or the court has taken the cognizance- bail allowed- Supreme Court Followed : Delhi High Court- 26/02/2010.   Read Judgement

Court Delhi High Court
Head Note Circumstantial Evidence : : Delhi High Court.   Read Judgement

Court Calcutta High Court
Head Note Delay in lodging FIR in Rape case : i) When there was considerable delay and the delay was not properly explained benefit must go to the defence. ii) A rape victim may think seriously before lodging complaint to the police as the onslaught of a social stigma may haunt her for life. Hence, delay might be possible in the case of a like nature. iii) If the complainant was victim and was injured in the incident delay in lodging the complaint would not be fatal : Calcutta High Court.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Case of circumstantial evidence : Whether the circumstances against the appellant are established and lead only to his guilt or not- all circumstances must be proved : Allahabad High Court.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Cancellation of Bail : In Mubarak Dawood Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra: 2004 (2) SCC 362, State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi:2005 (8) SCC 21, and Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan: 2004(7) SCC 528 it was observed that even when there is a prima facie apprehension of the likelihood of an attempt to derail the course of justice by tampering with the witnesses, the Court would be fully justified in cancelling the bail. Here as we have seen the eye witness, had actually turned hostile, and it was not only a case of an apprehension that an attempt would be made to tamper with the witnesses.Followed: Allahabad High Court.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Out of 17 general posts, 12 posts have been filled-up from the candidates belonging to the reserved category-on merit:Allahabad High Court.   Read Judgement

Court Punjab and Haryana High Court
Head Note ANTICIPATORY BAIL-Section 438 CR.P.C-Inconsistency in medical report-Bail Allowed- PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT-DATED-2OTH NOV 2009   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Recovery Of Heroine:The recovery was made from the basement of building belonging to Mohd.Mobin Khan. It is also very strange that why would the applicant plant the recovered heroine and then would make a cool statement before officials that he himself had planted the heroinea:Allahabad High Court-Bail Granted   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Recovery of 20 Kg. Charas- Bail Refused-Dilip and another Vs. State of M.P. (2007) 1 Supreme Court Cases 450 , Ritesh Chakarvarti Vs. State of M.P. reported in (2006) 12 Supreme Court Cases 321,State of H.P. v. Pawan Kumar (2005) 4 SCC 350: 2005 (1) EFR 2008 Discussed : Allahabad High Court   Read Judgement

Court Bombay High Court
Head Note For the purposes of deduction under Chapter VIA, the gross total income has to be computed inter alia by deducting the deductions allowable under section 30 to 43D of the Act, including depreciation allowable under section 32 of the Act, even though the assessee has computed the total income under Chapter IV by disclaiming the current depreciation : Bombay High Court   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note chargesheet for the offence under section 3(1)(X) SC/ST Act submitted by the Circle Officer concerned on the basis of the investigation carried out by the Sub-Inspector not valid   Read Judgement

Court Delhi High Court
Head Note The proximity of place of last seen vis-à-vis the place of murder having snapped in the instant case, we are of the opinion that in the facts of this case, it would be unsafe to conclude against the guilt of the appellant on the solitary circumstance of his seen in the company of the deceased in the house of the father of the deceased which house is at a distance of about 2 km from the place where the deceased: Delhi High Court   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Application of judicial mind:Judicial Magistrate II, Court No. 14 Saharanpur, has passed the impugned order ignoring all judicial discipline. She has not at all applied her judicial mind and had only referred some of the judgements of this court, which are contrary to the opinion of the apex court, rendered in many decisions. Judicial order should be passed by applying judicial mind. By this judgement, I severely criticise the conduct of Judicial Magistrate, II, Saharanpur and record my serious displeasure against her order for passing such type of illegal orders. Judicial Magistrate II Court No. 14, Saharanpur is warned for future and is cautioned to be careful in passing judicial orders. She should have thought of that rape not only causes physical injury to the victim, but it leave scare on mind for life long and implant the victim with such ignominy, which is worst than her death and I say no more. Though, I was inclined to refer this matter to Administrative Committee for taking action against Judicial Magistrate II, Court No. 14 Saharanpur, but only for the reason that she is a young officer and have long career ahead, I refrain from such a stringent action:Allahabad High Court   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note On granting bail by one judge to any accused, another judge is not under obligation to grant bail to similarly placed accused on the basis of parity :Allahabad High Court   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Murder-single blow-intention to murder absent-partly allowed-convicted u/s 304 part 1-sentence of 7 years R.I. implanted: Allahabad High Court   Read Judgement

Court Punjab and Haryana High Court
Head Note Pre-arrest bail prayer refused:Punjab & Haryana High Court   Read Judgement

Court Delhi High Court
Head Note Limitation- Complaint barred by-calculation of mandatory 15 days period for notice under Negotiable Instrument Act: Delhi High Court   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note 302 IPC- FIR anti-timed-informant presence doubtful-investigation tainted-conviction set aside 302 IPC:Allahabad High Court   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note 304-B-Sentence of life imprisionment-Cause of death not known-Sentence reduced to 10 years R.I. and fine of Rs. 2,00,000/-: Allahabad High Court   Read Judgement

Court Punjab and Haryana High Court
Head Note Anticipatory Bail of Unit Manager of ICICI Company Deepak Kapila rejected : Punjab & Haryana High Court   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Transfer Matters:In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Mrs. Shilpi Bose v. State of Bihar and others [AIR 1991 SC 531], Article 226 of the Constitution of India not to be invoked:Allahabad High Court   Read Judgement

Court Delhi High Court
Head Note The degree of proof required in departmental enquiries is that of a preponderance of probabilities and not proof beyond a reasonable doubt, is now well settled through a series of decisions by Apex Court: Delhi High Court.   Read Judgement

Court Punjab and Haryana High Court
Head Note Protection of life and liberty-petitioners are major and have married against the wishes of their parents.Proof of age and marriage certificated produced. Directions to SSP to look representation and take action: Punjab & Haryana High Court.   Read Judgement

Court Punjab and Haryana High Court
Head Note Apprehending - arrest and also harassment by the police and family members of petitioner- both major and married-Directions to SSP for proctection of life and liberty: Punjab & Haryana High Court   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Adult woman entitle to live independely and not to be detained in Nari Niketan because matter communally sensitive or parents unwilling to take her: Allahabad High Court [D.B.]   Read Judgement

Court Bombay High Court
Head Note The exercise of monitoring the investigation and the power vested in the High Court to issue a writ of continuing mandamus would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where the investigation is so very unjust and unfair and is in unlawful exercise of statutory discretion, the court could interfere and monitor the investigation even after a report under section 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 has been filed before the Court of competent jurisdiction: Bombay High Court   Read Judgement

Court Punjab and Haryana High Court
Head Note All the prosecution witnesses have been examined U/S 498-A,406,304-B,34 IPC, no ground for grant of bail made out.Bail refused:Punjab & Haryana High Court.   Read Judgement

Court Bombay High Court
Head Note Dowery Death:The antemortem injuries establish that soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty. There was a demand for Rs.40,000/- which the deceased’s father could not fulfill. Circumstances establish that the harassment was in connection with dowry demand. Presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act must, therefore, arise. The appellant’s failure to explain how the deceased received ante-mortem injuries provide an important link in the chain of circumstances. Conviction affirmed: Bombay High Court.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Recovery could not be initiated against the petitioner under the statutory provisions of assessment on the ground of theft of electricity, until petitioner s objection is decided, as per Cl.8.1 Electricity Supply Code ,2005 : ALL.H.C.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Only after the declaration of the result the petitioner has now started claiming that her candidature should be treated as Scheduled Caste candidates. This change cannot be permitted at such a belated stage.Petition dismissed: All. H.C.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Small or commercial quantity of Narcotic Drug is to be determined on the basis of actual contents in such drug - percentage of heroin in the recovered contraband was found 31.25%, meaning thereby that actual weight of heroin in the recovered contraband comes 93.75 gm, which is below commercial quantity as per entry 56 of Notification dated 19.10.2001 issued by Central Government -Bail granted: All. H.C.   Read Judgement

Court Delhi High Court
Head Note Section 377 IPC, insofar it criminalises consensual sexual acts of adults in private, is violative of Articles 21, 14 and 15 of the Constitution The provisions of Section 377 IPC will continue to govern non-consensual penile non-vaginal sex ....Delhi High Court   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Second bail application on the same grounds is not maintainable : Allahabad High Court.-• Satya Pal Vs. State of U.P. 1998(37) ACC 287, Gama and another v. State of U.P. 1986 (23) ACC 339, • State of Maharashtra Vs. Buddhikota Subha Rao 1989(26) ACC 503(SC), • Babu Singh Vs. State of U.P. 1978 Cr. L. J. 651 (SC), • Shahzad Hasan Khan V. Ishtiaq Hasan Khan 1987(24) ACC 425(SC) , • Kalyan Chandra Sarkar etc. Vs. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav and another 2005(51) ACC 727 (SC). , • Pramod Kumar Saxena vs. Union of India and others 2008 (63) ACC 115[SC]- Discussed.   Read Judgement

Court Bombay High Court
Head Note State Government shall immediately take steps to train its all Executive Magistrates so that they understand as to how the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Criminal Procedure Code have to be applied : Bombay HIgh Court   Read Judgement

Court Punjab and Haryana High Court
Head Note In Petition to protect the life and liberty of the petitioners Superintendent of Police, Yamuna Nagar ordered to take an appropriate action on the petition: Punjab & Haryana High Court   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Whether the principle of parity can be the sole ground for granting Bail ? No :Allahabad High Court   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Revision against summoning order maintainable and not barred under sub section (2) of section 397 Cr.P.C.;Hon. Vijay Kumar Verma,J.: Allahabad High Court   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Long incaricuration in jail during trail is not perse illegal and would not be voilative of article 21 of constitution of India.   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Notice to the prospective accused is not required to be issued prior to passing the order under section 319 Cr.P.C.:Allahabad High Court   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Merely ownership of the weapon did not makes out a case under Section 307 IPC and in any event Section 27 has no application.   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Jail Detention during trial not perse illegal and not be violative of article 21 of Constitution...: ALL. H.C. Pramod Kumar Saxena vs. Union of India and others 2008 (6 ACC 115, in which the Hon. Apex Court has held that mere long period of incarceration in jail would not be per-se illegal-Followed   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Jail Detention during trial not perse illegal and not be violative of article 21 of Constitution...: ALL. H.C. Pramod Kumar Saxena vs. Union of India and others 2008 (6 ACC 115, in which the Hon. Apex Court has held that mere long period of incarceration in jail would not be per-se illegal-Followed   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Transfer Aplication- Supereme Court transfered the case to faimily court Banglore, where husband and wife last resided-Divorce petiton.   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Death sentence in case of rape and murder of 10 years girl reduced to life inprisionment, case does not fall rare of rarest. Bachan Singh case followed.: SUPEREME COURT   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Evidence did not attribute any overt act to the appellant. The mere fact that he was in the company of the accused who were armed would not be sufficient to attract aplicability of section 34 IPC, accused acquitted : supreme court   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note The mere fact that one of the members of the Board or the District Magistrate or the Superintendent of Police or the Panchayat has recommended release of the convict from jail, is by itself of no consequence. The recommendation is of the Board and not........:SUPREME COURT   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note SUB-BROKER CARRYING BUISNESS WITHOUT SEBI REGISTRATION EFFECT:POWERS OF TRIBUNAL IMPOSITION OF PENALTY -SCOPE OF: SUPREME COURT   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Finding of trial judge regarding time of incident on the basis of stomach contents of deceased rejected,and high court view approved, conviction maintained: SUPREME COURT   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Section 302 read with 149 IPC:The role attributed was throwing bricks towards house of Aurangjeb, death was caused by gun shot,although accused did not caused fatal blow to deceased,but conviction maintained with help of 149 IPC.As,the acquitted accused were not mere onlookers, but they were members of unlawful assembly and they also had taken active part in the incident by throwing bricks thereby causing injuries to the injured Aurangzeb and Smt. Akbari.   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Absence of direct evidence of complicity of accused-319 cr.p.c. not be invoked.   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note An apprentice is not an employee : Supereme Court   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Vicarious Liability u/s 34 IPC -Bail can not be refused :Allahabad High Court,Hon. Shiv Charan,J. Hon. Vijay Kumar Verma,J.   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Banks Recovery of loans or seizure of vehicles can only be done through legal means- Banks not to resort to use of muscle power for recovery of loans and persistently bothering borrower at odd hours   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Dyeing recorded by SHO in presence of doctor of hospital accepted by Supreme Court to base conviction- rules regarding recording of dyeing declaration by magistrate held merely procedural.   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Division Bench referance answered in Neera Yadev case.----Section 19 Prevention of Corruption Act and 197 Criminal Procedure Code,120-B IPC   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Delay in FIR, Lack of names of witnesses at first instance, Statement to CRPF withheld by prosecution- all these stereo type arguments discarded, in the circumstances of the case.   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note In appropriate cases, interim bail may be granted by subordinate courts pending disposal of bail applications.   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Aggressor has no right of private defence. Active participation is not essential FOR applicability of section 149 IPC.   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Mentioning the names of accused and witensses is not the requirement of law. In case of direct evidence, absence of motive looses significance.   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Section 3(2)(v) SC/ST not be attracted in cases where the offence committed under IPC is punishable less than ten years imprisonment.   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Interest is payable even if possession is taken prior to notification u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition Act.   Read Judgement

Court Bombay High Court
Head Note Law laid down in Anant Vasantlal Sambre and Manohar Martandrao Kulkarni’s cases no more a good law to that extent.It is not a requirement under section 3 of the Atrocities Act that the complainant should disclose the caste of the accused in the complaint: Bombay High Court-Full Bench   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Medical evidence inconsistent to oral eye witness account,Held"conviction u/s 302 IPC can not be maintained and altered to 326 IPC   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note ALL. H.C.: Existence of an arbitration agreement is a sine quo non for invoking the jurisdiction of the court u/s 9 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note S.C.:Question of law not framed by high court, so case remmitted back.   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note Separate conviction and sentence under section 3(2)(5) SC/ST Act simplicitor is illegal--Allahabad High Court   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note All.H.C.;Magistrate having no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence can not pass the order for investigation under section 156(3) Cr.P.C.   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note All. H.C.:The Magistrate can pass order for further investigation on the final report.   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note All.H,C.:Carrying the cow, bull or bullock within the State for slaughtering is no offence under Cow Slaughter Act   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note All. H.C.:Second or subsequent bail application can be considered on new ground or change of law.   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note All.H.C.:Participation of all the accused in criminal act by doing some overt act is not necessary to attract Section 34 of I.P.C.   Read Judgement

Court
Head Note All.H.C.:There is no parity in rejection of bail.   Read Judgement

Court Punjab and Haryana High Court
Head Note Murder Reference No.1 of 2007 accepted and confirmed the death sentence awarded by the trial Court. Resultantly, Crl.Appeal No.105-DB of 2007 (Vikram Singh @ Vicky Walia and others versus State of Punjab) dismissed:Punjab & Haryana High Court   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Held"(1) The respondents shall not consider the applications submitted in pursuance of the advertisement dated 22nd October, 2003 (Annexure-2) for the time being and keep the process of appointment in abeyance so far as the petitioners are concerned;
(2) Applications of the petitioners for renewal shall be considered first, as required under Para 7.08 of the L.R. Manual and to be disposed of by a speaking and reasoned order;
(3) While considering the applications for renewal, the findings of fact shall be recorded by the authority concerned as to whether initial appointment of the petitioners had been made in accordance with law and in case, answer is negative, the applications for renewal shall be rejected forthwith.
(4) In case, the applications of the petitioners or any of them is rejected and renewal is not made, the said vacancies shall be filled up by the respondents in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Paras 7.03 and 7.06 of the L.R. Manual.
(5) The process shall be completed expeditiously, preferably within a period of 8 weeks from today" : Allahabad High Court. Dated 14/11/2003.
  Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court
Head Note Held,"In State of U.P. v. U.P. State Law Officers Association (supra), it was observed by the Supreme Court that the Government or a public body represent public interests, and hence, there is an obligation on them to engage the most competent lawyers.
Time, has, therefore, come when this practice must stop so that highly competent lawyers of integrity and sound knowledge of law are appointed as Government Counsels and for this purpose we recommend to the State Government to consult Hon'ble the Chief Justice of the High Court and suitably amend the L.R. Manual accordingly. Till that is done, ordinarily the recommendation of the District Judge, in the matter of appointment/renewal of the Government Counsels in the District Court in the State must ordinarily be accepted.": Allahabad High Court (DB)-Dated 1
  Read Judgement

Court Gujarat High Court
Head Note SECTION 18-EVIDENCE ACT- EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF SUGGESTION PUT IN CROSS EXAMINATION TO PROSECUTION WITNESS BY DEFENCE COUNSEL- NOT AN EVIDENCE--GUJARAT HIGH COURT   Read Judgement

Court CAT
Head Note Candidate is Called for Interview but not Selected.   Read Judgement

Court CAT
Head Note the applicant claiming that she was not called for interview despite possessing the qualifications prescribed in the advertisement published by the Commission and that the Commission can not shortlist the candidates on the basis of higher qualification and experience than those prescribed.   Read Judgement

Court Allahabad High Court - Vinod Prasad J.
Head Note Sentence and Compensation : Looking to the activity indulged into by the petitioner, it cannot be said that he does not deserve incarceration. How ever sentence has to be commensurate with the guilt of the accused. Judging from that angle it is detected that the illegal activity was carried out by the revisionist for a period of eighteen days. The maximum sentence, which has been provided under the Statute for offence under Section 294 IPC can extend to three months of imprisonment or with fine or with both. Looking to the entire facts and circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that the substantive sentence of the petitioner for two months R.I. is excessive and should be reduced and instead he should be implanted with heavy fine of Rs.30,000/- out of which compensation should be awarded to the the children for the agony suffered by them:Allahabad High Court - Dated 01/04/2011.   Read Judgement